Pathological completion: The blind leading the mind? by Walker, R & JB., Mattingley
1. Introduction
Figure 1 illustrates the so-called neon color illusion: a red
diamond is seen where there is only a lattice of red line seg-
ments. The term neon color spreading (van Tuijl 1975) is of-
ten used to describe this phenomenon: the figure seems to
result from the color having spread between the line seg-
ments into the background. The color is said to “fill in” the
background, thereby forming the figure. Nevertheless, one
does not see any spreading or filling-in process; one sees
only the figure. What line of reasoning, then, lies behind the
description of such figures in the terminology of “filling-
in”?
Visual scientists use the terms filling-in and perceptual
completion to refer to situations in which subjects report
that something is present in a particular region of visual
space when it is actually absent from that region, but pres-
ent in the surrounding area. The idea is easiest to under-
stand in the case of the blind spot. We have a blind spot in
each eye corresponding to the region where the optic nerve
leaves the retina and there are no photoreceptors (Fig. 2).
In everyday perception we are never aware of the blind
spot. The blind spots of the two eyes do not overlap, and
stimulus that falls on the blind spot of one retina will fall
outside the blind spot of the other retina. Even under
monocular viewing the blind spot is not easily revealed.
Close one eye and fixate on a point on a uniformly colored
piece of paper: there is no experience of any gap or discon-
tinuity in the visual field. Now follow the instructions for
the blind spot demonstration in Figure 3. The left dot dis-
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appears and one perceives a uniform expanse of brightness
and color. This is an example of perceptual completion or
visual filling-in: the color and brightness surrounding the
area corresponding to the blind spot are said to “fill in” that
area so that a uniform expanse is perceived.
The existence of such perceptual completion phenom-
ena at the subject level is uncontroversial. However, the
term filling-in is often used in a controversial sense that
goes beyond what subjects report. In this controversial
sense, the term filling-in suggests that certain kinds of sub-
ject-level perceptual completion phenomena are accom-
plished by the brain providing information to make up for
an absence – by the brain actively filling in the missing in-
formation. However, whether there is neural filling-in is a
matter of great debate in visual science. We will argue later
that there is considerable evidence for neural filling-in, but
that great care needs to be taken in thinking about the re-
lation between neural filling-in and subject-level percep-
tual completion.
To appreciate the debates about filling-in it is necessary
first to review certain facts about vision and second to dis-
cuss certain conceptual and methodological points. Many
of the objects we perceive have roughly uniform regions of
surface color and lightness. Now consider two facts. First,
cells in the visual cortex in general do not respond to uni-
form regions, but rather to discontinuities (Hubel & Wiesel
1962; 1968). In other words, many neurons respond more
strongly to boundaries than to regions or surfaces. Second,
psychophysical experiments (e.g., with stabilized images)
have shown the importance of boundaries for proper sur-
face perception (Krauskopf 1963; Yarbus 1967). In the clas-
sic study by Krauskopf (1963), an inner green disc was sur-
rounded by a red annulus (Fig. 4). When the red-green
boundary was stabilized on the retina (so that it always
maintained a fixed position on the eye), subjects reported
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Figure 1. Neon color illusion. When the segments in the dia-
mond are red and the matrix is black (left), the entire diamond ap-
pears reddish even though only the segments are physically col-
ored red (right).
Figure 2. The blind spot. (A) Vertebrate lens and retina. The
blind spot corresponds to the area where the optic nerve leaves
the retina and there are no photoreceptors (Sheperd 1994; used
by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.). (B) Distribution
of photoreceptors over the extent of the retina of the right eye.
Note the complete absence of photoreceptors in the blind spot re-
gion (Sekuler & Blake 1985, p. 56; used by permission of the 
McGraw-Hill Companies).
that the central disk disappeared and the whole target –
disk and annulus – appeared red. (This is another case of
visual filling-in: Krauskopf ’s observers perceived the cen-
tral area as having the red of the surrounding area even
though “green” light was striking the corresponding region
of the retina.) These and other results (e.g., Land 1977) sug-
gest that even under natural viewing conditions the per-
ceived color of a surface depends not only on the light re-
flected from the surface but on the change in light across
the boundary of the surface.
If boundaries – in fact, transients – are so important, how
is the brain able to determine the color and lightness of con-
tinuous regions? Is there an active filling-in process at the
neural level? Some visual scientists have developed theo-
ries and models based on the idea of a neural filling-in
process that involves activity spreading, diffusion, or other
forms of neural completion. Others have argued against this
idea, suggesting, for example, that contrast measures at bor-
ders can be used to assign values of surface featural quali-
ties, such as brightness or color. We will argue later that in
the case of brightness perception there is good evidence for
neural filling-in that involves spatially propagating activity.
However, the filling-in controversy is not only empirical,
because it involves fundamental conceptual and method-
ologic issues. To appreciate these issues it is necessary to in-
troduce the concepts of the bridge locus and neural–per-
ceptual isomorphism. The best way to introduce these
concepts is by way of an example. Figure 5 presents another
case often discussed in connection with filling-in, the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet effect (Cornsweet 1970; Craik 1940;
O’Brien 1958). Two largely uniform regions of different
brightness are seen, although most of the corresponding
stimulus regions have exactly the same luminance. In fact,
the two regions differ only in the luminance distribution at
the “cusp” edge separating the two regions. Why, then, do
we see a brightness step?
Here is one route leading to an answer to this question
that appeals to neural filling-in (Todorovic´ 1987). Suppose
one assumes that activity of a particular type in a specific set
of neurons is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of
the Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet effect. These neurons would
form the “immediate substrate” for the perceptual effect.
Visual scientists use the term bridge locus to refer to this
idea of a particular set of neurons “whose activities form the
immediate substrate of visual perception” (Teller & Pugh
1983, p. 581). Now suppose one also assumes that there
must be a one-to-one correspondence between the per-
ceived spatial distribution of brightness in the effect and the
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Figure 3. Blind spot demonstration. Close your right eye while
fixating at the cross. Adjust the distance of the page in front of you
until the left dot disappears (start at a distance of approximately 8
inches). A similar procedure should be used with the left eye
closed.
Figure 4. Fading of stabilized images. (Left) The boundary be-
tween a red ring (dark gray) and a green disk (light gray) is stabi-
lized on the retina (bottom). (Right) After stabilization a large red
disk is seen (bottom). This situation should be contrasted to the
case where no stabilization occurs (top).
Figure 5. Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet display. The luminance of
the two rectangles is identical, except in the vicinity of the com-
mon border, in which there is a luminance cusp. For appropriate
display conditions, the left and right regions appear to have uni-
form color and the left appears uniformly brighter than the right.
Above the figure we show a one-dimensional cross section of the
luminance distribution of the figure below.
neural activity at the bridge locus. In other words, just as
the perceptual content consists of two uniform regions with
a brightness step, so too the immediate neural substrate
must consist of spatially continuous activity and a step dif-
ference. In short, suppose one assumes that there must be
an isomorphism between the perceived brightness distrib-
ution and the neural activity at the bridge locus (Todorovic´
1987). One would then arrive at the following sort of expla-
nation of the effect: the brain takes the local edge informa-
tion and uses it to fill in the two adjacent regions so that the
region with the luminance peak (left) becomes brighter
than the region with the luminance trough (right). The end
result is the perception of a brightness step in the absence
of any corresponding luminance step.
Two basic ideas are involved here. The first is that the
way things seem to the subject must be represented neu-
rally in the subject’s brain. The second is the idea that, in
analyzing visual perception, one must arrive at a “final
stage” in the brain – a bridge locus – where there is an iso-
morphism between neural activity and how things are per-
ceived by the subject. (The isomorphism can arise at some
earlier stage of visual processing, as long as it is preserved
up to the bridge locus; see Teller 1984, p. 1242; Teller &
Pugh 1983, p. 586; Todorovic´ 1987, p. 550.) We will refer to
this idea as analytic isomorphism. When applied to per-
ceptual completion phenomena, such as the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet effect, analytic isomorphism entails
that there must be neural filling-in to make up the differ-
ence between how things are and how they are perceived
by the subject.
Analytic isomorphism is essentially a conceptual or
methodologic doctrine about the proper form of explana-
tion in cognitive neuroscience. The doctrine is that it is a
condition on the adequacy of an explanation that there be
a bridge locus where an isomorphism obtains between
neural activity and the subject’s experience. Furthermore,
the isomorphism typically is assumed to hold for spatial or
topographic properties, thus suggesting that vision involves
representations having the form of an “internal screen” or
“scale model” that preserves the metric properties of the ex-
ternal world (O’Regan 1992). In this target article, we ar-
gue that analytic isomorphism should be rejected. Never-
theless, we believe that the empirical case for neural
filling-in remains strong.
Enter the philosophers. Dennett (1991; 1992) has tried
to brand “filling-in” the “F-word” of cognitive science. He
thinks that the sort of reasoning epitomized by analytic iso-
morphism, and hence the idea that there must be neural
filling-in, depend on a fundamentally mistaken conception
of consciousness. Dennett calls this conception Cartesian
materialism. In the stereotypical version of Cartesian ma-
terialism, there is a place in the brain – a “Cartesian the-
ater” – in which contents become conscious as a result of
being presented to an inner “audience” or homunculus – a
viewer of the panoramic “internal screen” (O’Regan 1992).
Most scientists agree that this idea is totally wrong. Never-
theless, Dennett thinks that not everyone understands ex-
actly why it is wrong. In Dennett’s assessment, the real mis-
take is a conceptual one: the mistake is to assume that
consciousness is a property of individual contents in the way
that truth can be considered a property of individual sen-
tences. Given this concept of consciousness, it would seem
that there must be a determinate spatio-temporal point in
the brain where a content “enters consciousness.” Dennett
thinks that this concept of consciousness is incoherent and
offers in its place the idea that “consciousness is a species
of mental fame” (Dennett 1996b). Just as it is impossible to
be famous for a second, or to become famous in a second,
or to be famous when there are no other people around, so
it is impossible for a single, momentary, isolated content to
become conscious: for a content to become conscious it has
to persist long enough to achieve certain effects on mem-
ory and the control of behavior. In short, for Dennett, con-
sciousness is constituted through the joint interaction of
spatially and temporally distributed information-processing
systems.
Dennett argues that to claim there is neural filling-in “is
a dead giveaway of vestigial Cartesian materialism” (1991,
p. 344). Like a number of visual scientists, he believes there
is no reason to suppose that the brain fills in the regions; the
brain simply represents the fact that regions are filled-in
without itself doing any filling in. For Dennett, perceptual
completion is a case of the brain “finding out” or “judging”
that certain features are present, without the brain having
to “present” or fill in those features.
In visual science, O’Regan (1992) has outlined a similar
position. He suggests that the need to appeal to neural 
filling-in would “evaporate if we abandon the idea that ‘see-
ing’ involves passively contemplating an internal represen-
tation of the world that has metric properties like a photo-
graph or scale model” (1992, p. 483). Instead, he argues that
“seeing constitutes an active process of probing the exter-
nal environment as though it were a continuously available
external memory” (p. 484). Seeing depends not on the 
filling-in of a metric representation, but rather on “interro-
gating” the external environment directly through eye
movements, and then integrating the altered retinal sensa-
tions into one’s cognitive framework (p. 475).
In the past few years, the amount of literature on filling-
in among psychologists, neuroscientists, theoretical model-
ers, and philosophers has increased. However, the term 
filling-in continues to be used in different ways. Sometimes
it is used to describe what the subject perceives; sometimes
it is used to refer to what the brain does. The term is also
used to describe different sorts of perceptual completion.
For example, although illusory contours and brightness
perception probably involve different processes, the con-
cept of filling-in is often used in association with both: a line
segment is said to fill in between the inducers, and bright-
ness is said to fill in across regions. Although one need not
argue which usage is preferable, it should be obvious that
without conceptual and terminological clarification there is
room for considerable confusion. For example, do these
two types of completion involve common principles and
mechanisms? Or are they distinct? Given this situation, it
can be hardly surprising that in the more theoretical de-
bates the participants often seem to be talking past one an-
other.2
In this target article we provide a taxonomy of perceptual
completion phenomena with an overview of some recent
psychophysical results pertinent to filling-in. The taxonomy
is meant as a step toward conceptual and terminological
clarification. We would like to emphasize at the outset that
our taxonomy is based on salient examples of perceptual
completion; it is in no way an exhaustive survey.
In addition we argue that the filling-in issues are best un-
derstood in relation to issues about neural–perceptual iso-
morphism and “linking propositions.” Linking propositions
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are statements that relate perceptual states to physiological
states (Teller 1980; 1984; 1990; Teller & Pugh 1983). The
concept of a neural–perceptual isomorphism relies on a
certain sort of linking proposition, to be discussed later.
Nonisomorphic approaches reject the idea that there has to
be any structural one-to-one correspondence between per-
ceptual experience and neural processes.
Dennett’s discussion of Cartesian materialism is directly
relevant to these issues. Dennett has done a service by
showing how the filling-in idea often depends on Cartesian
materialism (see also O’Regan 1992), but we disagree with
his positive view that perceptual completion is always just a
matter of the brain’s “finding out.” We think that the idea
of neural filling-in has to be separated from Cartesian ma-
terialism and analytic isomorphism. We will show that there
is evidence in visual science to support the idea of neural
filling-in. As discussed below, filling-in is not always just
finding out. Nevertheless, we agree that it is a mistake to in-
voke filling-in as a theoretical category in the explanation of
vision. As we see it, such invocations depend on a mistaken
representational account of the task of vision. We argue
later that the representational account should be replaced
by the sort of account variously described as “animate” (Bal-
lard 1991; 1996; Ballard et al. 1997) or “enactive” (Thomp-
son 1995; Thompson et al. 1992; Varela et al. 1991).
The next section discusses in more detail the notion of
linking propositions and the concept of neural–perceptual
isomorphism. Section 3 offers a taxonomy of filling-in phe-
nomena to help clarify and organize the empirical findings,
plus a detailed look at examples of boundary completion in-
volving illusory contours, and featural completion involving
color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth. Section 4 ex-
amines some neurophysiological data about perceptual
completion. Section 5 summarizes Dennett’s position on
filling-in and connects it to earlier discussions of isomor-
phism in visual science. Section 6 presents evidence for
neural completion that is inconsistent with Dennett’s posi-
tion. Section 7 reviews some studies that assess the mea-
surable effects of perceptual completion. Section 8 shows
how neural filling-in does not entail either Cartesian mate-
rialism or analytic isomorphism. Section 9 introduces the
personal/subpersonal distinction – the distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, the perceiving animal or person as
a whole interacting with its environment, and on the other
hand, the animal’s internal functional organization and pro-
cessing – and shows its relevance to the filling-in contro-
versy. Section 10 concludes with a statement of directions
for further research.
2. Linking propositions and isomorphism
In this section we briefly review some important concep-
tual and methodologic issues about explanation in visual sci-
ence.
In 1865, Mach stated what has since become known as
“Mach’s principle of equivalence”:
Every psychical event corresponds to a physical event and vice
versa. Equal psychical processes correspond to equal physical
processes, unequal to unequal ones. When a psychical process
is analyzed in a purely psychological way, into a number of qual-
ities a, b, c, then there corresponds to them just as great a num-
ber of physical processes a, b, g. To all the details of psycho-
logical events correspond details of the physical events (Mach
1865/1965, pp. 269–70).
Thirteen years later in 1878 Hering (1878/1964) asserted
that the neural–perceptual parallelism was a necessary con-
dition of all psychophysical research. Müller (1896) then
gave a more explicit description of the neural – perceptual
mapping. He proposed five “psychophysical axioms” that
postulated a one-to-one correspondence between neural
and perceptual states (see Scheerer 1994; Teller 1984). In
particular, his second axiom stated that perceptual equali-
ties, similarities, and differences correspond to neural
equalities, similarities, and differences. This axiom was not
offered as a solution to the so-called mind-body problem,
but rather as a methodologic principle that could be a guide
in inferring neural processes from perceptual experiences
(Scheerer 1994, p. 185).
Köhler accepted this idea, but thought that Müller’s ax-
ioms were not comprehensive enough because they did 
not include occurrent perceptual states, but covered only
the logical order between neural and perceptual states
(Scheerer 1994, p. 185). In 1920 he proposed what he
would later call the principle of isomorphism (Köhler
1920), building on Müller’s earlier formulation, as well as
Wertheimer’s (1912). In his 1947 book Gestalt Psychology,
Köhler wrote: “The principle of isomorphism demands that
in a given case the organization of experience and the un-
derlying physiological facts have the same structure” (Köh-
ler 1947, p. 301).
There are several points about Köhler’s principle of iso-
morphism that deserve mention. First, by the phrase “have
the same structure” Köhler had in mind structural prop-
erties that are topological. Although the concept of
neural–perceptual isomorphism has often been taken to
mean a geometric one-to-one mapping, Köhler clearly in-
tended the isomorphism concept to have a topological
sense. For example, he argued that spatial relationships in
the visual field cannot correspond to geometric relation-
ships in the brain; they must correspond rather to func-
tional relationships among brain processes (Köhler 1929,
pp. 136–41; 1930, pp. 240–49).
Second, Köhler did not hypothesize that neural–percep-
tual isomorphism was valid for all properties of perceptual
experience. In particular, he did not extend the principle of
isomorphism to sensory qualities, such as brightness and
color (Köhler 1969, pp. 64–66, as quoted in Kubovy &
Pomerantz 1981, p. 428). The principle was restricted to
“structural properties” of the perceptual field, that is, to
characteristics of perceptual organization, such as grouping
and part-whole relationships.
Finally, it is not clear whether Köhler espoused what we
are calling analytic isomorphism. Two considerations sug-
gest that he did not. First, Köhler upheld a nonlocaliza-
tionist view of brain function, in which field physics was 
the main analogy for the underlying physiology; hence the
notion of a privileged site of perceptual experience in 
the brain seems foreign to his way of thinking about the
neural–perceptual relation.3 Second – and this is more
telling – he seems to have held (at least according to one in-
terpreter) that the isomorphism principle “is not an a priori
postulate, but ‘remains an hypothesis which has to undergo
one empirical test after the other’ ” (Scheerer 1994, p. 188).
In 1969, Weisstein provided a clear discussion of the re-
lationship between neural states and perceptual states in
the context of experimental studies based on recordings
from single cells: “Axiomatically, it can be assumed that any
visual event has some corresponding neural circuitry, and
Pessoa et al.: Perceptual completion
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that a good deal of neural circuitry in the visual system has
a corresponding function in producing a perceptual event”
(Weisstein 1969, p. 159). She noted that it is important “to
choose some aspect of the behavior shown in single units
which appears to have an analogous psychophysical effect
in humans,” but also that “the corresponding psychophysi-
cal effect cannot be strictly analogous to a single unit
recording,” for there will be more than one single unit ac-
tivated for almost any conceivable stimulus. As Weisstein
rightly insisted, both a spatial and a temporal characteriza-
tion of neural and perceptual data are essential in estab-
lishing a bridge between the two domains that goes beyond
identifying rough similarities (see sect. 4.5).
In recent years Teller has reintroduced some of these is-
sues into visual science (Teller 1980; 1984; 1990; Teller &
Pugh 1983). According to Teller, acceptable explanations
within visual science have the following form:
If the question is, what is it about the neural substrate of vision
that makes us see as we do, the only acceptable kind of answer
is, we see X because elements of the substrate Y have the prop-
erty Z or are in the state S (Teller 1990, p. 12).
This formulation leaves open another question about
form: what is the relation between the form of a given
neural response and the form of the corresponding visual
appearance? Answers to this question invoke linking propo-
sitions – propositions that relate neural states to perceptual
states. By analyzing how visual scientists reason, Teller
(1984) formulated five families of linking propositions
called identity, similarity, mutual exclusivity, simplicity,
and analogy.
The analogy family is the one that concerns us here. It is
a “less organized” family of propositions whose form is as
follows:
f “looks like” c r f explains c,
where f stands for physiologic terms, and c stands for per-
ceptual terms. The arrow connective r has a conditional
sense, thus the formulation reads: If the physiologic pro-
cesses (events, states) “look like” the perceptual processes
(events, states), then the physiologic processes explain the
perceptual processes.
The arrow is not the connective of logical entailment. It
is heuristic and is meant to guide the search for the major
causal factors involved in a given perceptual phenomenon.
Thus the term “explains” on the right-hand side is really too
strong – the idea is that f is the major causal factor in the
production of c: “if psychophysical and physiological data
can be manipulated in such a way that they can be plotted
on meaningfully similar axes, such that the two graphs have
similar shapes, then that physiological phenomenon is a ma-
jor causal factor in producing the psychophysical phenom-
enon” (Teller 1984, p. 1240).
The analogy family of linking propositions is similar to
Köhler’s principle of isomorphism but more general. Iso-
morphism in Köhler’s sense can be seen as a particular in-
stance of the analogy idea, one in which “looks like” is taken
in the sense of structural correspondence. In visual science
today, this idea of a one-to-one structural correspondence
is often taken to mean a spatial correspondence, so that, for
example, spatial variations of brightness in the visual field
are explained by analogous spatial variations of neural ac-
tivity (Todorovic´ 1987, p. 548).
To argue that the brain does not really fill in, it only “finds
out,” means that one rejects the principle of isomorphism
applied to perceptual completion. In other words, one re-
jects the hypothesis that perceptual completion depends on
neural completion processes that are structurally isomor-
phic to the perceptual phenomena. We agree that the doc-
trine of analytic isomorphism should be rejected, but we
think there is evidence for neural filling-in. One problem
with Dennett’s treatment is that he applies his “filling-in is
finding out” point across the board, without considering the
different kinds of perceptual completion. Before we go fur-
ther, then, we need to review the different sorts of percep-
tual completion phenomena.
3. Filling-in: A taxonomy of perceptual 
completion phenomena
The following working taxonomy is meant as a step toward
conceptual and terminological clarification. The term per-
ceptual completion refers to what subjects report and
should be taken in a theory-neutral sense. It is not meant to
have any implications for whether there are, or are not,
neural filling-in mechanisms in the operation of the visual
system. This is a matter to be taken up later. All that the
term perceptual completion is meant to imply is that sub-
jects report that something seems to be present in a partic-
ular region of visual space when it is actually absent from
that region, but present in the surrounding area.
There are two general divisions in the classification: (1)
amodal completion versus modal completion and (2)
boundary completion versus featural completion. These
two divisions cross-classify each other, and, thus, there is no
hierarchical organization implied in this listing. We will in-
troduce each division briefly using examples and then con-
sider them in depth in the discussion section.
3.1. Amodal completion and modal completion
Michotte et al. (1964) distinguished between two types of
perceptual completion, modal and amodal. In modal com-
pletion, the completed parts display the same type of at-
tributes or “modes” (e.g., brightness) as the rest of the fig-
ure. Illusory figures provide a particularly interesting
example. Figure 6 shows the famous Kanizsa triangle
(Kanizsa 1955; 1979). Here there are illusory contours –
clear boundaries where there is no corresponding lumi-
nance gradient – and a brightening within the figure. The
illusory contours and the central brightening are modal in
character: they are perceptually salient and appear to be-
long to the figure rather than the ground.4
Amodal completion refers to the completion of an object
that is not entirely visible because it is covered or occluded
by something else (Kanizsa & Gerbino 1982). Thus, amodal
completion denotes the perception of parts of objects – the
completed regions – that entirely lack visible attributes.
For example, consider Figure 7: although the circles are oc-
cluded, they are easily recognized and are seen as lying un-
derneath the rectangles. The parts of the circles occluded
by the rectangles are said to be amodally present.
3.2. Boundary completion and featural completion
The distinction between boundary completion and featural
completion was first proposed in the theoretical work of
Grossberg and Mingolla (Grossberg 1987a; 1987b; Gross-
berg & Mingolla 1985).5 Illusory figures also can serve to
Pessoa et al.: Perceptual completion
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introduce the distinction. In the Kanizsa triangle, there is
boundary completion – the illusory contours complete to
form a triangular outline – and there is featural completion,
an illusory brightening within the figure compared with the
background in the absence of any luminance difference.
In the next section (sect. 3.3) we review both boundary
and featural completion phenomena. Before doing so we
wish to state explicitly that we are not at all committed to
the currently popular “feature-based” approach to visual
perception, that is, to the idea that features such as color,
brightness, texture, and so on are the “visual primitives” out
of which visual perception is composed. Our intention is
not to subscribe to this paradigm; it is simply to review some
psychophysical studies that provide evidence for various
sorts of perceptual completion, and these studies typically
focus on the visual attributes just mentioned.
3.3. Discussion
3.3.1. Amodal versus modal completion. Amodal comple-
tion is the perceptual completion of occluded objects;
modal completion is perceptual completion in the fore-
ground. What does it mean to say that the amodally present
parts of the figure are “seen” or “recognized”?
Kanizsa and Gerbino (1982) have explored these ques-
tions in terms of the relation between seeing and thinking.
They describe the amodal presence of the occluded parts
as having an “encountered” character (their translation of
Metzger’s angetroffen), and they say that “the name ‘amodal
presence’ is reserved for the ‘encountered’ presence of
parts not directly visible” (pp. 171–72). They contrast this
encountered presence with a “purely mental completion of
an inferential kind,” saying that “amodal completion trans-
forms a collection of pieces into a reality of complete things
of a phenomenal ‘encountered’ character” (p. 173). Kanizsa
and Gerbino also try to differentiate between “cognitive
completion” and “perceptual completion” by arguing that
the latter always has a functional effect on the visual aspect
of a situation, whereas the former does not suffice to pro-
duce such effects. Of course, these two types of completion
are not mutually exclusive; they can act together. However,
it seems they can be dissociated, too: the cognitive sort can
be present in the total absence of the perceptual sort
(pp. 173–74).
Cognitive explanations have also been proposed for
modal completion phenomena. For example, during the
1970s, the preferred explanation of illusory contours in-
volved appealing mainly to cognitive-like processes of pos-
tulation and hypothesis formation (Gregory 1972; Rock &
Anson 1979) (see sects. 4.1, 6.1, 7.3).
We think that a profitable approach to these issues would
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Figure 6. The Kanizsa triangle. Illusory contours are seen form-
ing a triangle-shaped region although there are no corresponding
luminance changes. Note also that the illusory figure is brighter
than the background.
Figure 7. Amodal completion. (Top) Four disks are easily rec-
ognized as being occluded by four rectangles. This percept should
be compared with the one on the bottom from which the occlud-
ing rectangles have been removed. Adapted from Kanizsa and
Gerbino (1982).
be to determine to what extent modal and amodal comple-
tion involve common mechanisms. For example, in a series
of investigations with illusory contours and occluded figures
(among other stimuli), Kellman and Shipley (1991) have
gathered evidence that common interpolation mechanisms
are involved. On the other hand, Anderson (1995) suggests
that two kinds of boundary interpolation are involved in
modal and amodal completion phenomena.
Another way to probe completion mechanisms is to test
current theories of surface perception. For example, Gross-
berg’s facade theory tries to explain many challenging
completion phenomena involving form, color, and depth
(Grossberg 1994).
3.3.2. Amodal completion, surface interpolation, and the
blind spot. Several studies of the blind spot have appeared
recently (Brown & Thurmond 1993; Komatsu & Murakami
1994; Murakami 1995; Tripathy et al. 1995; Tripathy & Levi
1994). Here we mention a study related to amodal and
modal perceptual completion. Durgin et al. (1995) argue
that filling-in of the blind spot be considered a case of sur-
face interpolation. They compared percepts involving the
blind spot to percepts involving occlusion (e.g., a disk lying
on a thick line). In all the tasks they investigated, including
motion stimuli and amodal completion, the percepts were
similar in detail.
Durgin et al. interpret their results as “consistent with
the null hypothesis that the blind spot is treated visually as
a region of little or no information” (1995, p. 837). Although
the statement in this particular form is uncontroversial –
there are no photoreceptors originating from the blind spot
region – Durgin et al. go on to state: “we do not consider
that the content of visual perception in the blind spot must
directly reflect the activity of ‘filled in’ visual maps” (p. 837).
Durgin et al.’s perceptual demonstrations support the
notion that the blind spot may be treated as an “occluded”
region of vision “without an occluder.” However, at present
their demonstrations do not speak to the nature of the un-
derlying neural processes. Durgin et al. propose that blind
spot completion is similar to amodal completion, but the
perceptual similarities between blind spot completion and
amodal completion are not enough to draw conclusions
about the neural processes involved in blind spot filling-in.
3.3.3. Boundary completion versus featural completion.
Experimental studies in psychophysics provide evidence
for the existence of two separate types of perceptual com-
pletion: boundary completion and featural completion. Two
examples can be given, illusory contours and neon color
spreading.
3.3.3.1. Illusory contours. There are three defining prop-
erties of illusory contours: clarity (or sharpness of the con-
tours), brightness (of the illusory figure), and depth (the
“depthfulness” of the illusory figure) (Lesher 1995). Illu-
sory figures need not exhibit all of these properties. For ex-
ample, illusory contours can appear without an accompa-
nying illusory figure (no depth), such as in offset-grating
stimuli. Most important in the present context are illusory
figures without clarity (Fig. 8a) and illusory figures with
clarity but without any accompanying brightening or dark-
ening effect (Fig. 8b). (Another example of clarity without
brightness is the phenomenon of spontaneously splitting
figures: Kellman & Shipley 1991; Koffka 1935; Petter
1956.) We find these two situations (Fig. 8) useful for illus-
trating the distinction between boundary completion and
featural completion. In particular, the relative indepen-
dence of contour clarity and figure brightness (see Lesher
1995) suggests that independent neural mechanisms sub-
serve boundary completion and featural completion
(Grossberg & Mingolla 1985).
3.3.3.2. Neon color spreading. Watanabe and Sato (1989)
studied neon color spreading in the Ehrenstein-plus-cross
configuration. They varied the luminances of the cross and
the outer segments (Ehrenstein inducers) and were able to
show conditions in which no illusory contours formed while
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Figure 8. Illusory contours. (A) Illusory figure without clarity
(no clear contours) but with noticeable brightening. (B) Illusory
figure with clarity but no brightness difference (actual appearance
may be modified by reproduction processes).
color spreading occurred. Illusory contours did not occur
when the cross (yellow) and the outer segments (white)
were equiluminant. In these conditions color spreading was
possible. Watanabe and Sato conclude that separate mech-
anisms subserve the two aspects of the neon color spread-
ing effect. In their view, a luminance difference between
the outer segments and their surroundings (the inner seg-
ments plus the background) induces the illusory contours.
Color spreading depends on the color difference between
the inner and outer segments.6
3.3.4. Boundary completion. Two major types of illusory
contours can be distinguished: edge-induced and line-
induced. Edge-induced illusory contours consist of solid 
inducing elements containing edges, or gaps, locally con-
sistent with an occluding figure of the same luminance as
the background. In such cases, the illusory contour is col-
inear with the inducer edges consistent with the occlusion.
Line-induced illusory contours, on the other hand, can be
seen as the limiting case of edge-induced figures, where the
inducers are typically “thin.” In this case, the associated il-
lusory contours are not parallel to the inducers, but instead
roughly perpendicular to them. Figure 6 (the Kanizsa tri-
angle) presents both types of inducers. The three black, cir-
cular “pac-men” act as edge inducers, while the thin lines
work as line-end inducers. Figure 8 presents two other line-
end–induced illusory figures. Figure 8b also illustrates that
there is no sharp separation between edge– and line-
end–induced illusory contours – a line always has some
width and hence provides some edge information for very
small spatial scales.
The determinants of illusory contour strength are varied
and include both low- and high-level factors. Low-level fac-
tors include the spatial extent and proximity of inducers,
number of inducers, inducer luminance and contrast, and
inducer alignment. High-level factors include perceptual
set and memory, depth modifications, and inducer com-
pleteness (Lesher 1995). The strength of edge– and line-
end–induced illusory contours is enhanced by providing
additional stereo and motion cues. Remarkably, illusory
contours can be generated without any luminance discon-
tinuities whatsoever.
Random dot stereograms (Julesz 1971) give rise to
strong, sharp illusory contours at the (depth-induced)
edges. In such cases, the contours are associated with local
depth disparity cues. Illusory contours also occur without
local disparity (and luminance) discontinuities. If only the
edge inducers of a Kanizsa figure are defined by disparity
information in a random dot stimuli, contour completion
ensues (Mustillo & Fox 1986; Prazdny 1985). In this case,
stereo cues give rise to inducers, which then behave as lu-
minance defined inducers, resulting in contour formation
across regions with no local stereo (and luminance) cues.
Analogously, illusory contours can be specified by local mo-
tion cues. (See Lesher 1995 for an in-depth treatment of
the above issues.)
Illusory contour boundary formation is accompanied by
modal completion – the presence of perceptually salient
figure-like (as opposed to ground-like) elements. Amodal
completion also involves boundary completion. In other
words, contours are formed in regions that are not visible.
Although many studies of amodal completion involve both
the completion of contours and the completion of regions,
we include amodal completion in this section because 
several of the issues related to boundary formation (e.g.,
good continuation) are critical for the study of amodal 
completion.
Amodal completion is governed by global and local fac-
tors. Global factors include symmetry and simplicity (Buf-
fart et al. 1981; 1983). Defenders of the primacy of global
factors see the whole figure as important in determining the
percept, which is often postulated to be the simplest orga-
nization of the stimulus. Local factors include contour con-
tinuity and curvature (Shipley & Kellman 1992). Those who
espouse the importance of local factors stress the autonomy
of relatively low-level contour processing mechanisms as
governing amodal completion. The debate continues on the
relative merits of global (Buffart et al. 1981) and local
(Boselie 1994; Kellman & Shipley 1991; Takeichi et al.
1995) factors in determining amodal completion, with sev-
eral hybrid schemes having been proposed (Boselie 1988;
Sekuler 1994; Wouterlad & Boselie 1992). Recent studies
have also attempted to dissect potential representational
stages involved in amodal completion, such as a mosaic
stage – in which a literal description of the visible parts of
an occluded surface (called mosaic) would be produced –
and a completion stage (Bruno et al. 1996; Sekuler &
Palmer 1992). Finally, as previously discussed, current re-
search targets the critical issue of whether modal and
amodal completion phenomena are subserved by common
mechanisms.
3.3.5. Featural completion. For what kinds of feature can
there be modal perceptual completion? Experimental stud-
ies indicate that featural completion can involve brightness,
color, texture, motion, and depth.
3.3.5.1. Brightness and color. We have already seen exam-
ples of completion for brightness and color – illusory fig-
ures and neon color spreading, as well as the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet effect discussed in section 1. In
general, brightness and color filling-in are related to the
role played by contours in surface perception. The nature
of the underlying neural mechanisms is a matter of consid-
erable debate. Several researchers have advanced models
based on the idea of filling-in at the neural level (Arrington
1996; Cohen & Grossberg 1984; Davidson & Whiteside
1971; Fry 1948; Gerrits et al. 1966; Gerrits & Vendrik 1970;
Grossberg & Todorovic´ 1988; Hamada 1984; Neumann
1996; Pessoa et al. 1995; Ross & Pessoa 1997; Walls 1954).
Other researchers have proposed mechanisms that do not
actively fill in regions, but use other processes to assign fea-
ture (see the discussion in Kingdom & Moulden 1989; Pes-
soa 1996a; Ratliff & Sirovich 1978).
3.3.5.2. Texture. Watanabe and Cavanagh (1991; 1993) in-
vestigated whether attributes such as texture can make up
an illusory surface in a configuration similar to one that elic-
its neon color spreading. Subjects viewed a display consist-
ing of crosses filled with black and white textures inserted
into the gaps of the Ehrenstein figure (Fig. 9). They were
asked to report “whether the texture of the crosses ap-
peared to spread outside of the cross” or not; 83.3% of the
subjects reported the perception of texture outside of the
cross, compared with 0% when the central cross regions
were viewed in isolation. In the case of neon color spread-
ing, the spreading effect decreases when the inner cross is
disconnected from the Ehrenstein figure – for example,
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when the cross is rotated around its center (Redies & Spill-
mann 1981). Watanabe and Cavanagh report that their
demonstrations with texture spreading show the same ten-
dency. However, unlike neon color spreading, texture
spreading totally disappeared when a textured cross was
foveated (which the reader can confirm in Fig. 9a).
Studies by Kawabata (1982; 1984; 1990) also provide ev-
idence about the perceptual completion of texture. Kawa-
bata (1982) investigated the stimulus conditions necessary
for perceptual completion across the blind spot. Several
types of pattern were investigated, including dotted lines
(each half to one side of the blind spot), parallel lines (grat-
ing pattern), and concentric circles. Grating patterns com-
pleted only when they covered two quadrants around the
blind spot; for example, covering the top hemifield or the
left hemifield. Concentric circle patterns also completed
across the blind spot as long as the pattern consisted of
more than three circles. Perceptual completion of dotted
lines occurred as long as there was a small spatial separa-
tion between the line ends and the borders of the blind
spot; otherwise they were perceived as two independent
lines. In a subsequent study, Kawabata (1990) showed that
types of completion similar to those obtained for the blind
spot were obtained in peripheral vision (15 degrees or
more).
A recent series of studies by Ramachandran and col-
leagues on perceptual completion effects has also attracted
considerable attention (Ramachandran 1992a; 1992b;
1993a; Ramachandran et al. 1993; Ramachandran & Gre-
gory 1991). In one study, a homogeneous gray (or pink)
square was displayed on a dynamic two-dimensional noise
pattern (twinkling noise). Three effects were reported: (1)
the gray square faded after approximately 5 seconds; (2) the
square region appeared filled in with the surrounding noise
pattern; and (3) the noise pattern in the region originally oc-
cupied by the gray square persisted. Ramachandran and
colleagues described (2) as a filling-in effect and discussed
possible neural substrates and mechanisms (see Ra-
machandran et al. 1993). Finally, Hardage and Tyler (1995)
recently compared the actual filling in (Ramachandran’s
second effect) with the twinkle aftereffect (the third effect).
They showed that the two effects are sensitive to different
spatial and temporal parameters. Their results indicate that
different mechanisms are involved in the generation of
these two percepts.
3.3.5.3. Motion. Watanabe and Cavanagh (1993) (in the
study previously mentioned) also employed the Ehrenstein
figure-paradigm to investigate motion spreading. The tex-
ture inside the crosses was made to move while the crosses
themselves remained stationary. All of their subjects re-
ported that motion appeared to spread outside the crosses.
Apparent motion (the phi phenomenon) is a well known
effect. Motion perception is induced by stimuli presented
at distinct spatial positions and with an appropriate tempo-
ral interval between them. Lockhead et al. (1980) investi-
gated a variation of apparent motion known as sensory
saltation (Geldard & Sherrick 1972). In this perceptual ef-
fect (for proper display parameters) the subject reports dis-
crete points of stimulation between the two actual stimula-
tion points. Lockhead et al. attempted to determine
whether illusory stimulation points in sensory saltation
could be spatially assigned to the (receptorless) blind spot
region. The results for three subjects were similar and
showed that the saltation crossed the blind spot, with the il-
lusory stimulation points often localized within the blind
spot region.
3.3.5.4. Depth. The completion of depth is vividly illus-
trated by the stereogram shown in Figure 10 (Nakayama &
Shimojo 1990a). For such an untextured figure, it is not
clear what classical stereopsis would predict for the per-
ception of the center of the cross. Should the percept as-
sume the depth of the nearby vertical segment, or that spec-
ified by the horizontal limbs? For the fusion of left and
center images, although the vertical limb is closer to the
center, one perceives a horizontal bar in front of a vertical
bar, illustrating that disparity information can “propagate”
when necessary.
Another example of depth completion is given by the
phenomenon of Da Vinci stereopsis (Gillam & Borsting
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Figure 9. Texture filling-in displays investigated by Watanabe
and Cavanagh (1991). (A) Crosses made of black and white diag-
onal stripes inserted into the gaps of an Ehrenstein figure. When
foveating the center of the grid, subjects perceive a circular con-
tour around the texture crosses. A large percentage of the subjects
also report texture within the circular disks. (B) The texture
crosses presented alone. Neither circular contours nor texture
spreading is reported in this case (Watanabe & Cavanagh 1993;
used with permission).
Figure 10. Cross stereogram. Fusion of the left and center im-
ages (by “uncrossing”) produces the percept of a black horizontal
bar in front of a vertical bar (as indicated on the bottom left). Fu-
sion of the center and right images produces the percept of a ver-
tical bar in front of a horizontal bar (bottom right). For cross-
fusers the reverse depth relationships are perceived. Adapted
from Nakayama and Shimojo (1990).
1987; Nakayama & Shimojo 1990b). When we view a far-
ther surface that is partly occluded by a nearer surface, one
eye typically registers more of the farther surface than the
other eye does. The perception of the farther surface is of-
ten derived from the view of the eye that registers more 
of this surface. Da Vinci stereopsis is illustrated in Figure
11. Observers see the right-eye view of the surface BD 
in depth, although the region that lies between the verti-
cal lines B and C is registered monocularly by only the 
right eye. An outstanding question in the study of three-
dimensional vision is how the monocularly viewed region
BC inherits the depth of the binocularly viewed region CD
(Grossberg 1994; Grossberg & McLoughlin 1997).
A final example is a stereogram by Julesz (1971, p. 336)
in which each image contains 5% black dots on a 95% white
background. A portion of the black dots has disparity, while
the remaining ones have zero disparity. When the left and
right images are stereoscopically viewed, the black dots
with disparity are, as expected, seen in front. These black
dots, however, cause the white surround that they enclose
to be seen, as a whole, as a planar surface lying in front of
another planar surface containing the zero disparity black
dots and the white region that they enclose.
3.3.6. Summary. We offer a taxonomy of perceptual com-
pletion whose divisions are amodal versus modal comple-
tion, and boundary versus featural completion. Within
these divisions there are numerous different sorts of per-
ceptual completion and care must be taken to distinguish
among them. In particular, there seems to be an important
difference between boundary completion and featural
completion, with featural completion occurring for bright-
ness and color, texture, motion, and depth. This means that
propositions about filling-in as a whole are of limited use
and should be greeted with suspicion. For example, in ad-
vance of further research, there is no reason to group to-
gether illusory contour formation, for which there is strong
evidence for neural completion (see sects. 4.1, 6.1, and
7.3.2), and the texture completion studies by Watanabe and
Cavanagh (1991) and Kawabata (1990), in which peripheral
stimulation is necessary to elicit the completion effects. In-
deed, without additional careful experiments to assess the
effects of perceptual completion (see sect. 7), it is not clear
what these studies reveal about perceptual completion at
the neural level.
4. Cortical data and perceptual completion
We now turn to examine some recent physiological data 
relevant to perceptual completion. All the data come from
single-cell studies of the response properties of cortical
neurons. We wish to state here that our aim is to examine
some important representative studies, not to give an ex-
haustive review.
4.1. Illusory contours and cortical cell responses
In an influential paper, von der Heydt et al. (1984) pre-
sented results from single-cell recordings suggesting neural
correlates of illusory contours in area V2 of the macaque
monkey. Almost half the cells examined exhibited sizeable
responses to drifting bars or edges and also to the illusory
contour induced by drifting line gratings. Cells were not
simply responding to individual line-ends, however, be-
cause the typical cell would not respond to a grating with
only two or three bars, but would respond with increasing
strength as other bars were added, until a saturated level of
activity was reached.
Von der Heydt et al. (1984) also studied neural responses
to notch stimuli – dark rectangles with parts missing that
formed an illusory rectangle. Cellular activity fell off with
increasing notch separation and was greatly reduced when
only a single notch was present, in parallel with the per-
ceptual disappearance of the illusory figure. In all, the cel-
lular recordings of von der Heydt et al. revealed cells whose
responses to illusory contour variations resembled human
psychophysical responses to similar variations (see also
Redies et al. 1986 for similar results in cat visual cortex). 
Although some have described these findings as the dis-
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Figure 11. Da Vinci stereopsis. Example of Da Vinci stereogram derived from viewing a three-dimensional scene of a room. Region
BC is seen monocularly (in the right eye view only). This diagram represents the retinal images impinging on an observer near an oc-
clusion in depth caused by a nearer object (surface AB). Adapted from Grossberg (1994).
covery of “illusory contour cells” (Lesher 1995), von der
Heydt et al. (1984) tried to draw a clear distinction between
the stimulus-response relationship, on the one hand, and
perceived entities, on the other. For instance, they used the
term illusory contour stimuli, rather than illusory contour
cells, and they borrowed the term anomalous contours from
Kanizsa (1955; 1979) to define a stimulus property without
reference to perception.
In a recent study, Grosof et al. (1993) suggested the ex-
istence of neurons in V1 of macaque monkeys that respond
to line-end stimuli similar to offset gratings. However, the
results remain controversial and await further controls to
establish the role these neurons play in illusory contour per-
ception (see Lesher 1995).
4.2. The blind spot and receptive field dynamics
Fiorani et al. (1992) recorded the activity from single neu-
rons in parts of area V1 that correspond to the blind spot. A
cortical region that corresponds to the blind spot for the
contralateral eye (the eye on the opposite hemispheric side)
will also correspond to a normal area of the retina for the
ipsilateral eye (the eye on the same hemispheric side). How
do neurons corresponding to the blind spot for the con-
tralateral eye respond when a stimulus is presented across
this area and the ipsilateral eye is closed? One might pre-
dict that the neurons would not respond at all, that they
would respond only to stimuli presented to the nonblind re-
gion of the ipsilateral eye. However, this is not what hap-
pens to 20% of the cells. In other words, some neurons do
respond to stimuli presented through the blind spot. Espe-
cially interesting is a subpopulation of cells that Fiorani et
al. call completion neurons. These neurons, whose recep-
tive fields are located inside the blind spot, respond to a bar
longer than the diameter of the blind spot when it is swept
across the blind spot, but they respond poorly or not at all
to bars restricted to one side of the blind spot. Because
these neurons retinotopically map the blind spot (of the
contralateral eye) where there are no receptors, Fiorani et
al. describe them as having “interpolated receptive fields”
(see Fig. 12).
4.3. Scotomata and receptive field dynamics
Two studies involving dynamic changes in receptive field
size in primary visual cortex come from Gilbert and col-
leagues (Gilbert & Wiesel 1992; Pettet & Gilbert 1992; see
also Gilbert 1992). Gilbert and Wiesel (1992) recorded ac-
tivity from neurons in V1 in the monkey both before and af-
ter retinal lesions. They found that, over a period of min-
utes, neurons whose receptive field centers are originally
located near the edge of the retinal scotoma have greatly
enlarged receptive field sizes. They also found that, over a
period of 2 months, neurons with receptive fields originally
located within the lesioned area regain visual activity, but
now corresponding to retinotopic positions outside of the
lesioned area, thus providing an enlarged representation of
the area surrounding the retinal scotoma. In other words,
the retinal lesion temporarily silences cortical areas – in ef-
fect creating a cortical scotoma – but over a period of
months the cortical area regains activity due to the dynamic
changes in the receptive fields.
In a second study Pettet and Gilbert (1992) masked ar-
eas covering receptive fields of neurons in V1 of the cat,
thereby creating an artificial scotoma. They found that
when the area of the visual field surrounding the scotoma
is stimulated, the receptive field can expand an average of
five-fold in area over a period of approximately 10 minutes.
Gilbert suggests that this expansion may help to explain
perceptual filling-in, such as color and texture filling-in, and
even illusory contours (Gilbert 1992, p. 8). The idea is that
the expansion allows stimuli located near the boundary of
the original receptive field to drive the cell. The cells would
then fire as if the stimuli were close to their receptive field
centers – leading to a shifted percept of the location of the
stimulus – so that the unstimulated region would appear to
fill in.
In a more recent study, DeAngelis et al. (1995a) investi-
gated receptive field plasticity in V1 under artificial sco-
toma stimulation similar to that in the Pettet and Gilbert ex-
periments. However, unlike Pettet and Gilbert, DeAngelis
et al. did not encounter changes in receptive field size (but
see Chapman & Stone 1996). Instead, they report short-
term changes in responsiveness (gain changes) for some
cells. However, they also conclude that the sort of receptive
field changes they observed could account for psychophys-
ical phenomena such as filling-in.
4.4. Texture filling-in and cortical cell responses
A recent study by De Weerd et al. (1995) takes a major step
toward bridging the neural and perceptual levels in the case
of perceptual completion. De Weerd et al. discovered cells
in extrastriate cortex whose responses correlate well with
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Figure 12. Completion neurons and interpolated receptive
fields. Cell responses in the optic disk representation to oriented
bars (left, vertical; right, horizontal). Stars and dashed lines indi-
cate locations where stimulation with long bars elicited responses.
Arrows indicate direction of motion of oriented black bars. IRF:
interpolated receptive field (black squares). Adapted from Fiorani
et al. (1992).
the perceptual experience of texture filling-in of the sort
studied by Ramachandran and colleagues (Ramachandran
et al. 1993; Ramachandran & Gregory 1991). De Weerd et
al. first determined the time course of perceptual filling-in
for human subjects. They used a large texture with an equi-
luminant hole in the middle, located 8 degrees from a fixa-
tion spot (Fig. 13). Subjects were instructed to indicate
when they saw the hole fill in. As the hole size was increased
from 1 to 12.8 degrees, the time required to see it fill in
steadily increased. De Weerd et al. then recorded from two
awake behaving rhesus monkeys that viewed the same pat-
terns while they were rewarded for maintaining fixation.
For each cell, the hole was centered over the receptive
field. There were two main experimental conditions. In the
hole condition, the cell responses were recorded for the
texture with a hole (the same condition used for the human
subjects). The other no-hole condition served as a control
to establish the responses to the same texture without a
hole.
Cell responses in areas V2 and V3 revealed neurons
whose firing rate in the hole condition was initially lower
than in the no-hole condition, but that gradually increased
their responses to a similar level, exhibiting what the au-
thors term climbing activity (Fig. 14). In other words, after
a few seconds of fixation these extrastriate cells responded
to the texture with the hole as if it were a texture without a
hole. De Weerd et al. suggest, therefore, that the percep-
tual filling-in results from a minimization of the response
differences in the hole and no-hole conditions.
4.5. Discussion
In this section, we would like to raise several questions
about the Pettet and Gilbert explanation of how receptive
field plasticity might subserve completion phenomena, 
assuming for the moment that the experimental results 
they obtained are valid, despite being contested by the
DeAngelis et al. (1995a) study (see Chapman & Stone, 1996,
for a discussion that reconciles these two studies). (Similar
proposals, though less specific, have been advanced by Fio-
rani et al. 1992, Ramachandran 1992a, 1992b, Churchland
and Ramachandran 1993, and DeAngelis et al. 1995a).
The first issue is methodological. The proposal relies on
a problematic use of the analogy family of linking proposi-
tions:
f “looks like” c r f explains c.
In Gilbert’s proposal, f refers to the activities of single
neurons and c refers to subjective report data. The two
sides are then connected through a sort of “resemblance”
or “analogy” – the physiological data “look like” the per-
ceptual phenomena because they both involve kinds of
completion.
Building on Teller’s discussion (1980; 1984), we can raise
three concerns about this sort of linking proposition when
f stands for the activities of single neurons:
1. What is the proposition’s intended range of applicabil-
ity? Applied to the present proposal: for how many of the
filling-in phenomena is it supposed to hold?
2. Is there sufficient homogeneity at the neural level on
which to base the proposition? Applied to the present pro-
posal: are there many “completion neurons” and are their
responses homogeneous enough to support the link to the
perceptual level?
3. What about interactions between the putatively privi-
leged set of neurons and neural activity elsewhere in the 
visual system? Applied to the present proposal: does activ-
ity elsewhere in the visual system (for example back-
projections to V1 from other cortical areas) affect the re-
sponse patterns in V1?7
To this third concern we can add a fourth related one. In
supposing that the activity of single cells is reflected more
or less directly in the psychophysically measured response,
one thereby assumes that, in the highly controlled condi-
tions of an experiment, nothing else in the system interferes
with the influence those cells have on the animal’s response.
(Teller 1980, p. 164, calls this assumption the “nothing
mucks it up proviso.”) In the Fiorani et al. experiments,
however, the experimental conditions involve the animals
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Figure 13. Schematic representation of the texture filling-in
stimulus used by De Weerd et al. (1995) in their comparison of
perceptual filling-in and cortical cell responses. Human subjects
were asked to fixate on the fixation point (FP) and indicate when
they saw the hole fill in by releasing a button. Under similar stim-
ulation conditions, cortical cell responses were measured for cells
in V2 and V3 of the primate visual cortex.
Figure 14. Responses of cortical neurons stimulated with tex-
ture pattern from the study of De Weerd et al. (1995). Schematic
representation of the responses of a V3 cell in the hole condition
(solid line) and no-hole condition (interrupted line). The shaded
zone indicates the range of average times required for human ob-
servers to report filling-in. Adapted from De Weerd et al. (1995)
with permission.
being anesthetized. One often finds scientists making hy-
potheses about the physiological correlates of perception
based on findings in animals that are not consciously per-
ceiving anything due to anesthesia. (Zeki’s studies of color
perception and V4 are a well known case in point; Zeki
1983a; 1983b). Here the “nothing mucks it up” proviso
amounts to assuming that consciousness – in the sense of
being awake and alert – makes no difference to what the
rest of the visual system is doing. We see no reason to be-
lieve this, and good reason not to: experiments have shown
that when animals are awake and behaving in normal sen-
sory surroundings, many kinds of neuronal response in vi-
sual cells become highly dependent on behavioral factors
such as the bodily tilt of the animal (Horn & Hill 1969), the
animal’s posture (Abeles 1984), and auditory stimulation
(Fishman & Michael 1973; Morell 1972). Moreover, stud-
ies in alert, unparalyzed monkeys reveal that both attention
and the relevance of a stimulus for the performance of a be-
havioral task can considerably modulate the responses of 
visual neurons (Chelazzi et al. 1993; Haenny et al. 1988;
Moran & Desimone 1985; Treue & Maunsell 1996).
The second problem is empirical and has to do with the
observed time courses for filling in. There are two sorts of
time courses for receptive field expansion in the Gilbert
data: the first is on the order of minutes; the second is on
the order of months. These physiological time courses do
not match the perceptual ones, which typically seem to 
be on the order of seconds. For artificial scotomata, 
Ramachandran and Gregory (1991) report that perceptual
filling-in happens on the order of 2 to 3 seconds. Similarly,
Gerrits et al. (1966) reported that filling-in took several sec-
onds for stabilized images; in contrast, Gerrits and Tim-
merman (1969) later reported that filling-in for patients
with retinal scotomata happened “instantaneously.” Finally,
to add one more wrinkle, Paradiso and Nakayama (1991),
in a study of the temporal dynamics of brightness percep-
tion to be discussed in section 6.2, timed the speed of
brightness filling-in on the order of milliseconds – bright-
ness signals appear to propagate at a rate of 110–150
deg/sec (6.7–9.2 msec/deg). Clearly, to establish a closer
link between the perceptual data and the physiological data
we must await the application of new techniques for as-
sessing receptive field changes that might occur on the or-
der of seconds or even shorter time scales (but see DeAn-
gelis et al. 1995b).
The study by De Weerd et al. (1995) addresses the two
issues just raised. It carefully tries to correlate the time
course of perceptual completion with the cell responses in-
vestigated. The authors show that the time course of climb-
ing activity follows that of perceptual completion as the hole
size is increased, and they clearly delimit the range of ap-
plicability of their linking proposition to encompass only
Ramachandran-type texture filling-in. Finally, the study
employed awake, behaving monkeys under stimulation
conditions that paralleled those used for the human sub-
jects.
To conclude this section, at the present time the neural
processes involved in the different sorts of perceptual com-
pletion are largely unknown. However, on the basis of the
foregoing considerations, we think that it is best not to view
perceptual completion as directly reducible to “atomic”
neural properties at the single cell level. In other words, at
the neural level perceptual completion might be better 
described using concepts such as “cell assemblies” or other
forms of distributed coordinated activity.8
5. Dennett on filling-in
We turn now to Dennett’s criticism of the filling-in idea, in
particular to his claim that filling-in is really just finding out.
5.1. Filling-in versus finding out
Dennett makes two kinds of points about filling-in, one
conceptual and the other empirical.
The conceptual points depend on distinguishing clearly
between the content of a representation and the vehicle or
medium of representation. Suppose one sees a colored re-
gion. This is one’s perceptual content. Dennett assumes
that there must be states or processes in the brain that bear
this very content. However, he observes that this could be
accomplished by the brain in a number of different ways.
First, there could be a representation of that region as col-
ored, or a representation of that region could be absent, but
the brain ignores that absence. The point here is to distin-
guish between the presence of a representation and ignor-
ing the absence of a representation (Dennett 1992, p. 48).
Second, suppose there is a representation of that region as
colored. This, too, could be accomplished by the brain in
different ways: for example, the representation could be
spatially continuous or pictorial, or it could be symbolic.
These conceptual points illustrate the main mistake
made by analytic isomorphism. Analytic isomorphism holds
that there must be an isomorphic neural representation for
each conscious perceptual content. As Dennett correctly
observes, however, there need not be any isomorphism be-
tween perceptual contents and neural representations, be-
cause some perceptual contents might correspond to
neural processes that ignore the absence of neural repre-
sentations, or they might correspond to symbolic represen-
tations.
Take the blind spot, for example. From the fact that one
has no awareness of a gap in one’s visual field, it does not
follow that there must be a neural representation of a gap-
less visual field, for the brain might simply be ignoring the
absence of receptor signals at the blind spot. Nor does it fol-
low that the blind spot must be completed with spatially
continuous representations, for the region might simply be
designated by a symbol.
Dennett’s conceptual points still leave open the empiri-
cal matter of just what the brain does to accomplish per-
ceptual completion. Here Dennett is not entirely clear
about what he means when he says that the brain “jumps to
a conclusion.” In the case of the blind spot, Dennett asserts
that the visual cortex has no precedent of getting informa-
tion from that retinal region, and so it simply ignores the ab-
sence of signals from that area. The moral of this story is
that the brain does not need to provide any representation
for perceptual completion to occur; completion can be ac-
complished by ignoring the absence of a representation (cf.
Creutzfeld 1990, p. 460). The contrast, then, is between
providing a representation and jumping to a conclusion, in
the sense of ignoring the absence of a representation. Ac-
cording to this story, the brain does not need to fill in the
blind spot in the sense of providing a roughly continuous
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spatial representation, nor does it need to label the blind
spot region – the absence of any representation for the
blind spot region is simply ignored or not noticed in subse-
quent visual processing. Notice that this is a case of provid-
ing content; the point is that there is no representational ve-
hicle specifically devoted to the blind spot.
On the other hand, Dennett sometimes contrasts pro-
viding a roughly continuous spatial representation with la-
beling a region. In addition, he says that “filling in” means
the former. Here the contrast is between, on the one hand,
providing a spatial representation of each subarea within a
region – filling-in – and, on the other hand, jumping to a
conclusion, in the sense of attaching a label to the region all
at once. In this story the brain provides both content for the
blind-spot region and a representational vehicle devoted to
that region, namely, a label.9
Dennett’s slogan is: “The brain’s job is not ‘filling in.’ The
brain’s job is finding out” (1992, p. 47). The principle of
brain function being assumed here Dennett calls “the
thrifty producer principle”: “If no one is going to look at it,
don’t waste effort providing it.” For example, to see a region
as colored, all the brain needs to do is to arrive at the judg-
ment that the region is colored. Whether Dennett thinks
that the brain accomplishes this by ignoring the absence of
a representation or by providing a label (“color by num-
ber”), he clearly thinks that filling-in the color of each sub-
area (“color by bit map”) is not the thriftiest way to do it.10
5.2. Dennett’s criticism and visual science
In visual science there has been a great deal of debate about
neural–perceptual isomorphism in relation to filling-in,
and the debates all predate Dennett’s treatment (Bridge-
man 1983; Grossberg 1983; Kingdom & Moulden 1989;
Ratliff & Sirovich 1978; Todorovic´ 1987; see also O’Regan
1992). In fact, in 1978, Ratliff and Sirovich argued against
the need for a neural filling-in process in a way similar to
Dennett. They argued that to assume that there must be
neural filling-in to account for the homogeneous appear-
ance of bounded regions is to misinterpret Mach’s principle
of equivalence as requiring that there be an isomorphic
mapping from the form of the neural process to the form of
the perceptual response. However, such an isomorphism is
not logically necessary. Therefore, neither is a neural filling-
in process (see also Bridgeman 1983; and Kingdom &
Moulden 1989).
Ratliff and Sirovich went on to make some remarks that
are interesting in relation to Dennett’s discussion of Carte-
sian materialism:
The neural activity which underlies appearance must reach a fi-
nal stage eventually. It may well be that marked neural activity
adjacent to edges [rather than neural filling-in between the
edges] . . . is, at some level of the visual system, that final stage
and is itself the sought-for end process. Logically nothing more
is required. (1978, p. 847)
This point is similar to Dennett’s that, once discrimina-
tions have been made, they do not need to be re-presented
to some central consciousness system – a “Cartesian the-
ater” (1991, p. 344). However, there is a dissimilarity as
well: as Dennett’s critique of Cartesian materialism and his
alternative “multiple drafts” model of consciousness makes
plain, the notion of a “final stage” may have no application
at all. In fact, given the dense connectivity of the brain, with
reciprocal forward and backward projections, it is not clear
what “final stage” could mean in any absolute sense (see
sect. 8.1). For this reason, Dennett’s discussion of filling-in
represents an advance over Ratliff and Sirovich’s.
Although neural filling-in may not be logically necessary,
whether there is neural filling-in has to be an empirical
question. Ratliff and Sirovich admitted this: “we cannot by
any reasoning eliminate a priori some higher-order stage or
filling in process. . . . But parsimony demands that any such
additional stage or process be considered only if neuro-
physiological evidence for it should appear” (1978, p. 847).
Dennett, too, admits this (1991, p. 353; 1992, pp. 42–43).
What sort of evidence is there, then, for neural filling-in?
6. Evidence for neural filling-in
In section 3 we reviewed a large number of perceptual com-
pletion phenomena. We would like to draw attention to two
cases here: illusory contours and the temporal dynamics of
brightness and color induction. Both strike us as coun-
terexamples to the idea that perceptual completion is ac-
complished by the brain’s ignoring an absence.
6.1. Illusory contours
Several researchers have suggested cognitive theories of il-
lusory contour perception, most notably Gregory (1972)
and Rock and Anson (1979). In these theories, illusory con-
tour formation is largely the result of a cognitive-like
process of postulation. Illusory contours are viewed as so-
lutions to a perceptual problem: “What is the most proba-
ble organization that accounts for the stimulus?” Although
there is ample evidence for the role of cognitive influences
in illusory contours, current studies point to the importance
of relatively low-level processes in the formation of illusory
contours.
Two lines of evidence point to an early neural mechanism
for illusory contour completion: (1) neurophysiological
data, and (2) psychophysical studies of the similarities be-
tween real and illusory contours.
6.1.1. Neurophysiologic evidence. As we discussed in sec-
tion 4.1, von der Heydt and colleagues have shown that fig-
ures in which we see illusory contours evoke responses in a
large number of cells in V2 of alert monkeys (Peterhans &
von der Heydt 1989; von der Heydt et al. 1984; von der
Heydt & Peterhans 1989). The cells respond as if the illu-
sory contours were formed by real edges or lines, and they
respond to variations in the figure in a way that resembles
human psychophysical responses to the same variations. Al-
though making a link between single cell activities and per-
ceptual phenomena is problematic for the reasons reviewed
in section 4.5, the evidence here seems to suggest that the
perceptual completion of boundaries involves the neural
completion of a presence, rather than “ignoring an ab-
sence.”
6.1.2. Psychophysical evidence. Many psychophysical stud-
ies have provided evidence for a common early treatment
of both real and illusory contours by the visual system (see
Lesher 1995; Spillmann & Dresp 1995). For example,
Smith and Over (1975; 1976; 1977; 1979) have revealed
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similarities between the two types of contours in the realm
of motion aftereffects, tilt aftereffects, orientation discrim-
ination, and orientation masking.
Tilt aftereffects are particularly interesting. A tilt afteref-
fect will occur if one adapts for a few seconds by looking at
lines oriented counterclockwise from the vertical, and then
one is exposed to a test stimulus of vertical lines. The latter
will appear to be tilted clockwise, away from the adapting
orientation. There is compelling evidence from recent
studies showing that tilt aftereffects cross over between real
and illusory contours (Berkeley et al. 1994; Paradiso et al.
1989). Thus adaptation with real lines can affect the per-
ception of illusory contour orientation and vice versa (see
sect. 7.3.2).
An important question concerns the level at which real
and illusory contours have similar status. Motion and tilt af-
tereffects are often attributed to short term habituation in
early visual stages (Barlow & Hill 1963; Movshon et al.
1972). Thus the evidence from psychophysics is that real
and illusory contours share internal processes at an early
level of the visual system. In fact, there is considerable ev-
idence pointing to the functional equivalence of real and il-
lusory contours in the operation of the visual system (see
Table 1 of Lesher 1995; Spillmann & Dresp 1995, p. 1347).
6.2. Temporal dynamics of brightness 
and color induction
There is an enormous body of literature on the spatial vari-
ables determining brightness and color induction. In con-
trast, there are considerably fewer studies investigating
temporal variables (Boynton 1983; Kinney 1967; see
Heinemann 1972). However, there are a few studies with
results that speak directly to the question of evidence for
filling-in.
Paradiso and Nakayama (1991) used a visual masking
paradigm to investigate two issues – first, the role of edge
information in determining the brightness of homogeneous
regions, and second, the temporal dynamics of perceptual
filling-in. They reasoned that if the filling-in process in-
volves some form of activity-spreading, it may be possible
to demonstrate its existence by interrupting it. If bound-
aries interrupt filling-in, what happens when new borders
are introduced? Is the filling-in process affected before it is
complete?
Figure 15 shows the paradigm they used as well as the
basic result. The target is presented first and is followed at
variable intervals by a mask. For intervals on the order of
50 to 100 msec, the brightness of the central area of the disk
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Figure 15. Masking paradigm in temporal dynamics of brightness study (Paradiso & Nakayama 1991). (A) Brightness suppression of a
disk-shaped target by a mask consisting of a grid of thin lines. The target and mask are each presented for 16 msec. Optimizing the tem-
poral delay between the stimuli yields a percept in which the brightness in a large central area of the disk is greatly suppressed. (B) Bright-
ness suppression is highly dependent on the arrangement of contours in the mask.
is greatly reduced. If the mask is presented after 100 msec,
the brightness of the central region is largely unaffected.
The most striking result was that the brightness suppression
depended on the distance between target and mask. In par-
ticular, for larger distances maximal suppression occurred
at later times.
Paradiso and Nakayama’s results are consistent with the
hypothesis that brightness signals are generated at the bor-
ders of their target stimuli and propagate inward at a rate
of 110–150 deg/sec (6.7–9.2 msec/deg). The idea that con-
tours interrupt the propagation is perhaps clearest for the
case in which a circular mask is introduced, resulting in a
dark center, for the brightness originating from the target
border seems to be “blocked.” Paradiso and Nakayama dis-
cuss several alternative accounts, such as lateral inhibition
processes, but do not consider them to be plausible expla-
nations of their findings.
Some of these results were anticipated in an earlier study
by Stoper and Mansfield (1978). They employed a masking
paradigm in which the masks were varied systematically in
time. They interpreted their “area suppression” effects as
resulting from the interference of a mask with the process
of filling-in of target brightness. Their paradigm enabled
them to show that brightness suppression could not be due
simply to contour suppression, thereby indicating that
brightness and contour processes are subserved by inde-
pendent systems.
The filling-in model of brightness perception proposed
by Grossberg and Todorovic´ (1988) has been shown by Ar-
rington (1994) to produce excellent fits to the data from
both Stoper and Mansfield (1978) and Paradiso and
Nakayama (1991). This sort of close link between psy-
chophysics, neurophysiology, and modeling seems espe-
cially promising for investigating the mechanisms responsi-
ble for perceptual completion.
Another relevant study comes from De Valois et al.
(1986). They employed center-surround standard (refer-
ence) and matching (variable) stimuli, similar to the ones
used in classic contrast studies. They compared the results
of direct changes in brightness or color in which the center
of the standard pattern was modulated (as was the match-
ing pattern) to the changes that occurred when the sur-
round was modulated sinusoidally while the center was
kept constant at the mean level. These two conditions were
referred to as “direct” and “induced,” respectively. The pur-
pose of the experiments was to measure the brightness and
color changes produced by oscillations at various temporal
frequencies between 0.5 and 8 Hz. Their studies revealed
two main findings: (1) The temporal frequencies studied
had little effect on the apparent brightness change in the di-
rect condition; color variations in the direct condition were
present but small. (2) In the induced condition, the amount
of brightness change fell drastically as the temporal fre-
quency increased (approximately 2.5 Hz).11
These results can be interpreted in terms of a spreading
mechanism of induction that occurs over time, one that
would provide a spatially continuous representation for 
filling-in. Brightness and color signals would be generated
at the edges between center and surround, and would prop-
agate inside the center region determining the appearance.
An optimal temporal frequency would reflect the time in-
terval necessary for the signal to propagate from the edges.
The drastic fall-off found by De Valois et al. would result
from a change in the surround before the edge signal was
able to reach the middle of the center region.
Rossi and Paradiso (1996) have replicated the brightness
induction results of De Valois et al. (1986) and have stud-
ied the role of pattern size on the effect by varying the spa-
tial frequency of the inducing pattern. The correlation
found between spatial scale, degree of induction, and cut-
off frequency indicates that there is a limited speed at
which induction proceeds and that larger areas take more
time to induce. Rossi and Paradiso conclude that the limits
on the rate of induction are consistent with an active filling-
in mechanism initiated at the edges and propagated inward.
In a remarkable study, Rossi et al. (1996) showed that a
significant percentage of neurons in cat primary visual cor-
tex respond in a manner that correlates with perceived
brightness, rather than responding strictly to the light level
in the receptive field of the cells. Rossi et al. studied cell re-
sponses in conditions analogous to the direct and induced
conditions studied psychophysically by De Valois et al.
(1986) and Rossi and Paradiso (1996). In the induced con-
dition, neural responses were largest at low temporal fre-
quencies and decreased as the rate of modulation increased
over 1.0 Hz. In the direct condition, however, response am-
plitudes progressively increased with increasing temporal
frequencies. These results, as well as other findings, are
closely paralleled by psychophysical findings, suggesting
that such cell responses may contribute to the perception
of brightness.12
The studies discussed in this section provide strong evi-
dence for featural filling-in. In brightness filling-in, the
brain seems to be providing content, and it seems to be do-
ing so through a roughly continuous propagation of signals,
a process that takes time. On the other hand, ignoring a re-
gion by jumping to the conclusion that it has the same label
as its surround does not take time in the same way: although
labeling would involve brain processes with their own tem-
poral limitations, there seems no reason to suppose that it
would be subject to the same kinds of temporal constraints
as those involved in signals having to propagate through
some spatially extended area.
7. Assessing the effects of perceptual completion
Many studies of perceptual completion have provided re-
sults based directly on an observer’s report of the percept.
For example, observers are asked to give a verbal report of
what they see in their blind spot given surrounding stimu-
lation (e.g., Brown & Thurmond 1993). In other cases, sub-
jects are asked to draw the shape of an occluded figure
(Moravec & Beck 1986; Takeichi et al. 1995). Some studies
simply ask subjects to indicate whether they perceive a
given completion (as in Watanabe & Cavanagh 1993). Al-
though many of these studies provide important informa-
tion about the type of perceptual completion, how they are
to be interpreted in relation to neural processes is unclear.
On the other hand, many experiments have probed per-
ceptual completion by directly assessing the effects of the
completion processes themselves. By investigating whether
there are measurable effects of completion, it becomes pos-
sible to evaluate more precisely the mechanisms involved.
Dennett (1993, p. 208) raises this point in a useful way:
“The way to test my hypothesis that the brain does not
bother filling in the ‘evidence’ for its conclusion is to see if
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there are any effects that depend on the brain’s having rep-
resented the step, rather than just the conclusion. . . . The
detail would not just seem to be there; it would have to be
there to explain some effect.” In fact, visual scientists have
investigated this issue of whether there are measurable ef-
fects of filling-in, as the following discussion of some rele-
vant studies will demonstrate.
7.1. The blind spot
The motion aftereffect consists of the perception of motion
when one views, for example, a screen containing station-
ary dots, after being exposed to motion (of the opposite di-
rection) during a previous adaptation phase. Murakami
(1995) studied the motion aftereffect after monocular
adaptation to filled-in motion at the blind spot. Does the re-
gion of the blind spot (which contains no photoreceptors
and so is not stimulated) also generate an aftereffect?
Instead of directly assessing whether a regular afteref-
fect is produced, Murakami assessed the interocular trans-
fer of the effect, that is, whether the motion aftereffect
could be measured at the corresponding visual field of the
other eye. It is well known that a standard motion afteref-
fect transfers interocularly. Murakami found that the af-
tereffect also transfers interocularly in the blind spot case.
In other words, adaptation to filled-in motion at the blind
spot of one eye can cause a motion aftereffect at the cor-
responding visual field of the other eye. This result pro-
vides evidence for the perception of real motion and the
perception of filled-in motion sharing a common neural
pathway in an early stage of the visual system (see also note
8). If the brain treated perceptually completed motion at
the blind spot and real motion differently, then one would
not expect the motion aftereffect to transfer. Murakami’s
study thus provides a measurable effect of what appears to
be the brain’s having taken the trouble to fill in the motion
at the blind spot, though not necessarily in a topographic
manner.
On the other hand, in an earlier study, Cumming and
Friend (1980) compared the strength of the tilt aftereffect
induced by (partial) gratings completed across the blind
spot with control gratings. Gratings were seen as completed
across the blind spot, but the magnitude of the tilt afteref-
fect they induced suggested that the perceptually com-
pleted portions of the gratings did not contribute to the af-
tereffect. However, this negative result must be interpreted
with care. One cannot rule out the possibility of completion
contributing to the effect because the mechanisms involved
may be at a “higher” processing level than the ones involved
in the effect being probed (the tilt aftereffect).
7.2. Stabilized images
Several studies have shown that the changes in perceived
color associated with color filling-in due to stabilized retinal
images produce indirect effects that can be measured psy-
chophysically. Here we briefly review some recent studies.
The sensitivity to a small-field, flickering, blue test light
is significantly altered by adaptation to yellow light. Pi-
antanida (1985) studied whether yellow adaptation induced
by the filling-in of a stabilized image would have the same
effect on S-cone flicker sensitivity when compared with an
actual yellow light illuminating the retina. His results
showed that a yellow background induced by the filling-in
of a stabilized image is as effective in reducing flicker sen-
sitivity as an actual yellow background applied directly to
the retina.
According to current thinking, flicker sensitivity can be
affected by attenuation of the signals in the corresponding
pathways. For example, a yellow background is known to
reduce the flicker sensitivity of the S-cone system. Pugh
and Mollon (1979) have proposed a two-stage model, in
which attenuation would occur at the S cones themselves
and at a site where S-cone signals interact antagonistically
with other classes of cones. The precise mechanisms
posited to account for these effects need not concern us
here, but it is clear that an actual yellow light modifies the
state of possibly several stages in the visual system. At the
same time, Piantanida’s results show that the perception of
yellow in a region that is physically dark produces equiva-
lent results. His results suggest that the perception of yel-
low due to perceptual filling-in is associated with the same
types of changes that occur when the visual system is pre-
sented with an actual yellow light.
Nerger et al. (1993) investigated how hue cancellation
and increment thresholds are affected for backgrounds that
are retinally stabilized compared with nonstabilized back-
grounds. They employed a disk-annulus stimulus in which
the outer border was always unstabilized, and the disk could
be either stabilized or not stabilized. The disk and annulus
were illuminated by either 575 or 640 nm light; when one
was 575 nm, the other was 640 nm. In the nonstabilized
condition, subjects saw, for example, a red disk surrounded
by a yellow annulus. In the stabilized condition, the color of
the 640 nm disk changed from red to yellow. When subjects
were asked to perform a hue cancellation of the test probe
(so that it appeared neither reddish nor greenish), the sta-
bilized and nonstabilized conditions produced different
settings. (Note, however, that in both conditions the same
640 nm disk was imaged on the retina.) This result shows
that the color appearance of the background can influence
the color of lights superimposed on it. Nerger et al. also
evaluated increment thresholds (in which an incremental
test flash must be detected) for both conditions; they
showed that these did not differ.13 Thus increment thresh-
olds are unaffected by the appearance of the adapting field
and depend only on its spectral energy distribution. Nerger
et al. propose a two-site model, in which filling-in affects
the second (color-opponent) adaptation site, but not the
first site where gain changes occur.
7.3. Illusory figures
7.3.1. Featural completion. Dresp (1992) studied whether
threshold elevation (for the detection of a small light spot)
would be similar throughout an illusory Kanizsa square. She
reasoned that if filling-in mechanisms were responsible for
producing uniform brightness levels throughout the figure,
thresholds should be similar at the center of a square and
near inducing elements. The results instead showed that
thresholds decreased at the center of the figure.
Although Dresp interprets her results as being at odds
with a brightness filling-in mechanism responsible for illu-
sory figure brightness, there are several critical points that
have to be considered. “Increment sensitivity and subjec-
tive brightness are not necessarily related by any simple
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function” (Fiorentini, 1972, p. 195; see also Cornsweet &
Teller 1965). For example, increment thresholds follow
(more or less) the brightness of light Mach bands (Békéséy
1968), but not of dark Mach bands (see also Burkhardt
1966). Although a positive finding – constant threshold el-
evation throughout – would provide some indication of the
levels within the visual system in which contrast elevation
and brightness processes are operative, a negative finding
such as Dresp’s is hard to interpret because threshold ele-
vation might be probing rather early processes.
7.3.2. Boundary completion. Paradiso et al. (1989) studied
whether adaptation to illusory contours produces tilt after-
effects comparable to those obtained for regular real lines.
They initially established that illusory contours used in both
adaptation and test phases produce strong tilt aftereffects.
Can adaptation to illusory contours induce an aftereffect
when real lines are used in the test phase (or vice versa)?
Paradiso and colleagues showed that the answer is yes.
Adaptation to real lines induces a strong aftereffect when
testing with illusory contours, but a significantly weaker af-
tereffect is obtained when adaptation to illusory contours is
used and real lines are tested. The authors attribute this
asymmetry to the corresponding asymmetry in the distrib-
ution of receptive field types in areas V1 and V2 (cells re-
sponding to illusory contour stimuli are typically found only
in V2).
In another experiment, Paradiso et al. (1989) evaluated
the degree of interocular transfer of the tilt aftereffect,
which was found to be stronger when the test stimulus was
illusory than when it was real. As the authors observe, these
results are consistent with the idea that neural mechanisms
activated by illusory contours are more binocular than those
activated by real lines (assuming that cortical binocularity
underlies interocular transfer).
In summary, the existence of a tilt aftereffect with illu-
sory contours and its dependence on adaptation angle indi-
cate the existence of orientation-selective neurons that re-
spond to illusory contour stimuli. Moreover, the interocular
transfer shows that real and illusory contours share an early
visual pathway.
7.4. Chromatic diffusion and the gap effect
When two equiluminant colored fields abut, no clearly vis-
ible contour is seen. This occurs even for color differences
of twice threshold (Eskew & Boynton 1987). This stimulus
configuration can sometimes produce chromatic diffusion
(Eskew 1989; Eskew & Boynton 1987). For small fields dif-
ferentially exciting the S cones, the violet and green colors
“bleed” across the (invisible) contour, thereby producing a
larger uniform area after an initially apparent color differ-
ence sinks below threshold.
A remarkable property of the juxtaposed color-patch
stimulus configuration is that color discrimination may be
severely impaired. When the two fields are separated
slightly discrimination improves substantially. Boynton et
al. (1977) named this effect the gap effect. According to
Boynton et al., the gap effect is related to a spatial averag-
ing mechanism that integrates the two patches together.
The small border or gap prevents such integration and im-
proves sensitivity.
Eskew (1989, p. 717) suggested that chromatic diffusion
(the perceptual bleeding of colors across an invisible con-
tour) was related to a physical process of integration: “chro-
matic diffusion . . . seemed as if it could be the visible ap-
pearance of such an integrating process, observed in real
time.” He determined the chromatic discrimination thresh-
olds for juxtaposed fields as a function of stimulus duration
– that is, the fields were flashed for a certain time. Dis-
criminations were maximal at 400 msec and declined lin-
early (on a log scale). Eskew interpreted the approximately
exponential time-course of the decrease in sensitivity in
terms of a diffusive mechanism. The optimal presentation
time was linked to the lack of time for the integration
process to reduce the color differences across the border.
Note that for such exposure durations the introduction of
the gap has little or no effect. This is not the case for longer
exposure durations, where the introduction of the gap im-
proves discrimination. Also consistent with a spatial diffu-
sive mechanism is the finding by Eskew and Boynton
(1987), in which the change in sensitivity as a function of
time is reduced for a short wide stimulus when compared
with a tall narrow one.14
7.5. Summary
Experimental investigations of the blind spot, stabilized im-
ages, illusory figures, and chromatic diffusion and the gap
effect provide suggestive evidence about certain conse-
quences of perceptual completion. In particular, they point
to measurable effects that seem to depend on representing
a presence rather than ignoring an absence.
8. Filling-in without analytic isomorphism 
and Cartesian materialism
We now return to the conceptual issues surrounding the
neural–perceptual relation. We have seen that there is con-
siderable evidence for neural filling-in. The main point of
this section is to show that the existence of neural filling-in
does not entail either analytic isomorphism or Cartesian
materialism.
Discussions of neural filling-in have been closely tied to
the doctrine of analytic isomorphism. Visual scientists
sometimes interpret the evidence for neural filling-in
within the framework of analytic isomorphism (see sect.
8.1). On the other hand, Dennett rejects Cartesian materi-
alism and with it neural filling-in: although he appears to
concede that neural filling-in is an “empirical possibility,”
and says that he does not wish “to prejudge the question”
(1991, p. 353), he nevertheless asserts that the “idea of fill-
ing in . . . is a dead giveaway of vestigial Cartesian materi-
alism” (p. 344).
We agree that any argument for neural filling-in based on
Cartesian materialism should be rejected. However, the
empirical case for neural filling-in as reviewed above can be
separated from Cartesian materialism. Hence theories and
models in visual science that appeal to neural filling-in on
the basis of such evidence need not be motivated by Carte-
sian materialism. One must distinguish sharply between the
existence of neural filling-in as an empirical matter and
Cartesian materialist interpretations of filling-in. Visual sci-
entists are mistaken when they interpret the evidence for
neural filling-in within the framework of analytic isomor-
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phism, but it is equally mistaken to say that talk of filling-in
must mean a commitment to Cartesian materialism.
8.1. Isomorphism and the bridge locus
As we discussed in section 2, the term isomorphism first
gained prominence in visual science through the work of
Köhler. Although the concept of isomorphism has often
been interpreted to mean a spatial or topographic corre-
spondence, Köhler held that neural–perceptual isomor-
phism should be thought of as topological or functional.
Our view is that there is nothing conceptually wrong with
these sorts of isomorphism as such. Whether there are ei-
ther spatial/topographic or topological/functional neural–
perceptual isomorphisms in any given case is an empirical
question for cognitive neuroscience to decide.
What we find problematic is the doctrine of analytic iso-
morphism, which holds that cognitive neuroscientific ex-
planation requires the postulation of a “final stage” in the
brain – a bridge locus – in which there is an isomorphism
between neural activity and how things seem to the subject.
There are two critical points to be made here, one con-
cerning the role played by the concept of the bridge locus
and the other concerning the concept of isomorphism.
In their framework for mapping between the neural and
the perceptual domains, Teller and Pugh (1983) call the
neural structure that “forms the immediate substrate of vi-
sual perception” the bridge locus. They write:
Most visual scientists probably believe that there exists a set of
neurons with visual system input, whose activities form the im-
mediate substrate of visual perception. We single out this one
particular neural stage, with a name: bridge locus. The oc-
curence of a particular activity pattern in these bridge locus
neurons is necessary for the occurence of a particular percep-
tual state; neural activity elsewhere in the visual system is not
necessary. The physical location of these neurons in the brain
is of course unknown. However, we feel that most visual scien-
tists would agree that they are certainly not in the retina. For if
one could set up conditions for properly stimulating them in the
absence of the retina, the correlated perceptual state would
presumably occur. (p. 581)
This passage expresses a number of different ideas that
need to be disentangled. First, Teller and Pugh state ex-
plicitly that a particular pattern of activity at the bridge lo-
cus is necessary for the occurrence of a particular percep-
tual state. However, at the end of the passage they also
explicitly state that retinal stimulation is probably not nec-
essary (assuming one could stimulate the bridge locus neu-
rons directly), thereby suggesting that the bridge locus ac-
tivity pattern is sufficient for the perceptual state.
Therefore, it seems that part of what they mean by “bridge
locus” is a particular set of neurons having a particular pat-
tern of activity that is necessary and sufficient for a partic-
ular perceptual state. Second, in calling the bridge locus a
particular “neural stage,” and in saying that this stage is not
likely to be found in the retina, Teller and Pugh seem to be
conceiving of the bridge locus in a localizationist manner as
a particular cortical region or area.
Analytic isomorphism relies on the concept of the bridge
locus. Consider the following statement by Todorovic´
(1987, p. 549): “A logical consequence of the isomorphistic
approach is that a neural activity distribution not isomor-
phic with the percept cannot be its ultimate neural founda-
tion.” By “ultimate neural foundation” Todorovic´ indicates
that he means the bridge locus. The doctrine of analytic iso-
morphism states that it is a condition on the adequacy of
cognitive neuroscientific explanation that there be an ulti-
mate neural foundation in which an isomorphism obtains
between neural activity and the subject’s experience.
We are suspicious of this notion of the bridge locus. Why
must there be one particular neural stage whose activity
forms the immediate substrate of visual perception? Such
a neural stage is not logically necessary; moreover – to bor-
row Ratliff and Sirovich’s point about neural filling-in – par-
simony demands that any such stage be considered only if
neurophysiologic evidence for it should appear. On this
score, however, the evidence to date does not seem to favor
the idea. First, brain regions are not independent stages or
modules; they interact reciprocally due to dense forward
and backward projections, as well as reciprocal cross-
connections (Zeki & Shipp 1988). There is ample evidence
from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and psychophysics of
the highly interactive, context-dependent nature of visual
processing (DeYoe & Van Essen 1995). Second, cells in vi-
sual areas are not mere “feature detectors,” for they are sen-
sitive to many sorts of attributes (Martin 1988; Schiller
1995). One of the main ideas to emerge from neuroscience
in recent years is that the brain relies on distributed net-
works that transiently coordinate their activities (Singer
1995; Vaadia et al. 1995), rather than centralized represen-
tations. Finally, Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992) have ar-
gued that the notion of a single neural stage for conscious-
ness hinders our ability to make sense of neural and
psychophysical data about temporal perception.
Some of these critical points could perhaps be met by re-
lying on a less localizationist conception of the bridge locus,
which, as Todorovic´ (1987, p. 550) observes, is probably an
“oversimplified notion,” because “there is no compelling
reason to believe that the bridge locus is confined to neu-
rons of a single type within a single cortical area.”15 Al-
though this is a step in the right direction, the term bridge
locus – defined as “the location [our emphasis] at which the
closest associations between y [physiological] and f [psy-
chological] states occur” (Teller & Pugh 1983, p. 588) –
does not strike us as particularly useful for thinking about
the distributed neural correlates of perceptual experience.
For example, such correlates might involve neural assem-
blies in which membership is defined through a temporal
code, such as response synchronization (Singer 1995;
Varela 1995). For this reason, we think that the concept of
the bridge locus should be abandoned.
To abandon the concept of the bridge locus means re-
jecting analytic isomorphism, because analytic isomor-
phism depends on this concept. However, some visual sci-
entists reject analytic isomorphism while nevertheless
adhering to the concept of the bridge locus. For example,
Ratliff and Sirovich (1978) denied analytic isomorphism,
but asserted that the neural processes involved in percep-
tion “must reach a final stage eventually.” The notion of a
“final stage” seems equivalent to the notion of the bridge lo-
cus. We would reject any framework that depends on the
concept of the bridge locus, whether isomorphic or noniso-
morphic.
We now return to the concept of isomorphism. A good
example of what we object to in analytic isomorphism can
be found in a statement made by Todorovic´ (1987) in his
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discussion of “isomorphistic” versus “nonisomorphistic”
theories of the Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet effect. Todorovic´
admits that any mapping from neural to perceptual states
“is an aspect of the notorious mind-body problem,” but
then goes on to say that “conceptually the idea of an iso-
morphism between certain aspects of neural activity and
certain aspects of percepts may be more acceptable [than a
nonisomorphic mapping], at least within a general reduc-
tive stance that assumes that, at some level of description,
perceptual states are neural states” (1987, p. 550). We dis-
agree. On the one hand, as Todorovic´ recognizes, and as
Köhler himself observed more than 30 years ago (Köhler
1960, pp. 80–81), the thesis of neural–perceptual isomor-
phism does not logically entail mind–brain identity. On the
other hand, suppose one does assume that “at some level of
description, perceptual states are neural states.” Still,
neural–perceptual analytic isomorphism would be plausi-
ble only if perceptual states are strictly identical to neural
states (so that each type of perceptual state is identical to a
particular type of neural state). However, isomorphism
would not be plausible if the identity is weak, that is, if per-
ceptual states are multiply realizable with respect to neural
states (so that, although every perceptual state is identical
to some neural state, one and the same type of perceptual
state can be realized in many different types of neural
states, or in many different types of nonneural physical
states for that matter). This issue of strong (or type) iden-
tity versus weak (or token) identity is indeed “an aspect of
the notorious mind-body problem,” and nothing that
Todorovic´ says favors the strong identity thesis. Hence no
basis has been given for the a priori claim that isomorphism
is conceptually preferable to nonisomorphism in cognitive
neuroscientific explanation.
9. Filling-in and the personal/subpersonal
distinction
The final matters we wish to discuss are open-ended and
programmatic, for they concern some of the broad concep-
tual and methodological issues raised by our discussion of 
filling-in. We have seen that arguments for filling-in based
on either analytic isomorphism or Cartesian materialism
must be rejected. During the course of our discussion, a
fundamental conceptual point emerged, namely, that one
cannot infer anything about the nature of the neural repre-
sentational medium of visual perception from the charac-
ter of the subject’s perceptual content (see sect. 5.1). For
example, suppose one has a perceptual experience that
there is something red in front of one. It does not follow on
logical, conceptual, or methodological grounds that there is
a spatial or pictorial representation of the red region in one’s
brain.
We think that the full significance of this conceptual
point has to do with an important distinction – the distinc-
tion between the personal and the subpersonal (this termi-
nology comes from Dennett 1978, pp. 153–54). One must
distinguish between attributions of content to the person or
animal and attributions of content to the brain or nervous
system (McDowell 1994). Personal level attributions treat
the animal as an embodied whole embedded in an envi-
ronment and as constrained by norms of rationality. In con-
trast, attributions of content to the brain (e.g., the visual 
system) involve hypotheses about the animal’s internal
functional organization. In this section, we wish to show the
relevance of this distinction to the filling-in controversy in
visual science.
9.1. The personal/subpersonal distinction 
and task-level conceptions of vision
During the past two decades there has been considerable
research into the subpersonal mechanisms of visual per-
ception. One prominent research program, based on the
work of Marr (1982) and Poggio et al. (1985), conceives of
vision as a kind of “inverse optics” – a process of producing
representations in the brain of the three-dimensional lay-
out of objects from the limited information encoded in the
two-dimensional retinal image. The central idea of this ap-
proach is that the visual system must construct an accurate
representation of the world on the basis of the limited in-
formation available to the retina. However, different, non-
representational lines of research also have emerged in the
past two decades. In particular, the “ecological approach”
of Gibson (1979) and his followers (Turvey et al. 1981), as
well as the more recent “animate vision” approach (Ballard
1991; 1996; Ballard et al. 1997), emphasizes not the infor-
mation available to the retina, but rather the information
available to the animal as it explores its environment.
We think that the distinction between the personal and
the subpersonal has a direct bearing on the debate between
representational and nonrepresentational approaches to vi-
sual perception (McDowell 1994; Noë 1995; Thompson
1995, pp. 232–42), and in turn on the filling-in controversy.
Because the representational approach holds that vision
comprises a set of complex information-processing tasks, it
concentrates on representational/computational processes
underlying our perceptual capabilities. These processes are
all subpersonal, occurring within the animal’s brain. In con-
trast, Gibson’s ecological approach aims to provide an ac-
count, not of what goes on inside the animal, but rather of
what the active, probing animal itself accomplishes in its en-
vironment. As Gibson put it: “In my theory, perception is
not supposed to occur in the brain but to arise in the retino-
neuro-muscular system as an activity of the whole system”
(1972, p. 217). “Perceiving is an achievement of the indi-
vidual, not an experience in the theatre of consciousness”
(1979, p. 239). The central point made here is clear: the
proper subject of perception is not the brain, but rather the
whole embodied animal interacting with its environment.
We believe that this point can be accepted even by those
who reject the details of Gibson’s specific hypotheses.
The subpersonal level is important if we wish to under-
stand the neural mechanisms and processes that underlie
our perceptual capabilities. However, the subpersonal level
has influenced visual science to such an extent that the per-
ceptual subject – the person or animal – has been neglected
(with notable exceptions such as Gibson). We find this ne-
glect unacceptable. Attention to the animal as the subject
of perception is important for two interconnected reasons:
first, it corrects certain conceptual problems that often
emerge in the subpersonal, representational understanding
of vision; and second, it suggests a better kind of task-level
analysis of vision than that found in the representational 
approach.
Most computational and neural network models of vision
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are “image-based” in the sense that they follow Marr’s idea
that “vision is the process of discovering from images what
is present in the world, and where it is” (Marr 1982, p. 2).
The images are patterns of light on the retinal array, and to
represent what is present in the world and where it is, the
content contained in the images must be extracted and re-
constructed through complex internal processing. This ac-
count of vision is subpersonal because the animal – the per-
ceptual subject – has no place in it. The problem with such
subpersonal answers to the question “what is vision?” is that
they lead to conceptual confusions and thus to an unsatis-
factory task-level account of vision. For example, consider
another statement from Marr: “The purpose of these rep-
resentations [the primal sketch and the 2!s-dimensional
sketch] is to provide useful descriptions of aspects of the
real world” (1982, p. 43). Who is reading the descriptions?
Such an approach seems guilty of the fallacy of supposing
that there is a homunculus in the head whose job is to view
the incoming information (Thompson 1995, pp. 234–35;
for further discussion see Noë 1995). The animal, on the
other hand, simply sees aspects of the world. At the level of
the animal, there are no images, representations, or de-
scriptions in visual perception (except, of course, when
viewing something in the world that is an image, represen-
tation, or description); there is rather a perception-action
system that enables the animal to visually guide its activity
and thereby visually explore its environment. Thus by at-
tending carefully to the level of the animal – the personal
level – we arrive at a task-level conception of vision differ-
ent from the representational one: the task of vision is not
to produce representations from images, but rather to dis-
cover through a perceptual system what is present in the
world and where it is (McClamrock 1995; Thompson 1995).
Although this kind of task-level conception of visual per-
ception derives from Gibson (1979), it is clearly evident in
other recent cognitive science research programs, such as
“active” and “animate” vision (Aloimonos et al. 1988; Bajcsy
1988; Ballard 1991; 1996; Ballard et al. 1997), embodied 
artificial intelligence (Brooks 1991), autonomous systems
(Varela & Bourgine 1992), and enactive perception and
cognition (Clark 1996; Thompson et al. 1992; Varela et al.
1991). The main idea held in common by these research
programs is that proper task-level analyses of perception
and cognition are “activity-based” (Brooks 1991) – for ex-
ample, the task of vision is to guide activity or behavior
(such as hand–eye coordination in the manipulation of ob-
jects), rather than to construct an elaborate internal model
of a scene. The need for representations is minimized
through reliance on the perceptually guided action of the
animal or system as a whole. As Brooks (1991, p. 139) ob-
serves, it is “better to use the world as its own model” than
to suppose the world has to be represented in the head.
O’Regan (1992, p. 484) expresses the same idea when he
suggests that the environment provides an “external mem-
ory” for the animal to probe as the need arises.
What is the relevance of the personal/subpersonal dis-
tinction to the filling-in controversy? To a large extent, in-
vocations of filling-in as a theoretical category, especially
those based on either analytic isomorphism or Cartesian
materialism, depend on the subpersonal, representational
conception of the task of vision. Indeed, on this conception,
filling-in provides a paradigm of the kind of construction on
which vision depends: the job of filling-in is to complete im-
ages or representations in the brain. For example, Gross-
berg (1987a, p. 93) writes: “The images that reach the retina
can be occluded and segmented by the veins in several
places. Somehow, broken retinal contours need to be com-
pleted and occluded retinal color and brightness signals
need to be filled in. Holes in the retina, such as the blind
spot or certain scotomas, are also not visually perceived . . .
due to a combination of boundary completion and filling-in
processes . . . ”. In addition, in another article with Min-
golla: “Without featural filling-in, we would perceive a
world of colored edges, instead of a world of extended
forms” (Grossberg & Mingolla 1985, p. 175). However, to
reject the representational conception of vision in favor of
an animal-centered and activity-based conception is to
downgrade the importance of filling-in as a theoretical cat-
egory in the explanation of vision. This point reinforces
from a different angle our earlier points that propositions
about filling-in as a whole need careful consideration and
that evidence for neural filling-in must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. As we argued earlier (sects. 6 and 7), we
believe that in particular cases there is evidence for neural
filling-in, but our present point is that, once shorn of its con-
nections to the representational conception of vision, such
filling-in seems a shadow of its former self.
9.2. Recovering the personal in visual science
In the previous section, we argued for the importance of the
distinction between the personal and the subpersonal in the
understanding of vision. In this final section, we wish to dis-
cuss a particular assumption about perceptual content that
plays a role in certain criticisms of filling-in (Dennett 1991;
O’Regan 1992) and that results from neglecting the per-
sonal level. The assumption is that there is no difference in
kind between perceptual content at the personal level and
neural content at the subpersonal level. We reject this uni-
formity of content thesis. We hold that there is a difference
in kind between the content of visual perception at the per-
sonal level and the content of neural states at the subper-
sonal level: perceptual content pertains to the animal as a
whole interacting with its environment and requires for its
description an animal-centered task-level account of vision,
whereas neural content pertains to the animal’s internal
functional organization and requires for its description lev-
els of explanation concerned with internal processing.
To see the uniformity thesis at work we need to consider
some examples. Our first example is taken from Dennett’s
discussion of filling-in (see sect. 5.1); this example will be
supplemented by two others from visual science.
Suppose someone walks into a room where the walls are
covered with wallpaper whose pattern is a regular array of
hundreds of identical images of Marilyn Monroe (Dennett
1991, pp. 354–55; 1992). The person would report seeing
that the wall is covered with hundreds of identical Marilyns.
However, the person can foveate only a few Marilyns at a
time and the resolution of parafoveal vision is not good
enough to discriminate between Marilyns and colored
shapes. One can conclude that the brain represents that
there are hundreds of identical Marilyns, but not that there
is a spatial or pictorial representation of each identical Mar-
ilyn (see O’Regan 1992, pp. 474–75, 481). Conceptually, this
example is analogous to the filling-in cases discussed ear-
lier: just as the experience of a gapless visual field does not
entail neural filling-in of the blind spot, so seeing that the
wall is covered with hundreds of identical Marilyns does not
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entail a neural representation of each individual Marilyn.
Indeed, in putting forth this example, Dennett conjectures
that the brain does not bother to fill in the Marilyns, in the
sense of propagating a high-resolution, foveated Marilyn
image “across an internal mapping of an expanse of wall”;
rather, the brain just “jumps to the conclusion that the rest
are Marilyns, and labels the whole region ‘more Marilyns’
without any further rendering of Marilyns at all” (Dennett
1991, p. 355). Yet he goes on to say: “it does not seem that
way to you. It seems to you as if you are actually seeing hun-
dreds of identical Marilyns.” The implication is that in some
sense the person’s experience of the Marilyns is mistaken or
illusory, and the reason seems to be that there is no picture
in the person’s brain that represents each Marilyn distinctly.
The blind spot is treated in a similar way. Here too the hy-
pothesis is that the brain jumps to a conclusion, but again
“it certainly does not seem that way from the ‘first-person
point of view’” (Dennett 1992, p. 47). The person’s experi-
ence of the blind spot being filled in is an illusion because
there is no picture in the brain being filled in (the brain is
really just jumping to a conclusion in the senses discussed
in sect. 5.1). In general, the moral is supposed to be that al-
though our field of view seems to be full of detail, the de-
tail is actually an illusion (see also pp. 366, 408, 467–68). It
is this conclusion and the reasoning behind it that depend,
we think, on the uniformity thesis.
There are two problematic steps in the reasoning, both
of which depend on the uniformity of content thesis. First,
it is assumed that in the absence of a brain-level pictorial
representation of each of the identical Marilyns the person
cannot have a percept with the content that there are hun-
dreds of identical Marilyns. What is striking about this rea-
soning is that it relies on analytic isomorphism: the under-
lying assumption is that it is a necessary condition of a
person’s having an experience that there be states in the
person’s brain isomorphic to how things are represented as
being (for similar criticism, see Sedivy 1995, p. 475). Such
analytic isomorphism is also evident in Dennett’s idea that
for consciousness to be really continuous, the subpersonal
neural processes would have to be continuous, but they are
not, so the continuity of consciousness is an illusion: “One
of the most striking features of consciousness is its discon-
tinuity. Another is its apparent continuity. One makes a big
mistake if one attempts to explain its apparent continuity by
describing the brain as ‘filling in’ the gaps” (Dennett 1992,
p. 48). In Dennett’s case, the analytic isomorphism appears
to be driven by the uniformity thesis – by the idea that per-
ceptual content at the personal level just is the content of
brain states at the subpersonal level. We accept the general
thesis that facts about brain-level content determine what
the person sees or experiences, but we deny that the gen-
eral thesis entails the uniformity thesis and that there must
be an isomorphic neural representation of the perceptual
content.
The second problem comes from making the following
assumption about perceptual experience: in having an ex-
perience of, for example, hundreds of identical Marilyns on
the wall, it seems to one that the Marilyns are all there in
one’s mind or brain. Thus Dennett says of someone who
claims to see all the Marilyns: “The hundreds of Marilyns in
the wallpaper seem to be present in your experience, seem
to be in your mind, not just on the wall. . . . But why should
your brain bother importing all those Marilyns in the first
place?” (Dennett 1991, pp. 359–60). Once again, the con-
clusion being drawn is that the person’s experience of the
Marilyns is mistaken, and the reason given is that there is
no picture in the brain that represents each Marilyn dis-
tinctly. The reasoning depends on the assumption that it
seems to the person that there is such a picture in his or her
mind or brain. Put more explicitly: the reasoning depends
on the idea that visual experience is pictorial, in the sense
that to have a visual experience that is really of hundreds of
identical Marilyns is to have a picture in the mind or brain
with precisely that content. Clearly, to think of visual expe-
rience as being pictorial in this way depends on the unifor-
mity of content thesis.
The assumption of the pictorial nature of visual experi-
ence is widespread in visual science, as we have seen in con-
sidering the analytic isomorphism argument for filling-in
(see Todorovic´ 1987, and our discussion of the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet effect in sect. 1). However, it also plays
a role in the interpretations given to some experimental
studies by researchers critical of filling-in. For example,
building on Dennett’s discussion, Blakemore et al. (1995)
investigated the ability to register changes in visual scenes
across saccadic eye movement. In the first experiment, they
compared cases in which the image changed (or did not
change) and moved in an unpredictable direction (forcing
a saccadic eye movement) with cases in which the image
stayed in the same place and changed (or did not change).
The image changes involved the appearance, disappear-
ance, or rotation of an object in the scene. Blakemore et al.
found that when the image did not move, subjects reliably
detected the changes, but when the image moved their per-
formance fell to chance. In the second experiment, they
compared cases in which the image changed and moved (as
in the first experiment) with cases in which the image
changed but stayed in the same place, and a mid-gray in-
terstimulus interval separated the two images in time. This
“gray-out” condition was designed to mimic what happens
during a saccade. In the gray-out condition the subjects’
performance was considerably reduced, though not to
chance levels. Blakemore et al. interpret their results as
showing “the fragility of [transsaccadic] visual memory for
a complex scene” (p. 1080). They write: “we believe that we
see a complete, dynamic picture of a stable, uniformly de-
tailed, and colourful world,” but “[o]ur stable visual world
may be constructed out of a brief retinal image and a very
sketchy, higher-level representation along with a pop-out
mechanism to redirect attention. The richness of our visual
world is, to this extent, an illusion” (p. 1075).
O’Regan, Rensink, and colleagues have also contributed
important studies on the ability to perceive changes in
scenes, and have come to the same conclusion as Dennett
and Blakemore et al. (O’Regan et al. 1996; Rensink et al.
1996; for a discussion of other relevant research, going back
to the 1970s, see Grimes 1996). In one study (Rensink et al.
1996), an image of a natural scene was continually alter-
nated with a modified image, with a blank field inserted be-
tween each display. The duration of each image was 240
msec; the blank field lasted 80 msec. The modified image
was the same as the original except for one change that in-
volved either the removal of an object present in the origi-
nal scene or a change in the color or spatial position of an
object. Subjects found the changes very difficult to notice
under these “flicker conditions,” even though the changes
were large and easily observable under normal conditions.
Rensink et al. interpret these results as indicating that 
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attention is required to perceive change and that visual rep-
resentations are accurate only for those aspects of a scene
that are of greatest importance to the perceiver. On the ba-
sis of this experiment and another experiment investigating
transients that affect attention (O’Regan et al. 1996), these
authors conclude: “essentially only the ‘center of interest’ of
a picture is encoded in memory. The impression of contin-
uously seeing ‘all’ of a visual scene may be an illusion de-
riving from the fact that any change usually creates a visual
transient that attracts attention to the changing location”
(O’Regan et al. 1996).
We think that these studies provide a promising ap-
proach for investigating visual memory and visual attention,
but we think that it is problematic to interpret them as
showing that our impression of the visual world is a kind of
illusion, for such an interpretation depends both on the uni-
formity of content thesis and the thesis that visual experi-
ence has a pictorial character.
The main problem with both theses is that they are based
on neglecting the animal-centered or personal-level ac-
count of the task of vision. They result from trying to un-
derstand perceptual content at the level of what goes inside
the animal, rather than at the level of what the animal ac-
complishes in its environment. At the level of the animal –
the personal level – the task of vision is to guide activity in
the world, not to produce internal representations.
For example, it is true that, in seeming to see the hun-
dreds of identical Marilyns, it does not seem to you that
your brain jumps to a conclusion. However, there is no rea-
son to think that it should seem that your brain jumps to a
conclusion. After all, suppose your brain actually filled in a
detailed Marilyn image through some internal spatial map.
It would not seem that way to you either. In general, it does
not seem to you – the person – that your brain does any-
thing one way or another when you perceive; you simply
perceive the world (and, on occasion, misperceive it, as in
the blind spot demonstrations).
This point is really a conceptual one about how to un-
derstand perceptual content. The claim is that perceptual
content has to be understood in relation to task-level ac-
counts at the personal level, because perceptual content has
to do with the world, not with representations (pictorial or
otherwise) in the brain. As we suggested in section 9.1, at
the personal level, there are no pictures, images, or other
representations in visual perception; there is simply experi-
ence of the world. For example, when viewing the blind
spot demonstration in Figure 3, what seems to the subject
to happen is not that the brain fills in some inner image or
picture (or that the brain jumps to a conclusion), but rather
that something in the world – the black spot on the page –
disappears while being replaced (or perhaps covered over:
see Durgin et al. 1995) by what is present in the surround.
Similarly, the Marilyns do not seem to be present in one’s
experience or in one’s mind (whatever that might mean);
they seem to be present there on the wall. More generally,
one does not have the impression of a complete, dynamic
picture of a stable, uniformly detailed, and colorful world (a
picture that may or may not correspond to the subpersonal
neural representations); one has the impression of a stable,
colorful world (and, we might add, the impression is in the
main correct: the world is stable and colored).
The importance of this point for visual science is twofold.
First, in devising experiments and in interpreting their re-
sults, care must be taken to ensure that the evaluation of
perceptual content is not determined by subpersonal con-
siderations about internal processing, but rather by task-
level accounts at the personal level. Second, to recognize
the importance of the personal level in this way means that,
within the embracing context of cognitive science, scientific
research into the subpersonal mechanisms of visual per-
ception needs to be complemented by careful studies of
perceptual content at the personal level (for further dis-
cussion, see Thompson et al., 1998).
10. Directions for further research
Our intention in this target article has been to offer a guide
to perceptual completion for visual science and the philos-
ophy of perception. In recent years, perceptual psycholo-
gists and visual neuroscientists have provided a wealth of
new studies of perceptual completion, and these studies
have attracted the attention of philosophers. Psychophysi-
cists have produced a large body of experimental results,
while neurophysiologists have begun probing the mecha-
nisms to determine the neural substrates of the various
sorts of perceptual completion. At the same time, theoret-
ical modelers have tried to produce formal specifications of
the mechanisms involved, while philosophers have tried to
clarify some of the conceptual issues that arise in discus-
sions of perceptual completion. In this target article, we
hope to have shown that close collaboration between these
four fields is indispensible for the visual science of percep-
tual completion and for the philosophy of perception. With-
out such collaboration, visual scientists run the risk of pro-
ducing isolated facts that do not contribute to an integrated
understanding of perceptual completion, while philoso-
phers run the risk of ignoring important experimental and
theoretical studies that bear on the fundamental conceptual
issues.
The collaborative framework that we have tried to pro-
vide here suggests several specific directions for further re-
search:
First, we encourage explicit consideration of linking
propositions in both theoretical and experimental work.
For example, when investigators suggest that a set of cells
in a given region of the visual system is the neural substrate
of a perceptual phenomenon, it should be clearly stated ex-
actly how the presumed mapping is intended to hold. In
particular, it is necessary to show not only that certain cel-
lular properties correlate well with perceptual events, but
that the lack of perceptual completion is paralleled by an
absence of the underlying cell responses – as done by von
der Heydt et al. (1984) and De Weerd et al. (1995).
Second, in psychophysics there has recently been con-
siderable interest in the nature of modal and amodal com-
pletion. Are these subserved by common mechanisms or
are they distinct? One promising line of investigation at-
tempts to reveal whether certain experimental manipula-
tions affect the two types of completion in similar ways. We
suggest that a complementary line of investigation be em-
ployed to assess the effects of completion. Do modal and
amodal completion produce similar types of “by-products”
or not? In general, we advocate that studies of perceptual
completion investigate the potential effects of completion
processes in an attempt to determine more precisely the
mechanisms involved.
Third, much of the evidence for neural filling-in discussed
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above derives from experimental designs that presuppose
the “image-based” or representational task-level concep-
tion of vision, rather than the active, animal-centered one.
We believe that more “ecologically valid” studies of per-
ceptual completion are needed, by which we mean studies
based on the active, animal-centered task-level conception
of vision.
Finally, we advocate careful studies of perceptual expe-
rience at the personal level as a complement to experimen-
tal research. Whenever we attempt to understand and ex-
plain our perception, we do so on the basis of our own
perceptual experience of the world. Unless this experience
has been conceptually clarified and systematically de-
scribed, our scientific explanations will always be incom-
plete.
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NOTES
1. Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed.
2. See for example the debate between Ramachandran (1993b;
Churchland & Ramachandran 1993) and Dennett (1993; 1996a),
and the exchange between Durgin et al. (1995) and Ramachan-
dran (1995). See also Akins and Winger (1996).
3. Köhler’s “field physics” concept received a definitive blow
from a series of studies by Lashley, Sperry, and colleagues, demon-
strating intact vision in cats in which the putative fields had been
disrupted by the introduction of needles or by insulating regions
of cortex from each other (Lashley et al. 1951; Sperry et al. 1955;
Sperry & Miner 1955).
4. In view of the importance we place in section 9.2 on careful
descriptions of perceptual experience, we would like to note here
that calling such contours and figures “illusory” is problematic and
reflects certain methodological and theoretical assumptions
(Spillmann & Dresp 1995, p. 1341). We prefer the terms appar-
ent contours and anomalous contours as being less theoretically bi-
ased. Nevertheless, illusory contours is widespread in the litera-
ture and used in the studies we cite. We therefore follow this
usage.
5. Some form of the idea that both boundary and feature are
involved in surface appearance has been proposed by various in-
vestigators, including the initial proponents of the “filling-in” idea
(Davidson & Whiteside 1971; Fry 1948; Gerrits & Vendrik 1970;
Walls 1954). For example, Gerrits and Vendrik (1970) spoke of the
“spread of brightness-activity” (or feature) in a higher center be-
ing halted by a “brightness-barrier” (or boundary). Stoper and
Mansfield (1978) also provided important evidence that bright-
ness and contour processes are subserved by independent sys-
tems. Nevertheless, Grossberg and Mingolla (1985) were the first
to propose the idea of independent boundary and featural com-
pletion systems.
6. Additional evidence for neon color spreading involving two
distinct processes was obtained by Takeichi et al. (1992). Their
first experiment showed that local color spreading does not occur
under dichoptic presentation, suggesting that important monocu-
lar mechanisms are involved in the spreading effect. On the other
hand, they showed that illusory contours, when not specified by
each monocular configuration alone, can be determined by an in-
terocularly combined configuration, suggesting the involvement
of binocular processes.
7. Here we depart significantly from Teller’s formulation
(1980, pp. 164, 169; 1984, pp. 1241–42). Teller describes the anal-
ogy family of linking propositions in its application to single cells
as involving a “nothing mucks it up proviso.” By this she means
that one has to assume that the response pattern in the single cells
is preserved all the way to the bridge locus neurons – those neu-
rons “whose activities form the immediate substrate of visual per-
ception” (Teller & Pugh 1983, p. 581). We wish, however, to sep-
arate the idea that neural activity elsewhere in the cortex might
affect the response patterns of the single cells being considered
from the idea that the pattern has to be preserved all the way to
the bridge locus. The reason is that we find problematic the no-
tion of the bridge locus (see sect. 8.1). Accordingly, when we re-
fer to Teller’s “nothing mucks it up” proviso in the following para-
graph we are referring only to the assumption that nothing else in
the visual system (or elsewhere for that matter) interferes with the
influence the single cells have on the animal’s response; we are in
no way endorsing the futher point that invokes the bridge locus
idea.
8. Albright (1995) discusses a recent study by Assad and Maun-
sell (1995) of the neural correlates of inferred motion in monkey
posterior parietal cortex, arguing that it provides evidence for the
existence of “depictive representations” in amodal perceptual
completion. Assad and Maunsell collected single cell recordings
for awake behaving monkeys in three experimental conditions. On
full vision trials, a stimulus appeared 12 degrees from the fovea,
and after a brief delay moved toward the fixation spot; in this and
other conditions the monkeys maintained fixation throughout the
trial. On occlusion trials, the stimulus appeared as above, was in-
visible for a brief duration, and finally reappeared at 2 degrees of
eccentricity moving toward the fixation spot. The disappearance
time was consistent with a constant speed movement throughout
the trial. On blink trials, the stimulus appeared and disappeared
exactly as in the occlusion trials, but then it reappeared in the same
peripheral location (as if it had been stationary during the period
in which it was invisible). Assad and Maunsell found a large pro-
portion of neurons that were more active following the disap-
pearance of a visual stimulus in trials in which the animal could
have inferred that the invisible stimulus was moving rather than
stationary. They propose that the difference in activity between
the occlusion and blink trials could be the neural correlate of such
an inference. Contrary to Albright, we do not think that this study
is sufficient to determine the nature of the underlying represen-
tations. Indeed, Assad and Maunsell are more cautious than Al-
bright – they conclude only that they may have uncovered a neural
correlate of the animal’s inference about motion, not that they
have determined the nature of the motion representation itself.
9. In visual science the term filling-in often has the sense of
providing a roughly continuous spatial representation of a visual
region. However, the difference between Dennett’s two stories
enables us to see how there could be a purely symbolic–inferen-
tial version of the filling-in debate (compare Nakayama & Shimojo
1990a). Here the issue would be: how many of the premises need
to be “filled in” in inferential processing? How often can one sim-
ply “jump to the conclusion” without bothering to fill in the
premises? Compare Dennett (1993, p. 208): “The difference I am
after is the difference between jumping to a conclusion and step-
ping to a conclusion by making some bogus steps on which to rest
the conclusion (e.g., paint in the region, and then use that painted-
in region as one’s ‘evidence’ for the conclusion subsequently
drawn).” Notice how Dennett’s statement runs together the ele-
ments we are trying to disentangle.
10. Dennett’s position on filling-in has provoked a critical 
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response from Churchland and Ramachandran (1993). They dis-
agree with Dennett because they think that the brain is not merely
“finding out” in the perceptual completion of the blind spot and
artificial scotomata. They also disagree with Dennett’s claim that
there are no neural responses devoted to the blind spot, citing Fio-
rani et al. (1992) as showing the contrary. As far as we can see,
however, Churchland and Ramachandran do not think that the
brain fills in in the sense of providing a roughly continuous spatial
representation. In fact, on the basis of Ramachandran’s other writ-
ings (1992a; 1992b; 1993a; Ramachandran & Gregory 1991), it
seems to us that they might be prepared to accept some variant of
the second story we attribute to Dennett – the one in which the
brain attaches a label. In any case, we think the debate would be
better conducted in relation to issues about isomorphism and link-
ing propositions. We go on to discuss this in section 5.2.
11. Note that these frequencies are much lower than the fre-
quencies usually revealed in flicker studies, which have cut-off fre-
quencies of more than 30 Hz and peak around 4 to 6 Hz.
12. Given that the experimental animals (cats) were anes-
thetized, the same caveats discussed in section 4.5 apply here
when interpreting the relationship between neural and perceptual
events.
13. These results are consistent with the work of Cornsweet
and Teller (1965), which showed that increment thresholds are
unaffected by changes in the appearance of backgrounds when the
physical characteristics of those backgrounds are held constant.
14. We cannot review here all the details of the experiments
performed by Eskew (1989), but we would like to note that sev-
eral of his findings suggested that a complete account in terms of
adaptation and eye movements is not likely: “Although eye move-
ments and adaptation might play a role in the chromatic diffusion
phenomenon, an additional mechanism which is sensitive to the
effect of the contour would be required to account for the gap ef-
fect” (Eskew 1989, p. 726).
15. Nevertheless, Todorovic´ goes on to say that, “given the lack
of relevant data, the single-cell type of bridge locus is a heuristi-
cally useful assumption.” We disagree, for the reasons stated in
section 4.5.
Open Peer Commentary
Commentary submitted by the qualified professional readership of this
journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as Continuing
Commentary on this article. Integrative overviews and syntheses are es-
pecially encouraged.
Analytic isomorphism and speech perception
Irene Appelbaum
Department of Philosophy, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59812.
appel@selway.umt.edu
Abstract: The suggestion that analytic isomorphism should be rejected
applies especially to the domain of speech perception because (1) the
guiding assumption that solving the lack of invariance problem is the key
to explaining speech perception is a form of analytic isomorphism, and (2)
after nearly half a century of research there is virtually no empirical evi-
dence of isomorphism between perceptual experience and lower-level
processing units.
A problem with some work in cognitive science is that the empir-
ical data are too highly leveraged theoretically. Pessoa, Thompson
and Noë’s target article provides terrific relief from such work, for
its significance lies precisely in its deflationary theoretical inter-
pretation of the empirical findings it cites. There is empirical evi-
dence for neural filling-in, but its importance is doubly qualified.
For one thing, neural filling-in cannot be promoted to a method-
ological principle. Empirical isomorphism does not imply analytic
isomorphism. Moreover, even in cases where there is neural fill-
ing-in or isomorphism between neural activity and perceptual ex-
perience more generally, it becomes less significant once we see
that perception is not ( just) a matter of what the brain is doing,
but of what the animal is doing as well. Put differently, if we do
not care (as much) about representations, a fortiori, we do not care
about whether they are isomorphic to the subject’s experience.
Still, the central methodological moral of “finding out about fill-
ing in” is not, I think, that we should downgrade the status of fill-
ing-in as a theoretical category, but that we should reject analytic
isomorphism. For as Pessoa et al. point out, analytic isomorphism
states a criterion of adequacy not just for explanations of vision,
but for cognitive neuroscientific explanations more generally. By
way of reinforcing this claim, I would like to suggest that their crit-
icism of analytic isomorphism is especially applicable to the do-
main of speech perception. Indeed, I will suggest that rejecting
analytic isomorphism provides the key to progress in explaining
speech perception.1
The particular form that analytic isomorphism takes in speech
perception research is the assumption that the goal of a theory of
speech perception is to solve “the lack of invariance problem.”
With a few recent and notable exceptions,2 solving the lack of in-
variance problem has been taken to be a criterion of adequacy for
explanations of speech perception for nearly fifty years. “Lack of
invariance” refers to the widely recognized fact that there is no
one-to-one correspondence between units of acoustic structure
and perceived phonemes. A single consonant sound, for example,
may be realized acoustically in a variety of ways depending on the
surrounding phonetic context. This lack of invariance only be-
comes a problem, however, if one assumes that there must be an
isomorphic mapping between the subject’s perceptual experience
and underlying physical structure. And this is just what has been
assumed.
Thus, identifying an initial stage of processing in which pro-
cessing units are structurally isomorphic (e.g., segmented, linearly
concatenated) to perceived phonemes is taken to be a criterion of
adequacy for an explanation of speech perception. Although these
processing units are not always explicitly identified in neural terms
(sometimes they are identified in acoustic or articulatory terms),
it is the doctrine of analytic isomorphism that underwrites the goal
of solving the lack of invariance problem, for the latter assumes
that there must be isomorphism between the subject’s perceptual
experience and lower-level processing units (called “invariants”).
As it is put in one well-known article, “invariant gestures3 of
some description there must be, for they are required, not merely
for our particular theory of speech perception, but for any ade-
quate theory [emphasis in original]” (Liberman & Mattingley
1985, p. 3). The difficulty is that speech perception research
guided by the framework of analytic isomorphism, has made little
progress. Put bluntly, by the standards embodied in analytic iso-
morphism, there are no adequate theories of speech perception.
Despite nearly half a century of searching, virtually no empirical
invariants have been found. Only one theory has identified even a
candidate for an invariant property, but it has done so for only one
class of consonants, and it is present only about 85% of the time
(Stevens & Blumstein 1981). Thus, is seems that analytic isomor-
phism, as embodied in the goal of solving the lack of invariance
problem, will have to be rejected before progress in explaining
speech perception will be made.
Pessoa et al. caution against inferring analytic isomorphism
from the evidence of particular cases of empirical isomorphism
(e.g., cases of neural filling in). But in the domain of speech per-
ception, analytic isomorphism survives despite the virtual absence
of empirical confirmation. This suggests that in speech percep-
tion, at least, analytic isomorphism functions not merely as a
methodological principle, but as dogma. If so, it is likely to prove
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more difficult to eradicate. A personal-level, activity-based ap-
proach, however, such as the one favored by Pessoa et al. for vi-
sion, may well be the place for speech perception research to start.
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NOTES
1. In Appelbaum (1995) I treat this claim much more extensively, al-
though I do not use the term “analytic isomorphism.”
2. These include Browman and Goldstein (1996), McClelland and El-
man (1986), and Nusbaum and Henley (in press).
3. Gestures are here taken to be forms of neural representations.
Filling-in as the phenomenal side of binding
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Abstract: The question is broadened from isomorphism to invertible
transformation and optimal representation. Motivations are drawn from
image compression but with an emphasis on object segmentation. Filling-
in is considered as the phenomenal side of the binding process with back-
surface filling-in being important. Finally, re-normalization of local filter-
ing by globally integrated context is emphasized.
The question is not whether the visual system is isomorphistic, for
clearly it is not by at least some cognitive level, but rather how the
system transforms the information with minimal loss and optimal
representation abstraction. The image is already distorted by the
lens and needs some reconstruction at the regional level. Visual
area one (V1) has applied a log polar transform, but we accept this
as isomorphic by virtue of its being one-to-one, where one-to-one
is important because of invertibility. Also we easily accept that at
least some information has been lost by V1.
Now we have begun down the slippery slope: we have accepted
a transformed representation and we have accepted at least a 
minimal loss of information. This is the same issue as in still- and 
moving-image compression. We see near lossless compression by
2D and 3D Gabor filters. This is one-to-one and can be completely
lossless. So where we draw the line for isomorphism is not as in-
teresting as how the visual system attempts to organize and effi-
ciently represent 2D and 3D visual scenes and 4D visual events.
It is reasonable for a scene in depth to be represented as roughly
3D log-polar at V1 or V2.
Now the question: Is motion represented isomorphistically?
Clearly, even at the level of a motion detector there is an encod-
ing of motion, but this could be one-to-one, so it does not violate
our criteria. Now I like to think of the 3D log-polar scene as chang-
ing in time and also with a higher resolution at near times than far-
ther. So we have a 4D log-polar scene that is begging for a filter
encoding and representation, all of which, at least in theory, is one-
to-one. These 4D filters could be grouped into 4D hypercomplex
codes that we arrange by serial coding into symphonies of local 
3D events in time.
Next we consider how the local junction events are grouped into
objects that we can easily imagine to move as cohesive-matter en-
tities. The most important thing is for the animal to be able to sur-
vive. There needs to be visual segmentation into objects: food,
mates, obstacles, and paths. These objects must be manipulated,
in the case of food, into the mouth. For some animals this means
being graspable, for others, at least nudgeable. Edge junctions
(e.g., T-, Y-, and Arrow-junctions) must bind to form an object that
is manipulable. Filling-in can in many ways be considered as the
phenomenal side of the binding process, where surfaces that bind
the junctions and high curvature regions are constrained within
their boundaries, like a soap bubble in a wire loop (a kind of
boundary value problem). The junctions (hypercomplex cells with
local relative-depth indications) bind.
Filling-in is the phenomenal manifestation of active binding
within local surface constraints, which forms a segmented object
– the pieces of which will all be conceived as moving together, for
example, when nudged during foraging. Moreover, the junctions
specify expectations of back surfaces, though not seen as such,
these surface expectations guide grasping and nudging behavior
with great accuracy and relatively few surprises. Violations of ex-
pectation occur from accidental 3D objects that violate symmetry
(e.g., solids of revolution) expectations. So there is a front-surface
(modal and amodal) phenomenal filling-in side to binding into ob-
jects, but there is also a back-surface-imagination that is also a
phenomenal filling-in side of binding
Finally, for surface segmentation and object binding to proceed
correctly, local filter information must be interpreted (re-normal-
ized) in terms of the globally integrated context. For example, it
has been shown that global transitive luminance scene relations
can be lost by using only local oriented-contrast and filling-in op-
erations. But by building local feature filling-in operations upon
more distal information, as is with Directional Filling-In (DFI)
theory (Arrington 1996), the phenomenal surface feature seg-
mentations are preserved.
Filling-in as a within-level propagation 
may be an illusion
Talis Bachmann
Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 2DY
Hampshire, United Kingdom. talis.bachmannt@port.ac.uk
Abstract: “Finding out” about the visual world as approached from the or-
ganismic level may well include the “filling-in” type of perceptual com-
pletion if considered in terms of underlying neurophysiological mecha-
nisms. But “filling in” can be interpreted not only as a result of within-level
propagating of neural activity, but as a byproduct of the process that is nec-
essary for modulating preconscious information about physically present
objects or events so as to generate conscious quality in attending to them.
If two alarm clocks in two neighbouring rooms happen to ring si-
multaneously, this does not mean that the activity of ringing “prop-
agates” from one clock to another. The apparent propagation may
be an accidental byproduct of the fact that somebody set the
clocks for the same time. This example illustrates what will be the
main argument of this commentary, namely, that there is insuffi-
cient evidence in support of the neural “filling-in” as a lateral,
within-level propagation of activity from the neurons that repre-
sent actually presented and directly valid sensory data to the neu-
rons that represent contextually valid, but receptively invalid sen-
sory data. It seems more likely that the “propagation” and
interpolation processes assumed to be the basis of perceptual
completion and filling-in are mediated by a “third process” that
originates from a level that is different from the one where spe-
cific, cortical, sensory neurons are located.
The first argument is more general and can be explained as fol-
lows. Perceiving organisms are adaptively successful insofar as
they manage to find a compromise between two important re-
quirements: (1) They should not miss any potentially dangerous or
otherwise important signals (data), and in doing so they should
sustain adequate and consistent responding to the full concrete-
ness of the environmental stimuli from as wide an array as possi-
ble and (2) They should also be capable of generalising and find-
ing out abstract, meaningful characteristics of the environment
without losing them in the ever varying concrete appearance of
stimulation (e.g., variability in lightness, shading, size, angles,
movement vectors, etc.) and despite deformations, “crowding,”
and noise. The first requirement is that of full, “merciless,” actual
veridicality but the second is that of flexible categorizability,
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which is sensitive to expectations and maintains potential typical-
ity of appearance, given certain contexts. It is obvious that a 
single level of the neural representation system is incapable of sat-
isfying both these requirements at once because they are incom-
patible. To fulfill the task, more than one level of data analysis is
necessary, featuring flexible, dynamic ways of mapping the inter-
level activities.
If perceptual completion or filling-in were the function of some
sort of propagating or spreading activity only within the unitary
neural system at the sensory-representational level, then the first
requirement (actual veridicality) would be sacrificed. This system
would hence be unlikely to create illusory experiences in itself. If
“finding out” and “ignoring the absence” (both governed by the
principles of context sensitivity and typicality) were the only ways
the neural levels could deal with data, then the adaptive advan-
tages would be lost again and adequate responsiveness and au-
thentic monitoring would be replaced by wishfulness. Pessoa et
al.’s target article is useful in showing that to follow the strategy of
“finding out” as the good one at the organismic level, perceptual
systems sometimes produce neural filling-in (indicating the pres-
ence) at the lower level. It seems to me, however, that so as not to
violate the first requirement of maximum veridicality it is quite
probable that neural filling-in at a lower level has its origins, not
in the process of intralevel lateral propagation, but in the input
from some other level of sensory information processing. From
where, then?
The second argument is related to the neurophysiology of sen-
sory processes. A neuron tuned to a certain specific and spatially
located characteristic can be activated in various ways. The main
sources of activation include: (1) the input through ascending pri-
mary pathways that originates from receptors and mediates re-
sponses to the actually exposed stimuli for which the neuron is
veridically tuned; (2) top-down input from the higher, context-
sensitive levels; (3) lateral input from within the same level of neu-
ronal analysis; (4) modulatory input from the nonspecific arousal
system (NSP: e.g., thalamic nonspecific nuclei) that has been
shown to be necessary for “upgrading” the activity of the specific
neurons so that perceptual information carried by them will par-
ticipate in conscious experience (see Bachmann 1997, for a re-
view). It is clear that the origins of neural activity in neural filling-
in can be related to (2), (3), and (4). Although the first argument
in paragraph 2 biases me against the uncontested inclusion of (3)
among the main possible neural filling-in mechanisms, it seems
fair enough to say that at the present state of our knowledge it
would be reasonable to regard all three as potential candidates.
Whereas all phenomena discussed in the target article, however,
are related to perceptual conscious experience, it seems parsimo-
nious to discuss the role of (4) as the source of neuronal activity
that has been prima facie linked to the function of consciousness
in mediating the neural filling-in.
In recent years we have been presented with strong evidence
that neurons in visual cortical areas continue to respond to ex-
posed (actual) perceptual information to which they are tuned to
even if this information is not directly present in the perceptual
awareness of the subject (e.g., He et al. 1996; Leopold & Logo-
thetis 1996; Logothetis et al. 1996). This means that it is insuffi-
cient to find the correlates of interpolated perceptual features as
certain neural activities in visual cortices to posit them as the
equivalents of perceptual filling-in. We should be able to find
neural processes that are present with perceptual completion and
absent when this completion is not phenomenally experienced.
My hypothesis is that in many cases the filling in is a byproduct
of the thalamocortical modulation of the representational neurons
that stand for actually present stimuli. Two thirds of cortical visual
neurons have presynaptic input from the NSP (Brooks & Jung
1973). It is known that both the spatial and temporal resolution of
the NSP is considerably poorer than those of the specific sensory-
representational neurons. When sensory stimuli are presented,
then in addition to evoking fast specific encoding, they evoke
slower and spatially spreading modulation from NSP where neigh-
bouring units, the specific signals of which have not been pre-
sented, may also become modulated by this NSP process. (Mod-
ulation means enhancement of excitatory postsynaptic potentials,
which increases the cumulative firing frequency of the modulated
neurons.) As a result, “filling-in” can be expected. As primary sen-
sory pathways are semiautonomous from NSP, we can expect per-
ceptual completion even if the input that provided the context is
not itself visible (e.g., as a result of masking).
For example, Gellatly (1980) showed that illusory-contoured
figures can be perceived even when the “pacmen” that induce the
“boundary completion” are not perceived because of metacontrast
masking. The findings of Paradiso and Nakayama (1991) and of
Stoper and Mansfield (1978) (sect. 6.2, paras. 2–5) can be ex-
plained as the outcome of a gradual arrival of the temporally de-
layed and spatially spread NSP modulation that leads to the con-
scious quality of the contoured stimulus and its immediate
surround (notice that the surround quality belongs to the back-
ground of the contoured stimulus). Perhaps, just as alarm clocks
ring synchronously not because of any “propagation” of ringing,
but because of their common master, the neurons responsible for
actual and interpolated sensory qualities fire together because
they share the modulator which is located elsewhere.
Prediction, inference, and the homunculus
Horace B. Barlow
Physiological Laboratory, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EG, 
England. hbb10@cam.ac.uk
Abstract: Prediction, like filling-in, is an example of pattern completion
and both are likely to involve processes of statistical inference. Further-
more, there is no incompatibility between inference and neural filling-in,
for the neural processes may be mediating the inferential processes. The
usefulness of the “bridge locus” is defended, and it is also suggested that
the interpersonal level needs to be included when considering subjective
experience.
Pessoa et al.’s is a very comprehensive and useful review, and I
want to suggest two additions. First, prediction should be consid-
ered because it is pattern completion in the temporal dimension;
it certainly depends on statistical inference and shows that this is
likely to be important in all completion phenomena. The second
suggestion is to add the interpersonal to the authors’ illuminating
personal/subpersonal distinction, for this may tell us the origin of
the homunculi who look at the images in our brains.
Statistical inference, prediction, and completion. Helmholtz
thought that perceptions were unconscious conclusions about ex-
ternal causes inferred from the fragmentary and incomplete evi-
dence provided by sensory messages (Helmholtz 1925, Ch. 26, p.
4) and this is still a leading concept in modern attempts to under-
stand and model perception. Such conclusions depend upon sta-
tistical inference, and this is typically most useful just when filling-
in and completion phenomena occur – when the evidence is
incomplete. For instance, you gain little by identifying a regular
sequence of events after it has occurred, but if you identify it be-
fore it has run to completion you can make a reliable prediction –
with obvious advantages to survival in the jungle, on the stock mar-
ket, and everywhere else. Prediction is pattern completion in the
temporal domain; most examples of filling-in apply to static pat-
terns, but in both cases the appropriate statistical work has to be
done to gain reliable benefits, and it is no exaggeration to say that
this work plays a role in perception as important as the conversion
of chemical energy to mechanical work in muscle contraction.
Statistical inference requires a neurophysiological mechanism,
and Pessoa et al. point out in their Abstract that “Certain forms of
visual completion seem to involve spatially propagating neural ac-
tivity (neural filling-in).” This could be the inference mechanism
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in action, and it is hard to see why the authors go on to say that it
is contrary to Dennett’s (1991) description of filling-in as the
brain’s “ignoring an absence” or “jumping to a conclusion.” Statis-
tical inference, jumping to a conclusion, subjective filling-in, and
spatially propagating neural activity are surely different levels of
description of the same process in the brain and there need be no
incompatibility between them. If one thing is certain it is that
jumping to conclusions and ignoring absences will not take place
in the appropriate circumstances unless there are neural mecha-
nisms that approximately compute the statistics required, and the
need for these neural mechanisms clearly places the spatially
propagating activity in a new light.
Statistics and predictability also lead us to a psychophysical link-
ing proposition that, unlike all the other ones Pessoa et al. discuss,
is irrefutable: Whenever two stimuli can be distinguished reliably,
then some analysis of the physiological messages they cause . . .
would enable them to be distinguished with equal or greater reli-
ability.1 Since the Shannon-information in sensory messages can-
not be increased as it passes through the brain, the states of activ-
ity in underlying neural representations must provide sufficient
information for the perceptual discriminations that are based on
them, and this enables one to find out when brain events can and
when they cannot explain perceptual phenomena. A good feature
of this linking proposition is that it moves on from the metaphysics
of psychophysical links and instead focuses on the reliability of dis-
criminations among physical stimuli, sensory messages, and per-
ceptions, for these are open to experimental measurement. Its
greatest strength, however, is that its truth cannot be denied, for
it is simply the second law of thermodynamics applied to infor-
mation flow in the brain: it is possible to lose information, but it is
not possible to create it (Brillouin 1956).
One of the concepts this linking proposition can clarify is the
“bridge locus” of Teller and Pugh (1983). This can be interpreted
as the location in a neural system where one can most readily show
that particular neural states provide enough information to ac-
count for particular psychological performance. Examples where
such locations have been found include retinal ganglion cells that
can detect small, brief light flashes at absolute threshold (Barlow
et al. 1971), V1 neurons that can detect displacements in the hy-
peracuity range (Parker & Hawken 1985), and neurons in MT that
can detect weak coherent motion in random dot kinematograms
with sensitivity as great as the whole animal (Newsome et al.
1990). On the other hand, there are no known retinal ganglion
cells that could detect the weak, spatially extended, long-lasting
stimuli that intact subjects can detect (Denton & Pirenne 1954),
and to express this we simply say that we do not know where the
bridge locus for that task is, and cannot yet be sure whether there
is one. Collecting the statistical evidence required to perform a
particular psychophysical task is not a trivial matter (Barlow & Tri-
pathy 1997), and it is useful to have a term to describe areas that
house the neurons that do it.
The homunculus and interpersonal factors. Turn now to a fea-
ture of the target article that I whole-heartedly admire – the in-
troduction of the subpersonal/personal distinction into the dis-
cussion of subjective phenomena such as completion. Can we not
extend this to include interpersonal interactions? This extension
may at last give the homunculus, that scandal of modern percep-
tual psychology (Barlow 1996), a respectable role.
To show how this may come about consider the Gibsonian ex-
ample of a pilot landing a plane. He notices that the expansion
point in the flow field in front of him is not exactly where he has
been taught that it should be, and adjusts the controls to correct
this while keenly observing the flow field to see whether his cor-
rections are being effective. We tend to postulate a homunculus
to do this inspection, in spite of the fact that almost everyone rec-
ognizes it as an unscientific intrusion when considering subper-
sonal mechanisms, and no better in this example of the pilot’s per-
sonal interaction with the environment. But go further and
consider the interpersonal interactions between the instructor
and the pilot when he was being taught: wasn’t the instructor’s role
to implant into the pilot’s brain the homunculus who inspects the
flow-field? This single example does not change our thinking
greatly, but we depend on homunculi more than we like to admit,
and it makes a considerable difference if most of them are agents,
implanted in our minds by others, who enable us to see the world
as they see it. This would give homunculi great importance in our
social lives, and would suggest one reason why our conscious ex-
periences can quite easily be communicated to others. Although
it makes our own experience dependent on others in a way that
many will find hard to accept, the converse of this dependence is
that each of us can implant homunculi into other people’s brains
that will enable them to see the world as we see it.
In fact, I can summarise this whole commentary by saying that
I have tried to implant inference-detecting homunculi into the
brains of those who think about filling-in, and have also tried to
implant the homunculus who looks for the origin of other ho-
munculi.
NOTE
1. From Barlow (1995, p. 428). The original had in some single neuron
between cause and would, but this is an irrelevant distraction here.
Dennett versus Gibson
Alex Byrne
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139.
abyrne@mit.edu web.mit.edu/philos/www/byrne.html
Abstract: Pessoa et al. misinterpret some of Dennett’s discussion of 
filling-in. Their argument against the representational conception of vision
and for a Gibsonian alternative is also flawed.
Dennett claims, of his Marilyn wallpaper example (see sect. 9.2 of
the target article), that the “brain just represents that there are
hundreds of identical Marilyns” (1992, p. 46), and so there is no
neural representation that has hundreds of Marilyn-representa-
tions as parts (as it might be, a “high-resolution bit map”). He com-
ments: “Of course, it does not seem that way to you. It seems to
you as if you are actually seeing hundreds of identical Marilyns”
(p. 46). The point of the latter remark is that there is a persistent
tendency to confuse a representation of detail with a detailed rep-
resentation. This is a special case of confusing represented prop-
erties with properties of representations (Dennett 1991, pp.
147–48). Because the experience of the Marilyn wallpaper repre-
sents it as covered with detailed Marilyns, the temptation is to sup-
pose that the representation itself contains detailed representa-
tions of Marilyns. The mistake that Dennett is exposing is thus an
intellectual error we make when reflecting on our experience; it is
not any kind of perceptual illusion.
There is another mistake, according to Dennett: “The hundreds
of Marilyns in the wallpaper seem to be present in your experi-
ence, seem to be in your mind, not just on the wall” (1991, pp.
359–60; quoted in the target article, sect. 9.2, para. 5). Here Den-
nett’s point is that there is a persistent tendency to invoke some-
thing like sense data as the evidence that must be presented to an
“inner witness” in the brain. This comes out particularly clearly in
the section following the quotation, where Dennett’s stooge Otto,
looking at a color version of Pessoa et al.’s Figure 1, would suppose
that there really is a reddish diamond (not on the page, but pre-
sumably in his mind). In the Marilyn case, the temptation is to sup-
pose that there are Marilyn sense data. Again, the mistake is an in-
tellectual error, not a perceptual illusion. (Of course, neon color
spreading, unlike seeing Marilyn wallpaper, does involve a per-
ceptual illusion, but the perceptual illusion is not the mistake Den-
nett is identifying.)
Hence, Pessoa et al. have misunderstood Dennett when they
say that he erroneously concludes, both times, “that the person’s
experience of the Marilyns is mistaken” (sect. 9.2, para. 5). (Here
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Pessoa et al. must mean that Dennett erroneously concludes that
the Marilyn case involves a sort of perceptual illusion, for they ev-
idently agree that the alleged intellectual errors really are errors.)
Pessoa et al. think Dennett draws the erroneous conclusion –
that the Marilyn case involves perceptual illusion – by reasoning
correctly from a crucial assumption, the “uniformity thesis.” That
is why they side with Gibson (1979), and against Dennett (1978),
in rejecting the uniformity thesis.1 So, although these exegetical
matters are not significant, what is of some importance is Pessoa
et al.’s argument that the uniformity thesis is false because it has
false consequences.
According to the uniformity thesis, “perceptual content at the
personal level just is the content of brain states at the subpersonal
level” (sect. 9.2, para. 4). In other words: when a person has a per-
ceptual experience with such-and-such propositional content, this
fact is constituted by the presence, in some part of the person, of
a certain sort of representation with that content (as it might be,
by the tokening of a neural representation in the subject’s “vision
box”).2 The uniformity thesis is therefore entailed by the repre-
sentational theory of mind.
Pessoa et al. think the uniformity thesis leads to trouble in the
Marilyn case for two reasons. First, they claim that the thesis en-
tails (or at least motivates) the conclusion that “in the absence of
a brain-level pictorial representation of each of the identical Mar-
ilyns the person cannot have a percept with the content that there
are hundreds of identical Marilyns” (sect. 9.2, para. 4).3
(Pessoa et al. interpret Dennett as drawing the conclusion just
mentioned. But this does not make any sense. For Dennett cer-
tainly holds that there are no such pictorial representations, and
that the content of the experience is that there are hundreds of
identical Marilyns. If he went on to draw the above conclusion, his
position would be glaringly inconsistent.)
This parenthetical difficulty aside, it is obvious that the unifor-
mity thesis has no such unwanted consequence. According to it,
in order to have an experience with the content that there are hun-
dreds of identical Marilyns, one just needs an appropriate inner
representation with exactly that content, and plainly that does not
require a representation, pictorial or otherwise, of each Marilyn.
Second, Pessoa et al. claim that the uniformity thesis entails (or
motivates) the conclusion that, when looking at the Marilyn wall-
paper, “it seems to one that the Marilyns are all there in one’s mind
or brain” (sect. 9.2, para. 5). Since there are no such pictures (at
any rate according to Dennett), the person’s experience must,
again, be illusory. Pessoa et al. say that “the reasoning depends on
the idea that visual experience is pictorial, in the sense that to have
a visual experience that is really of hundreds of identical Marilyns
is to have a picture in the mind or brain with precisely that con-
tent,” which in turn “depends on” the uniformity thesis (sect. 9.2,
para. 5). But the uniformity thesis is clearly not guilty. First, it does
not lend support to the view that inner representations are picto-
rial (as opposed to, say, sentential). Second, even if we grant that
the representation is pictorial, the uniformity thesis does not im-
ply that the person is aware of this inner picture, only that the con-
tent of the person’s experience is the content of the appropriate
inner representation. In the example, the content is that there are
hundreds of Marilyns (more specifically: hundreds of Marilyns on
the wall). To think that the person must be aware of the repre-
sentation itself would be to confuse what is represented (what the
person is aware of: Marilyns on the wall) with what does the rep-
resenting (a neural picture, which the person need not be aware
of). It would be to confuse, that is, represented properties (e.g.,
being a Marilyn on the wall) with properties of representations
(e.g., being a neural picture of a Marilyn). As noted, Dennett him-
self has emphasized the distinction.
Pessoa et al. correctly state that “at the personal level, there are
no . . . representations in visual perception; there is simply expe-
rience of the world” (sect. 9.2, penultimate para.; see also sect. 9.1
and Thompson 1995, p. 235).4 What I do not understand is why
this shows that Dennett, and most of us, are wrong, and Gibson is
right.
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NOTES
1. For another Gibsonian attack on Dennett, see McDowell 1994.
2. The assumption that the content of a perceptual experience is the
content of a single inner representation is merely for expository conve-
nience. Dennett (1991) appears to hold that the content of a perceptual
experience is the conjunction of the contents of many inner representa-
tions, and is never the content of a single representation. That is not in con-
flict with a more careful statement of the uniformity thesis.
3. Pessoa et al. in fact present this line of reasoning in two steps: from
the uniformity thesis to “analytic isomorphism,” and from the latter to the
conclusion. I agree with them that analytic isomorphism should be re-
jected.
4. Unlike Dennett, philosophers like Block (1995) would at least want
to add a qualification here, but Block’s reasons are not relevant to the pres-
ent discussion.
The functional effects of modal versus
amodal filling-in
Greg Davis and Jon Driver
Department of Psychology, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University
College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom.
gjd1000@cus.cam.ac.uk j.driver@ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: Comparisons between modally and amodally completed re-
gions show that perceptual filling-in is not merely the ignoring of absences.
Illusory filled-in colour arises for modal completion, but not for amodal
completion in comparable displays. We find that attention spreads auto-
matically to modally but not amodally completed regions from their in-
ducers, revealing a functional effect of filled-in colour.
The target article provides a useful summary and discussion of the
extensive literature on visual “filling-in.” Like many others in this
field, we were already convinced of the main empirical conclusion,
namely, that neural filling-in goes beyond the mere ignoring of ab-
sent information, thus challenging Dennett’s (1991) account. We
were somewhat disappointed that the article focuses mainly on the
challenge from neural filling-in alone, and less on the equally 
persuasive challenge from the psychological reality of perceptual
filling-in itself. This seemed a missed opportunity, particularly
given Pessoa et al.’s extensive discussion of how neural activity
might best be related to perceptual states (and also given that few
researchers would be so interested in neural filling-in if none arose
perceptually!). The authors seem to assume that the existence of
filling-in at the perceptual level is merely an uncontroversial and
theoretically neutral starting point. However, we think that per-
ceptual measures, not only neural measures, can help establish
whether (and when) filling-in goes beyond the mere ignoring of
absences.
A direct comparison of modal versus amodal completion may
be particularly revealing on this issue. As Pessoa et al. note, sev-
eral recent authors (e.g., Shipley & Kellman 1992) have shown
that these two forms of completion can be induced by very simi-
lar displays, and also show several intriguing parallels regarding
the completed shape that will be perceived. However, a critical
difference remains. No illusory colour or brightness is filled in
perceptually for amodally completed regions, which are seen as ly-
ing behind an occluder. By contrast, modal completion leads to
perceptual filling in of colour and brightness for the completed re-
gion, seen in the front plane. The accompanying Figure 1 illus-
trates this, for two displays used in our own work (Davis & Driver
1997; 1998a). Each comprised two grey segments, abutting a
white bar on a dark screen (as in A). Only the depth of the white
bar differed between the two displays. When the bar appeared to
be closer than the grey segments (due to stereoscopic disparity),
the latter were amodally completed as a single grey ellipse that was
partly occluded by a white bar (much as it appears for the two-
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dimensional illustration in A). No illusory colour was seen in the
amodally completed region itself. By contrast, when the grey re-
gions appeared to be closer than the white bar, they now became
modally completed, as a continuous transparent grey ellipse in
front of the white bar. Critically, illusory colour and brightness was
now infused into the completed region, which took on the grey of
the curved segments (as cartooned in B), even though no grey was
physically present in the centre ( just as in A). Thus, modal and
amodal completion differ in terms of perceptual filling-in, with il-
lusory colour and brightness arising only in the former case. This
difference is not readily accounted for by mere “ignoring of ab-
sences,” given the similar absences for the two cases. As Pessoa et
al. discuss, there have been several previous neuroscience studies
on amodal completion, and also on modal completion but none
has ever compared them directly, even though this would be 
particularly revealing regarding the neural basis of perceptual 
filling-in.
In several recent articles, we have sought to compare the func-
tional effects of modal and amodal completion directly (Davis &
Driver 1994; 1997; 1998a, 1998b; Mattingley et al. 1997) as Pes-
soa et al. recommend. Two studies used displays like those in Fig-
ure 1, to examine the effects of modal versus amodal completion
upon the distribution of visual attention. Davis and Driver (1998a)
found that when attention was drawn to the inducing grey seg-
ments (by a sudden change in their size) this also drew attention
to the completed region between them in the modal situation.
However, this did not arise for the comparable amodal case, thus
revealing a difference in the functional effects of the two forms of
completion. Davis and Driver (1997) used a measure of distractor
interference to confirm that this spreading of attention between
inducers and completed regions, for the modal case only, happens
even when counter to observers’ intentions.
We concluded that the filling-in of colour and brightness, at
modally completed regions only, was responsible for this spread-
ing of attention. More generally, we proposed that the presence of
filled-in colour at modally completed regions signals that they be-
long to an unoccluded surface (even when physically absent in the
stimulation, due to coincidental camouflage or impoverished illu-
mination; see Davis & Driver 1998a). By contrast, the absence of
any colour coding at all for amodally completed regions signals
that they are occluded from view. The distinction between oc-
cluded and nonoccluded regions of objects is crucial for visual ob-
ject recognition (Nakayama et al. 1989). Moreover, it is also cru-
cial for directing attention towards potentially relevant versus en-
tirely irrelevant information when judging a particular object. Any
visible features at occluded (and amodally completed) regions of
a relevant object cannot reflect properties of that object, but only
those of the occluder. This restriction does not apply to visible fea-
tures that form part of a camouflaged by unoccluded object, as in
modally completed regions. Hence it makes excellent functional
sense that attention should spread from inducers to modally com-
pleted regions, but not from inducers to comparable amodally
completed regions, exactly as we find (Davis & Driver 1997;
1998a).
Our work thus identifies a difference in the functional effects
of modal versus amodal completion, using perceptual rather than
neural measures. Moreover, the observed difference makes good
sense in terms of the particular task faced by the visual system
when required to attend to potentially relevant information and
ignore irrelevant information. In this restricted sense, we are sym-
pathetic to Pessoa et al.’s enthusiasm for “task level” conceptions
of vision in terms of the function(s) served. However, we take is-
sue with their more general advocacy of a “personal level” or “an-
imal centered” approach to vision as a panacea for philosophical
confusions in this area. Arguing generically that the “animal . . .
simply sees aspects of the world” (sect. 9.1, para. 4) does not ad-
vance our understanding of how the animal achieves this: it merely
replaces the homuncular little-animal-inside-the-head as an all
powerful agent with the larger whole animal. Finally, some of the
criticisms of the Marr (1982) approach seemed inappropriate.
There are emphatically no homunculi in any of Marr’s computer
vision systems; and his work was characterised by careful analyses
of the tasks to be solved by particular visual processes.
No bridge over the stream of consciousness
Daniel C. Dennett
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155.
ddennett@tufts.edu www.tufts.edu/as.cogstud/mainpg.htm
Abstract: Pessoa et al.’s target article shows that although filling-in of var-
ious kinds does appear to occur in the brain, it is not required in order to
furnish a “bridge locus” where neural events are “isomorphic” to the fea-
tures of visual consciousness. Some recently uncovered completion phe-
nomena may well play a crucial role in the elaboration of normal visual ex-
perience, but others occur too slowly to contribute to normal visual
content.
I find this a very useful essay, a model, in fact, for philosophers
who want to make a substantive contribution to cognitive science:
it makes sense of controversy, dispels confusions, and sharpens
our understanding of the more distant implications of a wide va-
riety of current empirical work, an important task that is typically
beyond the aspirations (if not the talents) of those working in the
labs.
First, let me acknowledge that Pessoa et al. have corrected
some errors on my part, errors that betrayed my ignorance of a
wealth of empirical and theoretical work that had already been un-
dertaken on the vexed issue of filling-in. I am glad they also
pointed out, however, that I did point to the very sorts of empiri-
cal experiments that “would” disprove my hunch – some of which
should already have been known to me. I was not entirely the in-
novator I took myself to be, then, but I will settle for the role of
catalyst, since my rash interloping has served to direct attention
and begin the task of clarification that Pessoa et al. are continuing.
Second, I want to propose a friendly amendment to Pessoa et
al.’s fine discussion of what they take to be the fundamental mis-
take of “analytical isomorphism”: supposing there must be a
“bridge locus” where features of experience and features of neural
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Figure 1 (Davis & Driver). (A) Stimulus pattern employed by
Davis and Driver (1997; 1998a) to compare spreading of attention
to and from modally – versus amodally – completed regions. When
stereoscopic disparity caused the white bar in the stimulus to ap-
pear nearer than the grey regions, the grey regions were amodally
completed to form a partly occluded ellipse that continued behind
the white bar. Conversely, when disparity signalled instead that the
grey regions were nearer to the observer than the white bar, the
grey regions were modally completed to form a transparent ellipse
that continued in front of the white bar. The region where the
modally completed ellipse overlapped with the white bar now ap-
peared filled-in illusory colour. (B) Cartoon of how the stimulus in
(A) appeared when the grey regions underwent modal completion
to form a transparent ellipse.
activity are “isomorphic.” They are right: the widely felt necessity
for just such a bridge locus is a crippling theorist’s illusion. But
they do not go on to address the natural question of what should
replace this overwrought idea. One is inclined to think that some-
thing has to be “isomorphic” to something happening in the brain
– a “neural-perceptual parallelism” of some sort is required – on
pain of lapsing into dualism or sheer mystery. What is the minimal
form?
According to Müller’s (1896) second axiom (a methodological
principle, as they say), “perceptual equalities, similarities and dif-
ferences correspond to neural equalities, similarities, and differ-
ences.” The saving move, I submit, is to notice that the data from
“introspection” that we need to line up with neural data are not
necessarily Müller’s “perceptual equalities, similarities and differ-
ences” but rather subjects’ beliefs about perceptual equalities,
similarities, and differences. This is another way of making Pessoa
et al.’s point about the personal-level/subpersonal-level (first de-
veloped in Dennett 1969). What needs accounting for is not nec-
essarily that there is filling-in but that there seems to be filling-in
– subjects (naively) believe there is filling-in. And explanations in
neural terms must be found for the robust provocation of that be-
lief in subjects under various conditions. If we take the manifolds
of subjects’ beliefs about their conscious states (what I call the sub-
jects’ heterophenomenological worlds) as our data set, then so
long as every such belief (or better, difference in belief) is ac-
countable in neural terms, we “save the data” because those 
beliefs – rather than their putative objects: actual equalities, sim-
ilarities and differences – are the data. The possible wild hetero-
geneity of neural conditions for provoking such beliefs is just what
excuses us from hunting for a bridge locus. Sometimes, filling-in-
beliefs may be the normal outcome of processes which include
genuine filling-in, and sometimes not. In either case, we would
have a suitable neuroscientific explanation of the experience of
filling-in (in the neutral sense that does not presuppose that it is a
veridical experience of filling-in), so minimal materialism would
be safe, the burden of proof discharged.
Third, although I have a variety of reservations about Pessoa et
al.’s discussions of various candidates for “completion phenom-
ena,” I will restrict myself to one point. They note that several of
the phenomena they discuss (particularly Ramachandran’s [see Ra-
machandran & Gregory 1991] “artificial scotomata”) emerge on
slow time scales, ranging from hundreds of milliseconds to several
seconds; but Pessoa et al. do not make the further point that any
effect taking longer than about 200 msec of fixation to develop can-
not itself be part of normal vision, since the eye is seldom fixated
long enough for such effects to develop. Far from showing that
these varieties of supposed filling-in occur in normal vision, these
long time courses show that they cannot occur in normal vision –
so any sense we have in normal vision that the background, for in-
stance, is filled-in cannot be due to such effects. Of course, such
special effects might nevertheless tell us something about what
happens during the first hundred milliseconds of a normal fixation,
but any such inferences must be treated with great caution.
Finally, I want to say that Pessoa et al.’s discussion of my “more
Marilyns” example is more in agreement with my own view than
they have realized. I was using the example to argue (by reductio
ad absurdum) against the isomorphism principle that it seems to
invoke so readily. I was certainly not endorsing it. I say there is
something illusory about the ordinary perceptual experience, not
because I endorse the isomorphism principle, but because ordi-
nary people do tacitly endorse it, and it leads them to error. I en-
tirely agree that in one sense, there is nothing illusory about the
visual experience in this case: the room is papered with identical
Marilyns, and that’s just what our visual experience is of: a room
papered with identical Marilyns. But people are (mis-)inclined to
think that this in turn means that representations of all those iden-
tical Marilyns must “therefore” be in their brains – it “follows”
from their tacitly held isomorphism postulate. My point is that
they are very surprised – to the point of incredulity – to learn oth-
erwise. It is, if you like, a theorist’s illusion, but it turns out that we
are all theorists. That is, we tend to assume the isomorphism prin-
ciple tacitly, and hence are driven to expect that there is more in
the brain than there has to be.
Linking spread of neural activity and 
filling-in: A few more arguments in favor
Peter De Weerd
Laboratory of Brain and Cognition, National Institute of Mental Health,
Bethesda, MD 20892. pdw@ln.nimh.nih.gov
Abstract: This commentary sides with Pessoa and his colleagues in argu-
ing that some types of perceptual filling-in are linked with a spread of cor-
tical activity, a hypothesis that has often been rejected on philosophical
grounds. Some recent data are discussed that strengthen this linking hy-
pothesis and indicate that a spread of cortical activity may be essential for
normal surface perception.
While reading this commentary, you probably perceive an entire
page filled with English words. The homogeneity of this percep-
tion is at odds with the fact that, because of acuity limitations, you
would not have noticed whether this paragraph had ended in an-
other language. Our perception of objects (in this case a page of
text) is thus determined not only by visual processing and its lim-
itations, but also by expectations built through prior interactions
with similar objects. Perceptions of the world are not a reflection
of some “objective” reality, and distributed patterns of brain ac-
tivity correlated with our perceptions do not simply represent
such a reality. In this context, Pessoa et al. provide a thought-
provoking discussion of the validity of linking propositions used to
explain several visual illusions.
Pessoa’s discussion of linking hypotheses is especially pertinent
to perceptual filling-in, which can be experienced, for example, by
maintained peripheral viewing of a gray square surrounded by dy-
namic texture. Dennett (1991) suggests that the resulting filling-
in of the gray region by the texture reflects a symbolic operation
by which texture is assigned to the gray region, rather than an iso-
morphic spread across visual cortex of activity representing the
texture. The latter hypothesis is considered untenable because it
suggests that perception is caused by a homunculus viewing a fi-
nal, image-like representation of the “objective” world (sect. 5).
Pessoa argues that it is an empirical matter whether cortical
spread correlates with perceptual filling-in, and that the possibil-
ity of isomorphism should be disconnected from the idea of a fi-
nal representation (sect. 8). In this respect, it is useful to consider
that the visual system is hierarchically organized. Lower-order ar-
eas such as V1, V2, and V3, where elementary features are ana-
lyzed, such as brightness and texture, are retinotopically orga-
nized; neighboring points in the visual field are represented by
neighboring points on the cortex. In addition, many cortical neu-
rons show lateral connections extending for several millimeters
across the cortical mantle. Thus, the anatomy of lower-order areas
makes lateral neural spread a likely mechanism for the perceptual
spread of features such as brightness and texture. It is unknown
how perceptual filling-in affects activity in higher-order areas that
are not retinotopically organized, but any neural correlate of fea-
tural filling-in in those areas is unlikely to be isomorphic with the
percept. In fact, higher-order areas might be involved in more
symbolic types of filling-in, similar to the operation by which you
perceived the entire text as consisting of English words when you
started reading. Thus, percepts are correlated with activity in
many cortical areas simultaneously, and whether there is isomor-
phism between the percept and neural activity is a by-product of
the anatomical organization of those areas, and of the domain in
which the filling-in occurs.
With this in mind, Pessoa and his colleagues encourage the ex-
ploration of specific linking hypotheses (sect. 10), but also point to
potential pitfalls (sect. 4.5). Neurophysiological studies often com-
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pare single-neuron recordings in animals with human perception.
This is a big step to take, especially if the animal is anesthetized
and not perceiving anything. We have used anesthetized Cebus
monkeys (unpublished experiments conducted with Ricardo Gat-
tass at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) in an at-
tempt to replicate the increased (“climbing”) activity in V2 and V3
neurons of awake Rhesus monkeys that correlated with percep-
tual filling-in (De Weerd et al. 1995). We did not find any evidence
of climbing activity in V2 and V3 of anesthetized monkeys under
conditions that caused perceptual filling-in in human observers,
and climbing activity in neurons of awake Rhesus monkeys. This
negative result might be specific to the Cebus monkey, or to the
anesthetic agents used, but the most parsimonious conclusion is
that human conscious perception often cannot be compared with
neural activity in unconscious monkeys. The absence of climbing
activity during unconsciousness enhances its possible role as a
neural substrate for perceptual filling-in.
Pessoa and his colleagues did not address why different types of
filling-in follow different time courses (sect. 4.5) and thereby miss
the opportunity to explain the relevance of filling in illusions for
studying filling-in processes during normal surface perception.1
Why would brightness spread within milliseconds (Paradiso &
Nakayama 1991) and texture only after seconds (De Weerd et al.
1995)? This is because in the former study, the inward spread of
brightness was measured within figures with existing boundaries,
whereas in the latter, boundary representation separating gray and
textured regions had to adapt before filling-in could occur. Recent
psychophysical data from De Weerd et al. (1998) support that the
time required for the filling-in of a gray region by a surrounding
texture did not reflect a slow filling-in process, but rather a slow
adaptation of boundaries followed by a fast featural spread.
Hence, the climbing activity in V2 and V3 during perceptual 
filling-in may reveal mechanisms involved in fast filling-in pro-
cesses during normal surface perception. To further investigate
this linking hypothesis, measures of perceptual filling in must be
correlated with fast changes in neural activity on a trial-by-trial ba-
sis within the same monkey.
NOTE
1. If perception by definition never reflects an “objective” re-
ality, then the word “illusion” is never appropriate. However, the
perceptual filling in of a gray region by surrounding texture dur-
ing a maintained peripheral viewing reflects properties of the vi-
sual system, rather than a physical change of the stimulus; in this
limited context it can rightly be referred to as a visual illusion.
Area, surface, and contour: Psychophysical
correlates of three classes of pictorial
completion
Birgitta Dresp
Laboratoire de Psychophysique Sensorielle, EP 618 du C.N.R.S., Université
Louis Pasteur, 67000 Strasbourg, France. bee@currifl.u-strasbg.fr
Abstract: A simple working taxonomy with three classes of pictorial com-
pletion is proposed as an alternative to Pessoa et al.’s classification: area,
surface, and contour completion. The classification is based on psy-
chophysical evidence, not on the different phenomenal attributes of the
stimuli, showing that pictorial completion is likely to involve mechanistic
interactions in the visual system at different levels of processing. Whether
the concept of “filling-in” is an appropriate metaphor for the visual mech-
anisms that may underlie perceptual completion is questioned.
Pessoa et al.’s target article on picture completion argues in favor
of a scientific classification, or “working taxonomy” of the percep-
tual phenomena, encourages their experimental investigation, and
advocates seeking explanations in terms of goal-specific visual pro-
cesses and, as far as possible, neurophysiological mechanisms.
Holistic theories of perceptual completion such as Dennett’s
(1992) are reviewed, discussed, and finally rejected.
As a psychophysicist actively involved in the study of comple-
tion phenomena, I agree with Pessoa et al.’s conclusion that pic-
ture completion involves active visual processes (see also Dresp
1997) for which we can find mechanistic explanations that can
eventually be linked to neurophysiological substrates. However,
their classification of the various completion phenomena strikes
me as unnecessarily complicated. The authors call theirs a “work-
ing taxonomy . . . meant as a step toward conceptual and termi-
nological clarification.” Two general classes of phenomena are in-
troduced: (1) “amodal completion” versus “modal completion”
and (2) “boundary completion” versus “featural completion.” Pes-
soa et al. suggest that these divisions cross-classify each other with
no hierarchical organization implied. Examples of each of the four
subclasses are then discussed.
I would work with a much simpler classification based on psy-
chophysical evidence rather than phenomenology. Classical as
well as recent data on perceptual completion suggest that there
are only three types of pictorial completion, each involving a dif-
ferent level of visual or perceptual processing. The evidence also
suggests that the distinction between “modal” or “amodal” com-
pletion is not very useful. The three “operational” kinds of com-
pletion are area, surface, and contour completion.
Area completion. In area completion, simultaneous contrast
(Diamond 1953; Dittmers 1920) is diffused by the borders of vi-
sual objects and spreads out into areas or regions that have no
clearly defined spatial limits or boundaries (Spillmann 1981). It is
sometimes accompanied by the emergence of perceived relief and
apparent depth as in Mach Bands (Mach 1822). Whether phe-
nomenally emergent or not, area completion can be measured
psychophysically by having observers detect a small light target at
various spatial positions relative to the object border that induces
the spreading out (e.g., Dresp & Bonnet 1993; Fiorentini & Zoli
1966; Wildmann 1974). Detection thresholds gradually decrease
with increasing distance of the light target from the object border
(e.g., Dresp & Bonnet 1993); at some distance, they drop down to
the level of control thresholds, measured on areas that are not
“contextually contaminated.” These local alterations of visual sen-
sitivity change their sign when the contrast sign in the stimulus
changes and are reliable psychophysical correlates of the mecha-
nisms underlying area completion. Lateral interactions between
contrast detectors in the retina and the visual cortex have been
suggested as a neurophysiological explanation (e.g., Fiorentini
1972; Reid & Shapley 1988).
Surface completion. In surface completion, fragments of real
or apparent contours give rise to perceptual closure and make the
completed regions emerge as figures from the ground (e.g., Koff-
ka 1935; Metzger 1935). Surface completion may or may not be
accompanied by pictorial attributes such as illusory contours, ap-
parent depth, or a particularly strong brightness enhancement on
the surface, as in the case of the Kanizsa figures (as in Figure 6 of
the target article). The important point is that perceptually closed
surfaces, irrespective of whether they are filled by apparent con-
trast, show phenomenal properties of figural relief or depth, or
have illusory contours, produce the same psychophysical effects in
a variety of visual tasks. All perceptually closed surfaces can pro-
duce apparent motion as well as kinetic and stereokinetic effects
(e.g., Mather 1988; Vallortigara 1987; von Grünau 1979): They
have shape invariance and view stability, which means that the
percept resists changes in spatial orientation and position relative
to that of the observer (e.g., Carman & Welch 1992; Nakayama &
Shimojo 1992; Vallortigara 1987) and they do not affect visual sen-
sitivity to small contrast signals when these are presented on the
surface at a position not too close to its border (Cornsweet & Teller
1965; Van Esen & Novak 1974; Dresp 1992). Although surface
completion may in some cases be initiated by the same mecha-
nisms that initiate area completion, the psychophysical data tell us
that in the visual system surfaces are likely to be represented at a
higher level than areas.
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Contour completion. In contour completion, collinear lines,
edges, or fragments are perceptually joined or grouped together
by the visual system. Collinear stimulus fragments do not have to
define a closed surface, or partially delimit an area, to trigger com-
pletion. The phenomenal effect of contour completion varies. In
some cases, an illusory line may emerge perceptually, as between
two collinear edges in half a Kanizsa square; in other cases, not
much is visible to the naked eye. Psychophysically, the “joining to-
gether” operation that underlies contour completion can be mea-
sured between lines and edges of any kind provided they are
collinear, which means that they can be perceptually aligned.
These results tell us that the thresholds for the detection of small
contrast targets are considerably lower when the target is inserted
between collinear stimuli (lines or edges) than at any other loca-
tion in the stimulus display (Dresp 1991; Dresp & Bonnet 1991;
1993; 1995; Dresp & Grossberg 1997; Kapadia et al. 1995;
Wehrhahn & Dresp 1998; Yu & Levi 1997). These data show un-
ambiguously that the visual system “expects” something to appear
within gaps between collinear fragments and is ready to fill in the
missing information. This readiness to respond is reflected by the
significantly increased visual sensitivity measured in the psy-
chophysical detection task. Long-range interactions between ori-
entation selective neurons in the visual cortex (e.g., Gilbert &
Wiesel 1990) provide a plausible neurophysiological explanation
of contour completion across spatial gaps.
Conclusion. The three kinds of completion phenomena de-
scribed above can help explain pictorial completion. Some of the
behavioral consequences of the underlying mechanisms can be
measured in psychophysical experiments (i.e., “at the level of what
the animal accomplishes in its environment”). The psychophysical
reality rather than the phenomenal appearance of visual stimuli
should govern our scientific working taxonomy. What should be
regarded as a mechanism and what as a phenomenal attribute of
the stimulus must be clearly distinguished. If “filling in” is to de-
scribe one (or several?) mechanism(s), then the term is tenden-
tious, implying a ready conclusion about the nature of the opera-
tion(s) that are used by the visual system to achieve completion.
Could the whole debate about filling-in be just another example
of a well-discussed, ill-posed question?
In summary, I generally believe that down-to-earth and strictly
mechanistic conceptualizations rather than overly sophisticated,
phenomenal descriptions make it easier to approach visual per-
cepts from the bottom of their genesis. This might save scientific
minds from jumping to conclusions regarding whether or not the
brain is jumping to conclusions.
Quasi-modal encounters of the third kind:
The filling-in of visual detail
Frank H. Durgin
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081.
fdurgin1@swarthmore.edu www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/fdurgin1/
Abstract: Although Pessoa et al. imply that many aspects of the filling-in
debate may be displaced by a regard for active vision, they remain loyal to
naive neural reductionist explanations of certain pieces of psychophysical
evidence. Alternative interpretations are provided for two specific exam-
ples and a new category of filling-in (of visual detail) is proposed.
No worse evil can befall a man than to hate argu-
ment.
Plato, Phaedo
Kanizsa (1979) described amodal perception as encountered,
rather than seen. When no-nonsense neuroscientists suggest that
the filling-in debate is merely semantic, they miss the point that
all language is merely semantic. The interpretation of evidence in
the understanding of conscious perceptual experience sometimes
requires subtle thought, not simply better recording techniques.
The target article has taken a somewhat schizophrenic stance with
regard to the consideration of evidence. Pessoa et al. argue in the
end that concepts of active vision can replace the debate about fill-
ing-in with more worthy questions, yet the main treatment of the
psychophysical “evidence” is so reductionist in spirit that I feel
compelled to try to add a few twists to what I regard as false di-
chotomies.
There is more to life than boundaries and surfaces. Although
Pessoa et al. decry the legacy of Marr (1982), they are content to
retain division of visual representation into boundaries and sur-
faces. In surface perception they lump brightness and texture and
any other “features” of surfaces. Is anything left out? It is my con-
tention that the insight suggested by Gibson (1979) and fleshed
out in modern debates about consciousness, is that conscious per-
ceptual experience (despite being mediated by neural processes)
is of the world, not of the cortical codes. Gibson’s ideas about di-
rect perception seem most applicable to the understanding of per-
ception-action coupling (e.g., Milner & Goodale 1995), but part
of the reason the concept of direct perception appeals to college
sophomores is that perception sure seems direct, to paraphrase
Dennett (1991).
There is a third kind of filling-in related to this illusory direct-
ness, beyond surfaces and boundaries. It is an aspect of what may
be called the Grand Illusion of perception – that the perceived
world is complete and fully detailed in all directions, despite the
unarguable evidence that the internal representation of the world
that we can study in visual cortex is nonuniformly sampled (i.e.,
blurry and poorly localized in the periphery). This third kind of
filling-in, which is largely (and forgivably) ignored by those inter-
ested in cortical representation rather than perceptual experience,
is the filling in of visual detail.
In the space I have here I will provide one example of the sense
in which perceptual experience fills in (and seems to have access
to) detail beyond what is actually available to it by any straightfor-
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Figure 1 (Durgin). A density aftereffect (see Durgin 1995) can
be experienced by first gazing at the top fixation bar for about 30
seconds. Upon glancing at the lower fixation square the lower left
texture will appear much less dense than the right.
ward neuro-cognitive standard. The example is personally dear to
me because its discovery was what first convinced me that per-
ception was interesting. It is a rather strong aftereffect of texture
density that can be experienced with the aid of Figure 1. After
adapting to a dense texture to one side of fixation, subsequent tex-
tures presented in that region appear to have far fewer elements
than their identical counterparts presented in an unadapted re-
gion. Is this because some of the dots are now missing? Or is it 
because the information underlying my perception of texture den-
sity is actually a scalar value, which is “interpreted” (in Helmholtz-
ian fashion) as indicating the presence of such and such a distrib-
ution of dots?
It is convenient to speak of the dots as forming a texture that 
is represented cortically by means of summary information. But
what am I to make of the fact that the individual dots all seem (to
introspection) to be present in consciousness both before and af-
ter adaptation? I suggest that this perceptual encountering of de-
tail is a quasi-modal filling-in that is ubiquitous in the efficient reg-
istration of the visual world.
Is there such a thing as quasi-modal perception? One of the
favored arguments for neural “filling-in” is the evidence of “com-
pletion neurons” firing in the visual blind spot (Fiorani et al. 1992).
What the target article neglected to remind its readers is that Fio-
rani et al. also reported the same sorts of neurons firing in re-
sponse to completions behind occluders – that is, in cases of
amodal completion (see also Gattass et al. 1992). Clearly these
neurons are doing something more complicated than painting
lines into conscious experience.
A second kind of misleading argument comes from the studies
of Murakami (1995) of motion aftereffects in the blind spot. Ac-
cording to this study, perceived motion in the blind spot (under
conditions of perceptual completion) is neurally represented, so
that it will produce measurable motion aftereffects in the neurons
receiving direct input only from the contralateral eye. This inter-
pretation demands unwarranted faith in a high degree of localiza-
tion of motion information, however. Rebecca Cole and I (Durgin
& Cole 1997) have studied interocular texture density aftereffects
in the blind spot and found a rather more complicated set of
propositions to be true.
As with the motion aftereffect, we found that adaptation to
completed textures (across the blind spot) was similar to adapta-
tion to real peripheral textures, and differed from that to a “dough-
nut” of texture in the periphery. However, we also investigated lo-
calization of aftereffect strength and determined that the
doughnut condition suppresses aftereffect strength both within
the doughnut hole and across its textured doughnut surface. The
failure of texture completed at the blind spot to act like a dough-
nut of texture might therefore be due to (a) rather large periph-
eral receptive fields for properties such as texture (and motion),
and (b) the absence of a region of inhibition (as in the doughnut
hole), rather than the presence of interpolated activity (see
Hardage & Tyler 1995). As a final twist, we showed that even when
the perceptual filling-in of texture into the blind spot was pre-
vented by binocular rivalry, adaptation strength was essentially un-
affected (see also Blake & Fox 1974; White et al. 1978).
Although the substrate of perception is cortical patterns of fir-
ing, the implicit goal of this substrate is to be transparent in per-
ceptual experience. The quasi-modal perception of detail need
not reflect anything like an isomorphic reconstruction, though it
sure seems like I can see all the dots.
On the roles of consciousness and
representations in visual science
David C. Earle
Department of Psychology, Washington Singer Laboratories, University of
Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG, United Kingdom. d.c.earle@exeter.ac.uk
Abstract: It is argued that there is a role for the representational concep-
tion of vision, and that this is compatible with the task-level account ad-
vocated by Pessoa et al. However, the role of representations must be un-
derstood independently of our conscious experience of vision.
Pessoa, Thompson & Noë have argued against computational or
representational accounts of vision, which they characterise as
“subpersonal,” and in favour of a task-level approach at the per-
sonal level, which is more concerned with the interaction of the
perceiving organism with the world. I shall argue that the two po-
sitions are compatible, and that the arguments advanced by Pes-
soa et al. are based on a misconception about the role of con-
sciousness in vision, a limited analysis of the concept of a
representation, and a confusion over the proper description of
neural processes in vision.
Our undeniable conscious experience of the visual world gets in
the way of an understanding of vision. Paradoxically, the ecologi-
cally valid task-oriented approach advocated by Pessoa et al. re-
duces the importance of the phenomenological experience of vi-
sion. If we should be concerned with how the organism interacts
with its environment on the basis of visually presented informa-
tion, as argued by Pessoa et al., then the conscious experience of
the perceptual world, the phenomenology of vision, can be re-
garded as epiphenomenal.
Consider, for example, the case of machine vision: suppose we
have a machine that can determine relative depth from disparity
and on the basis of this information controls its own movements
or those of another machine in the physical environment. We need
not speak of consciousness here, yet we have a perceiving “organ-
ism” that interacts with the world, whose vision can be understood
at the task-level in the way described by Pessoa et al.
Similar arguments can be applied in the case of insect vision: do
we need to propose that a fly is conscious of its visual environ-
ment? The case of blindsight is also provocative in this respect. If
this argument is accepted, then perceptual content at the personal
level is concerned not with conscious visual experience, but with
the way in which an organism acts on the environment in response
to visual information, whether that action is a motor response, for
example, landing on the ceiling in response to the rate of optical
expansion, or making a behavioural judgement of equality of light-
ness of two fields.
Arguments about the bridge-locus, analytic isomorphism, and
the Cartesian theatre need no longer concern us, at least not in the
way discussed by Pessoa et al. The problem of vision can then be
understood as being concerned with the relation between the pro-
cessing of visual information and action in and on the world and
not the relation between visual processing and the mental way sta-
tion of the phenomenology of visual experience (Skinner 1963).
The phenomenology of vision may be important in its own right;
of course there is something that Jackson’s (1982) “Mary” doesn’t
know, but it has little to do with current visual science.
In this context the role of representations in vision can be more
clearly understood. I agree with Pessoa et al. that the function of
vision is not to produce an image, a picture in the head, which is
then inspected, but some might disagree. For a contrary view, con-
sider the following: “These patients cannot report the colours of
common objects from memory (e.g., the colour of a football, cac-
tus, or German Shepherd’s back), a task that most people find re-
quires imaging the object in colour” (Farah 1988, p. 312), pre-
sumably a Technicolor production by the Cartesian Theatre
Company. A representation may be many things: it can be both a
physical instantiation of a concept and a description. The concept
of money can be represented by almost anything: coins, cows,
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time, and so on; and equally, coins, cows, and time are descriptions
of money in the appropriate context. One of the pervasive errors
in visual science has been to attempt to discover the format of rep-
resentations – witness the propositional versus analog debate over
mental imagery in the 1970s and later (Pylyshyn 1981).
Marr (1982) was careful to define a representation in terms of
the information that it makes explicit, be that point by point in-
tensity values in the Grey Level Image, or intensity discontinuities
and their geometrical distribution in the Primal Sketch. No ho-
munculus is required to read these representations; a representa-
tion is simply the output of one process and the input to another
process. The primitives or constituents of these representations
are to be understood as assertions about the world, an edge here,
a depth value there.
Marr adopted a serial stage analysis of vision, and proposed that
the representations were symbolic. We do not need to accept
these two points to appreciate the value of representations in vi-
sion. In a task-oriented approach to vision, if, for example, the con-
trol of an action depends on visual depth information, then that
information must be represented in the system in some way. Such
depth information is not given directly; it must be extracted from
the stimulus and represented so as to guide and control action.
That representation may be a symbolic one, as in the 2.5D sketch,
or it may be encoded in the activity of populations of disparity
tuned neurons in V1. The point is that to say that a neuron is tuned
to disparity is to assign an information processing and representa-
tional function to that neuron. I can see no inconsistency between
this subpersonal approach to vision and the personal task-level ap-
proach advocated by Pessoa et al., provided that the goal of the
subpersonal level is not taken to be the production of the substrate
of the phenomenology of vision. If these points are accepted, then
I agree that filling-in does indeed seem a shadow of its former self,
but not because it has been shorn of its connections to the repre-
sentational conception of vision. Rather, it is because filling-in has
been shorn of its connections to the conscious experience or phe-
nomenology of vision.
The level of filling-in and when it is cognitive
Richard L. Gregory
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8
1TN United Kingdom. richard.gregory@bris.ac.uk
Abstract: This informative and conceptually stimulating target article is
very useful. I merely query whether the term “illusory contours” is appro-
priate for gap filling; “illusory surfaces” seems better – and “fictional sur-
faces” better still. These seem to be rule based rather than knowledge
based, suggesting indeed the importance of distinguishing rules (analo-
gous to syntax in language) from knowledge (equivalent to semantics) for
classifying perceptual phenomena.
I find this an unusually interesting, informative, and conceptually
stimulating target article about fundamental issues of perception
and problems of interpretation of phenomena in terms of often
hypothetical neural processing. I would like to comment on only
one small aspect: the “level” of illusory surfaces.
The term “illusory contours” is not appropriate when consider-
ing, for example, the notion that gaps are filled by a perceptually
created nearer surface. Couldn’t the term “illusory surfaces” be
used?
Referring to section 6.1, I think it is an open question how far
down the system it is appropriate to speak of “cognitive pro-
cesses”: Whenever knowledge is involved, I should think. It is
surely important to note that object knowledge does not seem to
be used for illusory surfaces: missing noses, for example, are not
completed. Completion seems to depend on general rules rather
than on specific object knowledge. Rules, however, might be re-
garded as cognitive in the sense that in language both semantics
and syntax are aspects of cognition. It would be interesting to look
carefully at the analogy between how we should describe percep-
tual phenomena and how we describe language. (Incidentally, I
have recently introduced the term “sideways” rules to comple-
ment “bottom-up” signals and “top-down” object knowledge
[Gregory 1997; 1998].)
In the first edition of Eye and brain (Gregory 1966), I consid-
ered the illusory Phi movement as arising from tolerance to gaps
in the normal motion signalling system. But surely the general
idea of tolerance, and of the brain ignoring signals, goes back at
least to Helmholtz in the last century. This may well seem to be
the most economical strategy; but one does need to consider the
more general system of which these processes and phenomena are
a small part. Once the sewing machine is invented, it is the easi-
est way of sewing a dress; but it would be absurd to invent the
sewing machine for a single garment – or not to use it when it is
available!
Filling-in the forms
Stephen Grossberg
Department of Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston University, Boston, MA
02215. steve@cns.bu.edu cns-web.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg
Abstract: Boundary completion and surface filling-in are computationally
complementary processes whose multiple processing stages form pro-
cessing streams that realize a hierarchical resolution of uncertainty. Such
complementarity and uncertainty principles provide a new foundation for
philosophical discussions about visual perception, and lead to neural ex-
planations of difficult perceptual data.
Pessoa, Thompson, & Noë have provided a timely, scholarly, and
persuasive description of phenomena related to filling-in. Having
with my colleagues introduced neural models of these phenom-
ena (e.g., Grossberg 1984; 1987a; Grossberg & Mingolla 1985;
Grossberg & Todorovic´  1988), I would like to discuss some basic
concepts that the authors have not mentioned.
Surface filling in compensates for variable illumination; it “dis-
counts the illuminant.” Discounting the illuminant attenuates
brightness and color signals except near regions of sufficiently
rapid surface change (Grossberg & Todorovic´ 1988). Without fur-
ther processing, visual representations would be colored outline
cartoons. Filling-in reconstructs a surface representation in the at-
tenuated regions using the surviving color and brightness signals,
which are relatively uncontaminated by illuminant variations. This
process illustrates the “hierarchical resolution of uncertainty.”
Filling-in behaves like a diffusion. Why is this? Filling-in of
small objects is restricted to small regions, whereas filling-in of
larger objects encompasses larger regions. A short spatial range,
like a diffusion, can realize both properties.
What keeps the diffusion within its object? This is accomplished
by perceptual boundaries. Topographically organized output sig-
nals from the boundary stream to the surface stream define re-
gions in which filling-in is restricted.
Remarkably, boundary completion and surface filling-in are
computationally complementary processes (Grossberg 1987a;
1994). As in the Kanizsa triangle of Figure 6, boundaries form in-
wardly and are oriented between cooperating pairs of inducers.
Boundaries also form between inducers that have opposite con-
trast polarities with respect to their backgrounds. Through the
pooling or signals from opposite contrast polarities, boundaries
form around an object even if it lies in front of a textured back-
ground whose contrasts with respect to the object reverse across
space (Grossberg 1997, Fig. 8). This pooling property renders the
boundary system output insensitive to contrast polarity. The
boundary system hereby loses its ability to represent visible colors
or brightnesses; “all boundaries are invisible.”
Visibility is a property of the surface system. Surface filling in
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spreads outwardly from individual inducers and is unoriented un-
til it is contained by a boundary. Filling-in can lead to visible sur-
face percepts, and is thus sensitive to contrast polarity.
The above properties of boundaries and surfaces are comple-
mentary. I claim that brain principles of “hierarchical resolution
of uncertainty” and “complementary interstream interactions” re-
flect the uncertainty and complementarity principles obeyed by
the physical world with which brains interact, and to which they
adapt (Grossberg 1998b).
People like Dennett, who do not believe in filling-in, face a se-
rious epistemological crisis. Ratliff and Sirovich (1978), for exam-
ple, have accepted the classical viewpoint that early filtering of 
visual signals occurs and distorts input luminances while dis-
counting the illuminant, but they do not accept that filling-in also
occurs. These early filters generate cusps of activation or inhibi-
tion near positions where input contrast changes quickly. Unfor-
tunately, two positions with the same (different) activity in the dis-
torted patterns often have different (the same) brightness in the
corresponding percept (see Grossberg & Todorovic´  1988). Being
able to measure equality and difference are fundamental opera-
tions in all scientific endeavors. Without filling-in, one gets the
wrong answer or no answer at all.
Pessoa et al. mention seeing and thinking, which I discuss as
seeing and recognizing (Grossberg 1987a). “Seeing” happens in
regions like cortical area V4 and “recognizing” in areas like infero-
temporal cortex. How you can recognize something that you can-
not see (amodal perception) follows from the properties: Bound-
aries are invisible within the boundary system (in interblob
cortical areas V1 and V2) and (2) pathways from this boundary sys-
tem to the recognition system can support recognition whether or
not the boundary is modally visible within the surface representa-
tions in area V4.
A nonclassical definition of a visual illusion is hereby suggested:
a visual illusion is an unfamiliar combination of boundary and sur-
face properties. The difference between illusion and reality can
also be described in these terms.
Both amodal and modal surface perception are possible. Gross-
berg (1997) suggested how amodal surface percepts form in the
monocular filling-in domain (FIDO), while modal surface per-
cepts form in the binocular FIDO. The monocular FIDO is where
monocular brightness and color signals are captured onto surfaces
that represent different depths by interacting with compatible
boundaries (possibly in the thin stripes of cortical area V2); the
binocular FIDO is where these captured signals are binocularly
matched and fill in a visible, or modal, 3-D surface representation
(probably in area V4) in which figure-ground separation occurs.
Both processes are proposed to be accomplished by similar mech-
anisms (Grossberg 1994), notably double-opponent cells. Double-
opponent cells are classically assumed to subserve color percepts.
At the binocular FIDOs they do lead to conscious color percepts,
but at the monocular FIDOs they do not!
So far as I can see, texture spreading can be understood as a
combination of boundary completion and surface filling-in. There
is no need to posit a separate mechanism.
Pessoa et al. mention several facts as if they were unrelated: (1)
reciprocal bottom-up and top-down cortical pathways; (2) rapid
reorganization of receptive fields in response to scotomas; and (3)
perceptual grouping in both cortical areas V1 and V2, albeit on a
smaller scale in V1. Grossberg (1998b) suggested how the visual
cortex integrates perceptual grouping, top-down attention, and
stable development and learning by making ingenious use of its
laminar and columnar circuits. Once one reaches this level of
analysis, debates about “Cartesian materialism” seem to be irrel-
evant.
Revising locus of the bridge between
neuroscience and perception
L. W. Hahn
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
PA 16802. lxh22@psu.edu psych.la.psu.edu/lhahn/home.html
Abstract: This commentary proposes keeping the bridge locus construct
with a revised definition which requires the bridge locus to be dynamic,
representation-independent and influenced by top-down processes. The
denial of the uniformity of content thesis is equivalent to dualism. The ac-
tive perception perspective is a valuable one.
Pessoa, Thompson & Noë provide an excellent summary of the
perceptual completion literature and a provocative review of the
philosophical constructs underlying it. The most significant con-
tribution is their attempt to unite ideas from neuroscience, psy-
chology, and philosophy in creating a description of perceptual
completion. Their conclusions, however, originate from a philo-
sophical perspective and are unlikely to be accepted by the em-
pirically minded vision community.
A revision of the bridge locus construct. In section 8.1, Pessoa
et al. reject the bridge locus construct based on a strict interpre-
tation of Teller and Pugh’s (1983) concise (perhaps overly concise)
definition. However, the bridge locus construct provides a useful
focal point at which neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy can
converge. A redescription of the bridge locus may make the con-
struct more powerful, and perhaps more acceptable to philoso-
phers.
Let us begin redefining the bridge locus with the premise that
the brain is responsible for the experience of visual perception.
Because the whole brain is not devoted to visual perception, we
can restrict the relationship between the brain and visual percep-
tion by including only those neural structures that can be stimu-
lated by a retinal image. Of these neural structures, there must be
a subset that is sufficient for the current visual percept. This sub-
set can be further divided into: (1) neural structures directly re-
sponsible for the visual percept – the neural percept level – and
(2) neural structures that directly and indirectly provide input to
the neural percept level. “Top-down” neural structures can pro-
vide input to the neural percept level but are not part of the neural
percept level. I propose that the neural percept level is the bridge
locus: the critical point bridging in Teller and Pugh’s (1983) words,
“two logically disjoint universes of discourse” (p. 587), physiology
and perception.
The proposed definition deviates from previous definitions of
bridge locus in five important ways. First, the definition does not
require that the neural representation be strictly isomorphic or
nonisomorphic to the percept. For example, the bridge loci for the
percepts induced by “o” and “o” may be the same, although they
are clearly discriminable. Second, the bridge locus at any particu-
lar time depends on the goals of the observer. For example, the
bridge locus for the color red will be triggered by an observer la-
beling the ink color of the word “green” printed in red, but the
bridge locus for the word “green” will be triggered by an observer
reading the word. Third, the bridge locus is not restricted to high
neural stages. For example, the bridge locus for the letter “i” may
occur earlier in the visual system than the bridge locus for the
word “I.” Fourth, the bridge locus is influenced by contextual in-
formation. For example, a letter bridge locus will be triggered by
the “0” image embedded in “IS0M0RPHIC” while a number
bridge locus will be triggered by the “0” image embedded in
“1101011111.” Finally, implicit in these examples is a significant
role for visual attention. By determining the focal percept, visual
attention or “what we are looking for” determines the prevailing
bridge locus. By giving this role to attention, a mechanism is pro-
vided for determining (1) the location of the “fame” of conscious-
ness (Dennett 1996) and (2) which of the “multiple stages” of 
filling-in is the useful stage (Ramachandran 1995). Thus, the
bridge locus provides an explicit link between perception and
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physiology, but to be useful, it must be dynamic, representation-
independent and influenced by top-down processes.
Is “uniformity of content” just materialism? In section 9.2,
Pessoa et al. encounter the mind-body problem in the form of the
uniformity of content thesis – that perceptual content and neural
content can be the same. Their rejection of the thesis can be in-
terpreted in two ways. First, their denial of the uniformity of con-
tent suggests an endorsement of dualism. They step back from a
strict dualist perspective in accepting “the general thesis that facts
about brain-level content determine what the person sees or ex-
periences” but they “deny that the general thesis entails the uni-
formity thesis.”
An alternative interpretation is that Pessoa et al. are stressing
that neural content is always expressed in neural impulses which
cannot be equated with the perceptual content of percepts. This
assertion challenges a straw man that would be accepted by few
researchers. Perceptual experience is not composed of neural im-
pulses, or, for that matter, spatial frequency decomposition.
Nonetheless, overwhelming empirical evidence has demonstrated
that perceptual experience is encoded in neural impulses and a
spatial frequency decomposition. In summary, denying the uni-
formity of content is either dualistic or a straw man and, in both
cases, highly questionable.
The active aspect of the subpersonal versus personal debate.
In section 9, Pessoa et al. argue that visual science is dominated
by “subpersonal” neuroscience and psychophysics and that the
“personal” task-level or goal-level perspective is neglected. Al-
though their argument that the subpersonal approach is being
overutilized is unconvincing, I do agree that perception should not
be isolated, but should be viewed as embedded within an interac-
tion between perception and action. How many times must we re-
discover the significance of Held and Hein’s (1963) finding that vi-
sual perception depends critically on the interaction between
perception and action? Researchers of eye movements are per-
haps the most familiar with the ebb and flow of the perceived im-
portance of this interaction. As Steinman and Levinson (1990)
have noted, “we are inclined to believe, based on the history of this
area, that interest will last a decade or two to be followed by a pe-
riod of neglect” (p. 115).
We can’t fill in answers to philosophical
questions
Lloyd Kaufman
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003.
lk@xp.psych.nyu.edu
Abstract: The target article discusses the classic blind spot, scotomas, sub-
jective contours, and other so-called filling-in phenomena. Its purpose is
to evaluate the idea that some theories of filling-in amount to tacit accep-
tance of Cartesian materialism and a form of psychophysical isomorphism.
Pessoa et al. reject what is termed structural isomorphism as well as Carte-
sian materialism, but claim that neural processes adduced as underlying
filling-in may be acceptable without implying isomorphism. The article
supports the idea of perceiving as an active constructive process. However,
the various subthemes are not clearly related to each other. Topological
psychophysical isomorphism is indeed untenable, but the tacit assumption
that filling-in enjoys any kind of unique status with respect to illuminating
philosophical questions is doubtful.
People have to discover their own blind spots. Some writers be-
lieve that stimulating the retina surrounding this spot results in a
spreading of neural activity to fill it in. Similarly, when viewing the
Kanizsa triangle, we “see” borders but when we examine them
closely, they vanish. Nevertheless, we say that the borders are
completed (filled-in). Pessoa et al. provide a taxonomy of these
and other “completion” phenomena and correctly decide that
many of them differ basically from each other. The authors’ pur-
pose, however, is to illuminate the issue of the relation between
physiological events and conscious experience.
How successful were they? Pessoa et al. discuss various forms
of isomorphism. As suggested in Kaufman 1974, Kohler (1929)
formulated the doctrine of psychophysical isomorphism to legit-
imize inferences about the brain based on experiences. If a one-
to-one correspondence exists between experienced events and
brain events, then one may gain insight into the brain by observ-
ing one’s inner states; by the same token, one can infer experiences
from observed activity of the brain. Kohler lacked the tools in 1929
to study the activity of the brain. If one could tap into the brain
and observe its states and their changes, it would be enormously
convenient. In the 1940s, with the help of Richard Held, Kohler
managed to detect changes in steady potentials at the human scalp
and suggested that underlying electric currents in the brain did in
fact constitute those brain events that mapped experience. The
classic monograph by Kohler and Wallach (1944) on figural after-
effects beautifully illustrates the complementary idea that one
may make inferences about the brain from experienced events.
The shifting in spatial position of contours after adapting to other
contours must be due to self-impeding current flow in the fluids
bathing the brain. Right?
Wallach (personal communication) thought that Kohler’s field
theory was not justified by the data he and Kohler had collected.
He was at a loss to explain these strong phenomena, although the
theory did a remarkably good job in its day. Now we see that
Kohler’s field theory is highly improbable. However, it illustrates
the idea that it is impossible to uniquely identify brain activity that
underlies perceptions by studying perceptions alone. By the same
token, it is highly unlikely that one could uniquely determine the
character of an ongoing perception of any complexity at all from
measures of neural activity.
As I wrote in 1974, and as made amply clear by Pessoa et al., iso-
morphism is tacitly accepted by many in the field of perception.
Pessoa et al. describe the latest wrinkle in the isomorphism story,
that of structural isomorphism. Structural isomorphism implies
that if one could measure relevant brain activity, a simple transform
of the data would yield a picture of the events as perceived by the
owner of the brain. This does not seem likely. Nevertheless, many
of the experiments described in the target article are apparently de-
signed to determine whether the behavior of neurons is correlated
with some aspect of perception, for example, spreading of neural
activity. Finding such a correlation does not establish a causal link.
Analogy, as intimated in the target article, is not an explanation.
Even as we grant that psychophysical isomorphism in its vari-
ous forms is inapplicable to perception, we must acknowledge re-
markable successes in inferring neural functions from psy-
chophysical evidence. The notion of opponency was formulated in
the nineteenth century by Hering, long before anybody had sharp-
ened a microelectrode. Hurvich and Jameson (1957) described
the workings of opponent mechanisms in detail based on psy-
chophysical evidence. Similarly, lateral inhibition was postulated
long before the work of Hartline (1942) solely on the basis of vi-
sually experienced phenomena (Hering 1872/1964). In 1960, von
Bekesy conducted a psychophysical experiment on himself and,
based on his data, proposed a hypothetical neural unit remarkably
similar to the classic “DOG” or “Mexican hat” concentric recep-
tive field which could account both for various skin sensations as
well as the so-called Mach bands. His theorizing led to many quan-
titative theories that clarify why events at one retinal place affect
perceptions linked to distant retinal places (Ratliff 1965). When
such mechanisms are present there is no need to postulate filling-
in as action-at-a-distance between populations of neurons. How
do we account for such successes?
I suggest that these successes are related to processes that oc-
cur very early in the visual pathway. We can measure the stimuli
to decide what they “really are.” Then we notice that our percep-
tions do not appear to match the measured properties of the stim-
uli. If a stimulus is “filtered” at an early stage, all that the cortex
has to work with is the filtered version of the stimulus. In that case
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it would be fairly easy to guess at the nature of a transformation
that would more or less “work.” However, the going gets really
rough when an early-occurring linear transformation cannot ac-
count for the discrepancy. Complicated nonlinear transformations
(as, e.g., in multistability) are difficult to define, and the number
of possible solutions to the problem explodes. Add complexities
such as effects of instruction, of prior exposure to other stimuli,
and of attention and the problem becomes truly enormous. Plau-
sible physiological theories are so difficult to formulate that men-
talistic interpretations are bound to arise.
Apparently Pessoa et al. focus on filling-in partly because Den-
nett (1991) referred to the idea of filling-in as “a dead giveaway of
vestigial Cartesian materialism.” However, Dennett’s assertion,
quoted by Pessoa et al., is hardly central to Dennett’s main thesis,
which concerns the nature of consciousness itself. He acknowl-
edged that filling in is an empirical issue. He is certainly right to
question the assumption that filled-in properties of a perception
have the same physiological bases as actual properties. It is so easy
to see the difference between what is filled in and what is actually
present. Consider the blind spot. We must use the visible back-
ground information to make some kind of “inference” about the
actually invisible portion of the visual field. We discover that the
blind spot is there because we can use it to cause objects or parts
of objects to literally disappear. At least some of the filling-in phe-
nomena described in the target article do not require that an in-
ner construction take place. Some may or may not be due to a kind
of action-at-a-distance. “Finding out” may be as useful a metaphor
as “filling-in” or “neural spreading.”
A lesion in the visual cortex may result in a blind spot that is not
seen. The lesion is an island of death in a living cortical sea. This
dead tissue cannot subserve any function. In fact, if it had normally
acted to inhibit activity of adjacent cortical regions, those regions
become disinhibited. This may be why the receptive fields in those
regions seem enlarged. If so, we cannot refer to the measured
changes in receptive field dimensions as reflecting something like
neural spreading. Rather, excitability of surviving cells is enhanced
because of the lack of normally occurring inhibitory processes that
serve to modulate overall brain activity. This may have nothing to
do with the fact that the blind spots produced by such scotomas
are invisible. They are not filled in, but are simply dead. They dif-
fer from the naturally occurring blind spot because the latter has
no receptors. The former have retinal receptive fields, but the cor-
tical cells that own those receptive fields are absent. Either way,
the differences between these blind spots and their surroundings
are not directly sensed. We discover them. Koffka (1935) de-
scribed a shadow of linearly varying darkness. We fail to notice this
gradual change in luminance. However, if a stripe divides the
shadow into two regions, we perceive a lighter region and a darker
region. The abrupt changes in luminance at the edges become de-
tectable. Similarly, the abrupt changes in luminance of the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet patterns (Ratliff 1965) are clearly supra
threshold, while more gradual changes between them are less
likely to be detected. Hence, the changes at the edges are the only
available information regarding the brightnesses of the different
regions. This too may be likened to a kind of finding-out or, per-
haps, a best bet as to what is out there.
I mention these examples merely to emphasize that the target
article deals with empirical issues that have no special status with
regard to philosophical questions. The dispute with Dennett
seems basically trivial. Even Pessoa et al. agree that there is no in-
ner screen with a little green guy looking at it, and that con-
sciousness is not something to be entered. All of these points are
well made by Dennett. In 1974 I too urged that perception be
viewed as an active process that unfolds over time. There is nei-
ther an instant when nor a place where events enter conscious-
ness. Rather, perceptions develop in time. They are constructions
made after the fact of stimulation. Consider apparent motion.
When an object appears to move from A to C, it is perceived as
moving through the spatially intermediate point B prior to reach-
ing C. Yet if C is occluded, the object never leaves A, it simply
flashes on and off. So perceiving the object at B must occur after
it is perceived at C! Such simple perceptual events can thus be de-
scribed as constructed after the facts of stimulation – even the per-
ceived order of those events in time.
I agree with the general idea of perception as an active process,
but am at a loss to understand how filling-in exemplifies this point
of view. Given enough space I could describe other phenomena
better suited to making this point. To conclude, I am somewhat
puzzled by this target article. I agree with many of the ideas pre-
sented. However, the connections among them are difficult to dis-
cern. The portions dealing with filling-in are interesting in them-
selves. So are the comments on isomorphism. Then we leap to the
distinctions among subpersonal and personal and task level per-
ception. However, there is no substantial information on how such
distinctions would guide specific research, and, moreover, no links
to the material on filling-in.
Surface representation by population coding
Hidehiko Komatsu
Laboratory of Neural Control, National Institute for Physiological Sciences,
Myodaiji, Okazaki-shi, Aichi, 444-8585, Japan. komatsu@nips.ac.jp
www.nips.ac.jp/
Abstract: Although there is empirical evidence of neural filling-in, this
does not necessarily entail “isomorphic” theory. Most cortical neurons do
not respond to a uniform surface and are instead sensitive to surface size
and quality. I propose that a population of such neurons encodes the pres-
ence of a surface. This scheme is different from either the “cognitive” or
“isomorphic” theories.
As is nicely summarized in Pessoa et al.’s target article, there is 
empirical evidence supporting the existence of neural filling-in at
the retinotopic map of early visual cortical areas during percep-
tual filling-in (De Weerd et al. 1995; Fiorani et al. 1992; Rossi et
al. 1996; see also Komatsu et al. 1996). Does it follow from these
studies, however, that the “bridge locus” lies in these early corti-
cal areas? I do not think so. I think the questions addressed in
these studies are independent of the question regarding where the
“bridge locus” is located. In my view, there are two common be-
liefs on which these physiological studies are based. The first is
that surface perception resulting from perceptual filling-in and or-
dinary surface perception share common underlying neural
mechanisms somewhere in the course of visual processing.
Clearly, the mechanisms involved are different at the receptor
level, but the question then remains: At which stage in visual pro-
cessing do they start to share common mechanisms and how does
this happen? Ideally, this question might be answered if we
recorded and compared the activities of neurons during these two
sorts of surface perception at every stage in the processing; how-
ever, such an attempt has not yet been made.
The second common belief is that in ordinary surface percep-
tion, neuronal activities in the retinotopic map in early cortical ar-
eas closely correlate with the percept in the sense of topographic
correspondence. For example, when a surface with a certain color
and shape appears in the visual field, some classes of neurons lo-
cated in a region of the retinotopic map topographically corre-
sponding to the surface should be activated. Under these two
premises, one feasible approach for physiological experiments to
study neural mechanisms of filling-in would be to examine
whether or not neural filling-in occurs at the region correspond-
ing to the perceived surface in the retinotopic map of early corti-
cal areas.
Does such empirical evidence of neural filling-in entail “iso-
morphism”? Pessoa et al. do not think so. They find “analytic iso-
morphism” problematic because it requires the postulation of a
“bridge locus” ( sect. 8.1). I agree that evidence of neural filling-
in does not entail “isomorphism,” but for a different reason. When
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one speaks about neural filling-in, it is often assumed that neurons
with a small receptive field confined within the surface are acti-
vated throughout the region in the retinotopic map correspond-
ing topographically to the perceived surface, producing a roughly
continuous propagation of signals. Such a scheme is unlikely to
function as a general explanation of what is going on in neural fill-
ing-in. First, when we examined whether visual stimuli covering
the blind spot (BS) activated the neurons in the retinotopic map
of V1 representing the BS, we found that most of the activated
neurons had very large receptive fields that covered a large part
of the BS and extended beyond it (Komatsu et al. 1995). I think
for the case of perceptual filling-in at the BS, neurons with small
receptive fields confined within the BS that are activated during
perceptual filling-in are rare, if they exist at all. Another important
point is that we need to consider carefully what happens in the
early cortical areas when a surface is perceived in an ordinary con-
dition. Actually, only a minority of cortical neurons respond to a
homogeneous surface (von der Heydt et al. 1996). Many neurons
have some suppressive mechanisms within and outside of the re-
ceptive field and are sensitive to the size of stimuli. The optimum
response occurs to a stimulus with a certain size, which is in most
cases smaller than the size of the receptive field (Komatsu & Ki-
noshita 1997). This fact is neglected by the “isomorphic” theory.
How should we take into account this fact to interpret neural fill-
ing-in then?
Suppose there is a population of such size-selective neurons,
each with a receptive field at the same location in the visual field,
but different size preferences. Also, assume that the preferred size
of each neuron is known. Then, if the visual responses of the neu-
rons in the population are measured, it should be possible to com-
pute the stimulus size presented at that location. If there is a pop-
ulation of neurons that are sensitive to some surface quality, such
as color, luminance, or texture, the activity of a population of such
neurons should encode the presence of a surface with that partic-
ular quality. Similarly, there are many neurons in extrastriate ar-
eas that are sensitive to surface size and quality. According to such
a scheme, the population of size-selective neurons at each cortical
stage encodes the surface up to the limit of the maximum encod-
able size specific to each cortical area. An important difference
across different areas is that neurons at a higher stage have larger
receptive fields and are thus capable of encoding larger surface ar-
eas. Such a scheme of surface representation conforms to neither
the “cognitive” nor the “isomorphic” theories. It should also be
added that, in such a scheme, a trade-off should exist between the
spatial resolution and encodable surface size. In order to deter-
mine the precise location and size of a given surface, interplay be-
tween early cortical areas and higher cortical ones is necessary.
This might correspond to the notion in the target article that vi-
sual processing has the “highly interactive, context-dependent na-
ture” (sect. 8.1, para. 7).
One final point should be made about the relationship between
perceptual filling-in and the retinotopic map in early cortical ar-
eas. Two different cases should be distinguished; in one, percep-
tual filling-in occurs across a region in the visual field where there
is no distortion at the corresponding location in the retinotopic
map. Filling-in at the BS is an example of this. In another case, re-
organization or distortion takes place in the retinotopic map, and
this might also result in perceptual filling-in. Receptive field plas-
ticity at a binocularly produced retinal scotoma, as shown by
Gilbert and Wiesel (1992) is an example of this second case (see
also Ramachandran 1993c). Distinguishing between these two
cases is very important conceptually because the underlying
mechanisms of perceptual filling-in should be very different. We
have recently shown that, for the monocular retinal scotoma, per-
ceptual filling-in occurs without any reorganization of the retino-
topic map of V1 (Murakami et al. 1997). Thus, monocular sco-
toma, unlike binocular scotoma, conforms to the first case.
Blindsight in the blind spot
K. Kranda
Psychophysiological Laboratory, Freie Universität Berlin, D-14057-Berlin,
Germany. ksk@komma.zedat.fu-berlin.de
Abstract: The filling-in process proposed as a cover up for the existence
of the blind spot has some conceptual similarities to blindsight. The per-
ceptual operation of a hypothetical mechanism responsible for filling in
represents a logical paradox. The apparent indeterminacy of the percept
in the optic-disc region can be tested experimentally by viewing the grat-
ing test pattern below.
The conviction that the human spirit can conquer the flesh is past
its heyday, even though it occasionally crops up in disguised form.
Some BBS commentaries on a phenomenon called “blindsight”
(Campion et al. 1983) document such tendencies. The apparent
ability to “see” without a functioning striate cortex is an exciting
option even if the actual percept is rather ambiguous (Weiskrantz
1996). Pessoa et al. review another perceptual phenomenon – the
“filling-in” over the retinal blind spot – but without mentioning its
conceptual similarity to blindsight.
The essence of all preoccupation with filling-in, even if not ex-
plicitly stated, is the feeling that the blind spot is a blemish of the
retina. This “accident” of embryogenesis is admittedly not so bad
as a damaged striate cortex, but a nuisance nevertheless, so that
our brain needs to iron it out. Although many of us may feel in-
stinctively that there is a real need for some “corrective action,”
there is an apparent lack of consensus about how to describe this
process. Apart from the traditional notion of filling-in favoured by
Pessoa et al., other ideas suggesting that the brain performs sur-
face interpolation (Durgin et al. 1995) or some kind of “finding
out” (Dennett 1992) are in circulation. Our brain supposedly does
all that work to fill the optic-disc area with visual information. But
the reason we do not notice the blind spot is precisely because that
part of the retina conveys no information. Let me advance this ar-
gument by suggesting a thought experiment. Imagine what would
happen if a neural mechanism responsible for the hypothetical fill-
ing-in or finding out process were selectively lesioned. An as-
sumed appearance of a black or grey disc in the visual field repre-
sents a logical paradox, because such a percept actually conveys
information about a border and contrast where there is none. The
damage to this hypothetical mechanism would thus generate in-
formation by producing an illusory percept of the blind spot. The
opposite assumption, implying that nothing happens, also leads to
a paradox, because it makes the very existence of a mechanism re-
sponsible for filling-in superfluous. Pessoa et al. also concede that
“neural filling-in may not be logically necessary” (sect. 5.2) but,
paradoxically, they express the opinion that its existence can be re-
solved empirically.
The key to solving this apparently intractable problem is to con-
sider how we perceive the world outside our field of vision. We do
not seem to miss a hypothetical extra eye in the back of our heads,
nor do we extrapolate our proverbial wallpaper Marilyns (Dennett
1991) beyond the normal field of vision. Under normal viewing,
the world does not appear as if seen from inside a tunnel or
through binoculars where sharp borders separate the perceived
from the nonperceived. As our visual acuity progressively deteri-
orates with retinal eccentricity, the perceived world merges with
the nonperceived one. This process is gradual to the point of in-
determinacy of what we actually see in this zone of transition.
There is no boundary, because to see it we would need photore-
ceptors on either side of its retinal image, or, in case of a retinal
scotoma, a functioning neural structure expecting input from the
damaged part of the retina.
The indeterminacy of the percept from the region of the visual
field occupied by the blind spot can be demonstrated experimen-
tally. There are many examples supposedly showing that this re-
gion assumes the appearance of a light pattern distributed over the
surrounding retina, but can the observer be so certain that he can
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accurately describe the percept? This can be tested by viewing a
pattern (Fig. 1) where two orthogonal square-wave gratings can
produce a perceptual rivalry within the blind-spot region of our vi-
sual field. What kind of percept would we expect if some filling-
in process operated in this case? Would the grating of one orien-
tation dominate or would the two gratings alternate in time or
perhaps fuse to form a two-dimensional grid? If we fixate the spot
in the middle with the right eye and slowly move our head towards
it, then at a distance of about 30 cm the white spot on the right
disappears. What we then actually see within that white region is
controversial. Most observers, including myself, cannot tell what
it is. Our readers may, however, experience other types of percept,
of which I would gladly receive reports!
If our brain is not actively filling in or finding out to cope with
the unfortunate existence of the blind spot, what does it actually
do about it? I do not know; probably nothing at all because, like
monkeys but unlike scientists, it has no concept of a blind spot.
Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy 
of the subjective perceptual experience
Steven Lehar
14 Crocked Lane, Manchester, MA 01944. slehar@cns.bu.edu
cns-alumni.bu.edu/pub/slehar/Lehar.html
Abstract: The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of
subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information en-
coded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view
that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality
than the percept to which it gives rise.
I see no difference between the original Gestalt formulation of
isomorphism, and what Pessoa et al. call “analytic isomorphism”
except for the secondary issue that in the former, the “bridge lo-
cus” need not imply a physical location anchored to the neural
substrate, but can refer to dynamic patterns of energy in that sub-
strate, as in Köhler’s Field Theory. The authors are mistaken when
they claim that Köhler’s concept of isomorphism did not extend to
sensory qualities such as color. Köhler clears up this confusion
(Köhler 1947, p. 60) by explaining that by similarity of “structural
properties” he means that “physiological events must be variable
in just as many directions or ‘dimensions’ as the [perceived] col-
ors are,” and he specifically cites Müller’s axiom.
The key insight of Gestalt theory is that when we view the world
around us, what we see is not the world itself, but in fact it is pri-
marily a percept, that is, an internal data structure active within
the brain, and only in secondary fashion is this data structure also
similar in certain respects to external objects and surfaces, just as
an image on a television screen is first and foremost a pattern of
glowing phosphor dots, and only in secondary fashion is it repre-
sentative of a remote scene. Based on this insight, it is valid to ex-
amine the properties of the world we see before us, not as a sci-
entist observing the physical world, but as a perceptual scientist
observing a rich and complex internal representation.
We cannot yet say with certainty exactly how information is en-
coded in the brain; neither can we say with certainty what the
neural correlate of any perceptual experience might be. What we
can say with certainty, however, according to isomorphism, is that
when we see a filled-in percept, whether real or illusory, the in-
formation apparent in that subjective experience is exactly repre-
sentative of the information coded in the mechanism of the brain.
Hence, whenever we find, as in the many manifestations of filling-
in, a disparity between what we perceive and our notions of neural
representation, we cannot argue, as Dennett (1992) suggests, that
what we perceive is somehow more explicit than the representa-
tion on which it is based; instead we must revise our notions of
neurophysiological representation to account for the properties of
the subjective experience as observed.
The argument that filling-in is not logically necessary, because
the world we perceive around us can be encoded in a compressed
or abstracted representation, seems to be supported by computer
image compression algorithms that eliminate redundancies in im-
ages by encoding only higher-order regularities. However, the
compressed representation is of lower dimensionality than the
spatial world we perceive, in violation of Müller’s axiom. Further-
more, as in image processing, a compressed representation is use-
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Figure 1 (Kranda). Grating pattern demonstrating the indeterminacy of the percept in the blind-spot region.
less without a complementary image decompression algorithm to
unpack the compressed code and express it again in the ecologi-
cally useful form of filled-in surfaces and objects. In fact, the many
manifestations of filling-in implicate exactly such an explicit com-
pletion mechanism because the percept is observed to contain
more explicit spatial information than the retinal stimulus on
which it is based.
In response to the objection of “Cartesian materialism,” there
is no need for a miniature observer of the filled-in scene, for that
scene is a data structure, like any data in a computer, except that
these are expressed in explicit spatial form.
Dennett argues that the neural representation of a filled-in per-
cept need not involve an explicit filled-in representation, but can
entail only an implicit encoding, such as the edge image of the reti-
nal ganglion cells, from which the filled-in percept could in prin-
ciple be computed – although this calculation need not, accord-
ing to Dennett, actually be performed. However, if such an
implicit representation were sufficient to account for perception
then there would be no need to posit any further processing be-
yond the retinal image, since that image already implicitly encodes
everything in the visual scene.
The notion of perception by “ignoring an absence” (Dennett
1992, p. 48) is meaningful only in a system that has already en-
coded the scene in which the absent feature can be ignored. In the
case of the blind spot, that scene is a two-dimensional surface per-
cept, every point of which is experienced individually and simul-
taneously at distinct locations. The onus is on Pessoa et al. to ex-
plain how this two-dimensional structure can be encoded as a
nonspatial “absence.”
O’Regan (1992) argues that visual saccades sample the external
world like a data access of an internal data structure, and that
therefore the structural representation of the visual world need
not be encoded internally, because that information is immedi-
ately available in the world itself. However, the three-dimensional
spatial information of the external world is by no means immedi-
ately available from glimpses of the world, but requires the most
sophisticated and as yet undefined algorithm to read that spatial
information from the world. Indeed, isomorphism suggests that
the required algorithm involves the construction of a fully spatial
three-dimensional internal model of that external world as ob-
served subjectively. The fact that O’Regan’s argument seems at all
plausible to him is explained by the fact that when O’Regan thinks
he is observing the external world, he is actually accessing an in-
ternal spatial model of the world, because the external world itself
is beyond direct experience. The reductionist arguments accepted
by Pessoa et al. are plausible only in the context of a Naive Real-
ism that confuses the subjectively perceived world with the ob-
jective external world.
Representational theory emerges unscathed
Dennis Lomas
Philosophy Program, Department of Theory and Policy Studies, Ontario
Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S
1V6, Canada. dlomas@oise.utoronto.ca
Abstract: Representationalism emerges unscathed from Pessoa et al.’s at-
tack. They fail to undermine a key reason for its influence: it has the the-
oretical resources to explain many illusory visual experiences such as illu-
sory contours and features. Furthermore, in attempting to undermine
representationalism, the authors seem to erect an unduly inflated distinc-
tion between neural accounts of perception and personal-level accounts of
perception.
Is Pessoa et al.’s attack on representationalism (sects. 9 and 9.1 in
particular, paras. 2–7) well taken? They are attacking representa-
tional theory at one of its strengths because it seems able to ex-
plain many experiences of illusory contours and features (as well
as many other illusions such as hallucinations). A familiar repre-
sentational story is that cognition relies on representations “in the
head” that contribute to (causally mediate) the perceptual experi-
ence of illusions. A couple of examples suffice to make this point.
An illusory shape that many people experience at the center of
Figure 1 is hard to explain without representational theory. Rep-
resentational theory seems even more indispensable in account-
ing for another experience with this figure. Suppose that subjects,
before experiencing Figure 1 and based on verbal communica-
tion, expect to perceive a particular illusory shape, for example, a
square. In this situation, Coren et al. (1986) have shown that ex-
pectations of subjects significantly influence the shape of the illu-
sory contour they experience. It is hard to avoid a representational
conclusion in assessing both these experiences: An internal repre-
sentation of the shape is causally mediating the visual experience.
Despite their anti-representationalism, Pessoa et al. do not
seem to give any directly anti-representational account of illusory
contours and features, the central concern of their paper. They
may feel that they respond adequately in section 9.2 to the repre-
sentationalism. There they discuss the experience of seeing hun-
dreds of Marilyns on a wall, maintaining, against some theorists,
that the visual experience is not an illusion. Whatever the merit of
their case, representational accounts play a crucial role in cases
where illusions undoubtedly are experienced, as in the case of il-
lusory contours and features.
Pessoa et al. attempt to bolster their anti-representationalism
by appealing (sect. 9, para. 2) to the distinction between subper-
sonal accounts, which, they hold, are concerned with neural
mechanisms and processes (sect. 9.1, para. 3), and personal-level
accounts, which they hold are concerned with the norms of ratio-
nality (sect. 9, para. 2). It is not clear, however, that such a dis-
tinction usefully applies to the phenomena of filling in. Neural ac-
counts of many of these phenomena surely play a role in
accounting for the personal-level experience of the perceiver. At
any rate, the authors have presented no alternative explanation of
the personal-level experience of perceptual filling in.
Furthermore, it is unclear what role Pessoa et al. want the no-
tion of “norms of rationality” to play in accounts of visual percep-
tion. Are they claiming that visual perception is “constrained by
norms of rationality” (sect. 9, para. 2)? If so, their position seems
to run afoul of many experiences. (If visual perception, in the au-
thors’ view, is not governed by the norms of rationality, then what
is the relevance of raising this notion?) The Müller-Lyer illusion,
which is often cited in this regard, seems to show that visual per-
ception is not governed by the norms of rationality (for example,
see Crane 1992, pp. 149 ff.). For, like many illusions – including
illusory contours and features – the Müller-Lyer illusion, for the
most part, persists despite the belief that it is an illusion.
All in all, Pessoa et al.’s personal-subpersonal distinction seems
to create a gulf between neural and personal accounts of percep-
tion that belies the role that neural accounts play in explanations
of visual experience on the personal level, including the experi-
ence of many illusory contours and features.
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Figure 1 (Lomas). Coren et al. (1986) have shown that expecta-
tions of subjects significantly influence the shape of the illusory
contour they experience at the center of this figure.
Pessoa et al.’s homunculus charge against representational ac-
counts (sect. 9.1, para. 4) hits these accounts at one of their weak
points. Specifically, the authors level their fire against Marr’s
(1982) theory. In this theory, because interpretation takes place
only after a “bottom-up” construction of a three-dimensional
model, the concern is raised that an implied, fully cognitive ho-
munculus is taking on full responsibility for interpretation.
(Hence, the problem of infinite regress lurks.) So the authors’ as-
sessment of Marr is justified. However, it is not clear that all rep-
resentational models necessarily have such a problem. If early vi-
sion is guided from the outset by conceptual “top-down” processes
(a claim that is consistent with, for example, Cavanagh 1991 and
1995), the problem of a fully cognitive homunculus may be
avoided.
Pessoa et al.’s attack on Marr motivates their “task-level con-
ception of vision”: “the task of vision is not to produce represen-
tations from images, but rather to discover through a perceptual
system what is present in the world, and where it is” (sect. 9.1,
para. 4). It is not clear how this stance bears on representational
accounts, because these accounts provide key insights into how
the perceptual system allows us to recognize and locate objects. In
fact, representational accounts of one kind or another seem to be
front runners in the study of object recognition. To cite one ex-
ample out of many in the vision science literature, Cavanagh
(1995) has argued that the recognition of many two-tone pictures
can only be explained by appeal to template matching. Represen-
tational accounts also pertain to the study of perception of loca-
tion. Peterson and Gibson (1994), for example, have argued that
in some situations shape recognition of contours in early vision
contributes to figure-ground separation.
Pessoa et al. seem to have failed to dint the armour of repre-
sentationalism with regard to the phenomena of filling-in that
their paper addresses. Furthermore, the problems the authors
raise against representationalism may be remedied without dis-
carding the theory. Finally, their personal–subpersonal distinction
– a basis of their criticism of representational theory – seems to
inflate unduly the distinction between neural accounts and per-
sonal-level accounts of perception.
A retinotopic representation of filling in:
Further supporting evidence
Ikuya Murakami
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.
ikuya@wjh.harvard.edu visionlab.harvard.edu/
Abstract: A few findings from our laboratory are provided as evidence fa-
voring “isomrphism” in filling-in. One is the responsivity of macaque-
cortical area V1 cells to a stimulus designed for surface filling-in at the
blind spot. Another is a phenomenological observation of motion afteref-
fect confined within a filled-in surface at the blind spot. Our recent study
on the monkey’s perception of surface filling-in at a scotoma is also men-
tioned.
An illusion called X in fact comprises many qualitatively different
varieties; to perceive illusion X does not necessarily imply that the
same illusion occurs isomorphically in the brain; studies of illusion
X in a dark room with a chin rest might miss the real purpose, na-
ture, and mechanism of X in a natural environment. Based on
these general considerations, Pessoa et al.’s target article provides
us with an extensive and well-organized review of the issue of per-
ceptual filling-in (or completion or whatever), although nothing
dazzling really seems to be postulated. I basically agree with the
authors’ conservative view of the underlying mechanism of filling-
in: There is no promising way to test whether there is a pictorial
neural representation of filling-in that is directly or indirectly
equated with our perception. The essence of this is certainly a
broad issue, not specific to filling-in, but to discuss it in a positive
and constructive way in relation to filling-in would definitely be
helpful.
Indeed, the idea of a direct correspondence – “analytic iso-
morphism” – is, though conceptually possible, quite confusing if
used in the context of “isomorphism versus neglect.” Pessoa et al.
correctly pointed this out. I would just add that if analytic iso-
morphism implies a particular locus in the brain, then it lacks
physiological support. In contrast with our impression of the
world, which has both high resolution and meaningful organiza-
tion, no visual cortical areas identified so far seem to have both.
The idea of an indirect correspondence or “neural correlate” of-
fers a more practical and testable strategy for solving the “isomor-
phism versus neglect” problem in certain kinds of filling-in. Al-
though it is still dangerous to call a particular neuron a “filling-in
cell” (as Pessoa et al. explicitly indicate), cells showing firing pat-
terns correlated with our perception of filling-in are a likely can-
didate for its underlying mechanism. After all, retinotopy is
roughly preserved at least in primary visual cortex (and beyond, to
some extent), and cells in such a visual map that respond only to
a particular (opponent pair of) color(s) are considered “color-
selective local units,” although the physical world is devoid of
“color.” Why is this valid? Because we know that the spectral de-
tail is lost after metameric preprocessing in the retina. Likewise,
if cells behaved as if they could not distinguish a filled-in pattern
from a physical pattern, why not infer that some filling-in-like pre-
processing has occurred before that stage? I would like to add fur-
ther supporting evidence for a retinotopic representation of per-
ceptual filling-in.
The first hint came from our physiological study (Komatsu et al.
1996). When stimulated by a uniform white rectangle covering the
blind spot while the normal eye was closed, a few cells of the
macaque monkey’s cortical area in V1 the representation within
the blind spot were activated as if there were a visual input inside
the blind spot (an input that could never occur). This firing pat-
tern is consistent with what Fiorani et al. (1992) found in Cebus
monkey area V1 using stimuli for line completion.
The second point is a phenomenological report (Murakami, un-
published observation) obtained during my study on motion af-
tereffect following adaptation to filled-in motion (Murakami
1995). An adapting stimulus was confined within the blind spot of
the right eye, but presented to the left eye. After adaptation, mo-
tion aftereffect was tested using a large stimulus covering the blind
spot. When only the left (normal) eye was used at the test, a retino-
topically confined motion aftereffect occurred in the middle of the
test stimulus. When the right eye was used, however, the same
percept was obtained: motion aftereffect was confined to the mid-
dle of a filled-in pattern. To my knowledge, this is the first report
that surface filling-in is seen as nonuniform! The neglect hypoth-
esis could hardly explain this phenomenon. On the other hand, ac-
cording to the isomorphism theory, filling-in is retinotopically rep-
resented at an early level before motion adaptation alters the
activation map.
The final comment does not have much to do with the isomor-
phism theory, but is aimed to supplement section 4.3 with our re-
cent study of filling-in after monocular focal retinal lesion in the
macaque monkey. Cortical reorganization after binocular focal
retinal lesion was reported to be a candidate for the underlying
mechanism of filling-in at the scotoma (Chino et al. 1992; 1995;
Darian-Smith & Gilbert 1995; Gilbert & Wiesel 1992; Kaas et al.
1990). However, the time course of this cortical reorganization
could be on the order of months (Darian-Smith & Gilbert 1995;
Gilbert & Wiesel 1992). We found that just a few days after a
monocular lesion, the monkey perceived filling-in at the corre-
sponding scotoma (Murakami et al. 1997). Furthermore, the time
course of filling-in at the scotoma in each trial was very quick: the
monkey made a required action instantly (,0.4 sec) after the stim-
ulus onset.
Pessoa et al.’s target article gives us a good guide for studying
filling-in, demarcating modal/amodal and contour/surface dis-
tinctions, criticizing a misleading confusion of isomorphism with
Commentary/Pessoa et al.: Perceptual completion
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:6 765
the idea of a Cartesian theater [See Dennett & Kinsbourne: “Time
and the Observer”: BBS 15(2) 1992.], and emphasizing the im-
portance of interactions between the perceiving animal and its en-
vironment. My comments above should be taken as an addendum
to the current knowledge of filling-in compiled in the target arti-
cle, rather than as an attack from a radical isomorphist.
Trading in form for content and taking 
the sting out of the mind-body problem
Erik Myin
Department of Philosophy (EMEP), Free University Brussels (VUB),
Pleinlaan 2, B 1050 Brussels, Belgium. emyin@vub.ac.be
Abstract: Analytical isomorphism is an instance of the demand for a trans-
parent relation between vehicle and content, which is central to the mind-
body problem. One can abandon transparency without begging the ques-
tion with regard to the mind-body problem.
Pessoa et al. rightly argue against the thesis of analytical isomor-
phism, a specific form of the more general idea of what can be
called transparency, the idea that there has to be some kind of
very special, inner relation of similarity between the bearer of a
perceptual content – be it an idea, a sense datum or a neural
process – and the content itself.
Transparency was an invariant feature of all premodern theo-
ries of perception. In the crude atomistic version, the bearer of
content was simply a minuscule copy of the perceptual object that
entered even more minuscule pores in the perceiver’s eye. With
Aristotle, the guarantee of transparency became dematerialized:
it was the (immaterial) form that became common to perceived
object and perceiver (Lindberg 1976). Transparency lost its self-
evident status in the seventeenth century, with the emerging dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities. Qualitative
continuity between object and idea was shattered for the sec-
ondary qualities, as in the case of color.
Transparency resettled itself immediately, however, now no
longer as a reassuring guarantor of the continuity of man and the
perceptual world, but as a central manifestation of the most con-
spicuous symptom of this broken unity, the mind-body problem.
Still today, the lack of a transparent relation is involved by those
who insist on the existence of an unbridgeable explanatory gap be-
tween science and experience, suggesting that it is because of the
qualitative difference between bunches of neurons and phenom-
enal experience that we will never bridge the gap.
This appeal to transparency as a criterion and a necessary con-
dition for consciousness is accepted by those who claim that we
are making advances on the mind-body problem because we are
discovering more and more neurophysiological structures and
processes that are transparently related to phenomenology. Obvi-
ous examples are the various claims about the reducibility of color
sensations, because of the (alleged) existence of a neurophysio-
logical color space in which phenomenological relations between
colors are mirrored by neurophysiological relations (Clark 1993).
[See also Thompson et al.: “Ways of Coloring” BBS 15(1) 1992 and
van Brakel & Saunders: “Are There Nontrivial Constraints on
Colour Categorization?” BBS 20(2) 1997.] The target article un-
veils in the filling-in literature another area where the course of
empirical theory building is deflected significantly by the attrac-
tion of transparency. As Pessoa et al. clearly state, we do not need
to reject the possibility of transparent relations between neuro-
physiological bearers of content and phenomenological contents,
but its necessity. It is possible, and perhaps even probable, that
neurophysiological state spaces exist which are structurally iso-
morphic to color phenomenology. In the same way, whether fill-
ing in involves spreading neural activity is an empirical matter. The
fundamental point is that this isomorphism is neither necessary
(pace the skeptic) nor sufficient (pace the reductionist) for getting
the represented content into consciousness.
Abandoning transparency takes the sting out of the mind-body
problem, although believers in the existence of an explanatory gap
will surely point out that it is a case of begging the question. More-
over, it obligates us to search for new ways of relating brain to
mind. But if the search for structurally isomorphic items can no
longer guide us, what should?
The obvious way to proceed is to trade in form for content: if
we want to find the brain basis of consciousness we need not look
for structural correlates, but simply for whatever neurophysiolog-
ical items we think could carry the content that is present in our
phenomenological states. How it is made out that a certain struc-
ture or process carries a certain content is a matter for empirical
science to decide, and neuroscience and psychology have a vast set
of techniques, which seem to fit well enough to accomplish the
task, as is shown by Pessoa’s overview of the recent research on
filling-in phenomena.
According to the more plausible accounts of consciousness,
even the simplest visual experience carries within it a sense of how
its visual content is related to self, both bodily and personal, and
time and space, both inner and outer (Damasio 1994; Myin 1998).
A natural way to explain this informational richness of personal
level experience is to construe it as the result of the holistic inter-
action of a number of subpersonal contents. None of these con-
tents can be conscious by itself, but together they constitute an 
experience at the personal level.
Subpersonal representation seems necessary because the rep-
resented objects are at a distance. This is true even for the sub-
ject’s body, which is – from the brain’s point of view – too far away
to be consulted directly. Emphasizing embodiment in this way,
leads, contra the target article, not away from but rather toward
representationalism. Given some modularity in the brain or sim-
ply the assumption that the representational capacities of confined
areas in the brain are limited, this holism of content easily implies
physical representations that are distributed, and the rejection of
the idea of confined visual areas that form the immediate substrate
of consciousness. Now one can meet the challenge of having
begged the question by abandoning transparency, for here is an
argument that shows that even if transparency obtains, it alone
cannot form a sufficient condition for consciousness. Even if a lo-
cal visual representation is isomorphic to the visual content of a
certain experience, this alone would not suffice for consciousness,
because too little of the actual content of consciousness would be
carried by such a solitary representation.
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Representations, computation, 
and inverse ecological optics
Heiko Neumann
Fakultät für Informatik, Abteilung Neuroinformatik, Universität Ulm, D-89069
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Abstract: Implicit and explicit filling-in phenomena should be distin-
guished. Blind spot phenomena and mechanisms of boundary completion
can be accounted for by implicit filling-in. Surface regions are “painted”
with perceptual quantities, such as brightness, by explicit filling-in. “Filling-
in” and “finding-out” relate to different computational tasks. Mechanisms
of purposive computation (e.g., for navigation) evaluate local measure-
ments, thus “finding out”; whereas mechanisms for grasping might require
passive reconstruction, thus “filling in.”
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Introduction. Pessoa, Thompson & Noë provide a comprehen-
sive overview of perceptual completion phenomena. Although 
I agree with the authors’ general claim that there is evidence for
filling-in processes in the neural machinery, I suggest some alter-
native interpretations of specific findings related to filling in. I also
discuss the potential capability of such mechanisms in terms of
cortical computation.
Cortical representation, computation, and perceptual units.
Perceptual completion appears as a result of different processes
and stages in neural architecture. Contrary to Pessoa et al.’s pro-
posed taxonomy for several distinct observations, I recommend
disentangling various types of filling-in phenomena.
1. There has been no explicit experimental evidence so far that
the blind spot is mapped as an explicit “empty region” in V1 that
must be filled in in order to generate a continuous representation
of surface layout. Instead, data on cortical development and plas-
ticity suggest that the blind spot appears as a singularity in the cor-
tical representation of nested computational maps. Hence, retinal
regions surrounding the blind spot are ideally mapped in direct
spatial neighborhoods with overlapping receptive fields that vir-
tually bridge this physiological scotoma. As a consequence, a re-
gion is implicitly filled with surrounding featural quantities with-
out an active spreading process.
2. Physiological recordings of monkey V2 cell firing demon-
strate that these cells are responsive to subjective contours in the
stimulus layout. Boundary completion by V2 contour cells is indi-
cated by their selectivity to the presence of inducers at both ends
of the elongated receptive field. Researchers have suggested that
contour completion generates a spatially contiguous representa-
tion of contour activity in V1 through an inwardly directed com-
pletion between pairs of inducers. Contrary to this, we argue that
an oriented long-range integration mechanism in the V1–V2 for-
ward pathway is sufficient to explain the data (Neumann et al.
1997). Feedback from V2 contour cells to V1 contrast cells helps
to selectively enhance those initial V1 responses that are spatially
related. Hence convergent afferent projections and activity inte-
gration generate an implicitly filled-in contour activity without an
explicit spreading mechanism.
3. Mechanisms of surface perception are faced with the prob-
lem of generating representations that are invariant under, for ex-
ample, illumination. Yet no neural theory of surface representa-
tion has been developed. It is reasonable to assume that for certain
tasks, such as grasping, a contiguous neural representation of sur-
face shape is necessary. This suggests that the assignment of per-
ceptual surface properties requires a mechanism of “filling in” to
generate such an explicit layout. So far, demonstrations of an ac-
tive diffusion-like filling-in mechanism have been restricted to the
brightness domain. It is reasonable to assume that comparable
mechanisms also exist for other properties, such as color and
depth. For stereoscopic depth perception, localized boundaries
which provide disparity information are integrated on the basis of
nonaccidental properties (Nakayama & Shimojo 1992). The prin-
ciples of generating coherent depth quantities are consistent with
the filling-in interpretation.
Over all, mechanisms of perceptual completion might be di-
vided into implicit and explicit filling-in phenomena. Afferent pro-
jection zones from nonresponsive retinal regions, such as retinal
veins and the blind spot might appear as singularities in a non-
Cartesian spatially nonhomogeneous representation in visual cor-
tex. Boundary completion might be better characterized by inte-
gration and selective enhancement than by directed spreading
activity or filling-in. In both cases, a coherent “filled-in” neural
representation is generated implicitly by the neural mapping and
coupling principles. On the other hand, any two-dimensional en-
tity corresponding to surface regions might be actively filled-in
with perceptual quantities such as brightness.
Visual tasks, representations, and inverse ecological optics.
Mechanisms of perception are related to different computational
tasks. In the case of vision, purposive computations, active selec-
tion from the ambient optic array, and passive reconstruction are
sample strategies. A plethora of results suggest that there is no
unique type of cortical representation and process. For tasks like
visual navigation or obstacle avoidance, “finding-out” by simply se-
lecting results from neural motion estimation is sufficient to gen-
erate proper behavioral control signals (compare Srinivasan et al.
1997). On the other hand, for grasping purposes we may need a
dense representation of surface properties to guide any fine-tuned
manipulation. We have shown (Neumann & Pessoa 1998b) that
filling-in, modeled as an active boundary-mediated propagation
process, generates such a dense representation of reconstructed
surface properties. These findings indicate the need for more
modeling in future investigations. I suggest that emphasis should
be shifted from the observation that “the job of filling-in is to com-
plete images or representations in the brain” to an investigation of
the purpose of computational mechanisms in an ecological sense.
Filling-in is a potential candidate to support related computations
on parametrized maps in visual and other sensory cortical areas.
No evidence for neural filling-in – vision 
as an illusion – pinning down “enaction”
J. K. O’Regan
Laboratoire de Psychologie Expérimentale, CNRS, Université René
Descartes, EHESS, EPHE 75006 Paris, France. oregan@ext.jussieu.fr
pathfinder.cbr.com/people/oregan/oregan.html
Abstract: (1) The purported evidence for neural filling-in is not evidence
for filling-in, but just for long-range dynamic interactions. (2) Vision is per-
haps not an “illusion,” but at any rate it is not “pictorial.” (3) The idea of
the “world as an outside memory” as well as MacKay’s “conditional readi-
ness for action” may help approach an “enactive” theory of vision.
No evidence for neural filling-in. I fear that for many readers,
the main conclusion of Pessoa et al.’s timely synthesis will seem to
be that there exists good evidence for low-level filling-in mecha-
nisms: after all, neurons exist whose outputs seem to correspond
to illusory contours or filled-in scotomas, and psychophysical evi-
dence exists showing that the filling-in process develops over time
in the way expected from a completion mechanism.
But this is the wrong conclusion to draw. The evidence does in-
deed show the existence of these neurons and these dynamic pro-
cesses, but the trouble is: there is no guarantee that they are ac-
tually being used for filling-in!
For illustration, consider a “nonisomorphistic” theory, in which
the internal representation which underlies the phenomenology
of vision is not a map of the incoming luminance distribution it-
self, but a map of the discontinuities of the luminance distribution,
calculated over a range of spatial scales. Suppose the visual stim-
ulus is a horizontal bar crossing the blind spot. At the finest scale,
the bar would be represented as the presence of corners and
edges. At a coarser scale, each end of the bar would be repre-
sented as an “end-of-line.” At a still coarser scale, the presence of
two aligned end-of-lines would be signaled. The calculation of
such a code, involving derivative-like operators over more or less
large areas of the visual field, would take time, and develop pro-
gressively.
Note that within this theory, there is no filling-in. The bar is seen
as continuous across the blind spot because to be seen as broken,
a discontinuity would have to be signaled, yet the blind spot can
code no discontinuity, since it codes nothing at all.
Yet, although there is no filling-in mechanism in this theory,
there are nonetheless neurons corresponding to the “completion
neurons” found in the literature, which code the presence of two
aligned end-of-lines. Furthermore, there is a dynamic process in-
volved in calculating the code, which could quite feasibly produce
effects such as those which Pessoa et al. refer to as psychophysi-
cal evidence for dynamic filling-in processes.
The point I am making is that the purported evidence for neural
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filling-in is actually not evidence for filling-in. This is also noted in
Pessoa et al.’s admirable paper, but I fear it will escape most peo-
ple’s notice. If, as the authors say, “filling in seems a shadow of its
former self” (sect. 9.1, last para.), why not call it something else,
such as “long range dynamic interactions,” which does not pre-
judge the issue of an internal, pictorial representation?
Is vision an “illusion”? Pessoa et al. criticize statements we
(O’Regan 1992; O’Regan et al. 1996) and others (Blackmore et al.
1995; Dennett 1991) have made to the effect that “the impression
of continuously seeing ‘all’ of a visual scene may be an illusion.”
They say that this way of talking seems to assume that visual ex-
perience has a pictorial nature, and that it neglects the per-
sonal/subpersonal distinction.
I agree that use of the term “illusion” may lend itself to such a
misinterpretation. My use of the term is more of a literary device,
designed to shock people into realizing that vision is not what they
think it is. In fact, I agree entirely with Pessoa et al. that the in-
ternal representation of the outside world is probably not of a pic-
torial nature. This was one of the main points of my “world as an
outside memory” theory (O’Regan 1992).
Pinning down “enaction.” On the other hand, concerning the
importance of the personal/subpersonal distinction, although I
am convinced of its relevance, I don’t know how this distinction
can be knitted into a theory that makes testable predictions. I
think a promising related path is to be found in MacKay’s (e.g.,
1986) idea that vision is “conditional readiness for action,” and in
the view that the world is like an “external memory” (O’Regan
1992). Under these views, “filling-in” is unnecessary, because the
perception of an object is constituted by the sensory changes
brought about by actions undertaken with respect to that object.
For example, seeing the bar in the example above consists in an
aggregate of different kinds of knowledge: in addition to the sym-
bolic knowledge of discontinuities similar to that postulated
above, there is knowledge concerning sensorimotor contingencies:
I have the visual sensation of looking at a horizontal bar near the
blind spot, when, among other things, I know that if I move my
eye leftwards, information from the right end of the line will no
longer be registered because it has moved into the blind spot. It
is this kind of knowledge that is actually part of seeing the bar 
and knowing where it is. Were there not this peculiar behavior of
the bar near the blind spot, one would be obliged to conclude one
was not seeing the bar, but perhaps hallucinating it. In a similar
way: if I closed my eyes or moved them and nothing happened to
visual sensation, I would be dreaming, not seeing.
An analogy with tactile perception may be helpful. When a
blind man feels a cup, he feels a cup despite the fact that there are
spaces between his fingers. In fact, he can handle the cup, and put
his fingers into positions which straddle the handle, the edge of
the cup, and this helps him to recognize the cup. Far from need-
ing to be “filled in,” the spaces between his fingers actually help
in recognizing the cup.
Similarly, apparent “defects” of the visual apparatus such as the
blind spot, nonhomogeneities in the way the retina samples space
and color, as well as eye saccades, can actually be used to gain in-
formation about an object. They are part of what seeing is. They
do not need to be compensated for. The feeling of “seeing” con-
sists in “being at home with” the way sensations change when you
“handle” things with your sensory apparatus. These are the ideas
I tried to develop in the “world as an outside memory” theory
(O’Regan 1992).
The practical and conceptual case against
isomorphism: Evolution and homomorphism
Valla Pishva
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155
vpishva@aol.com www.tufts.edu/as/cogstud/maingpg.htm
Abstract: The case against analytical isomorphism is made within an evo-
lutionary framework. The relevance to neural filling-in is discussed. Ho-
momorphism is argued for as a conceptually superior substitute for iso-
morphism, and the implications for the personal/subpersonal distinction
are explored.
Pessoa et al.’s rejection of analytical isomorphism and their em-
phasis on a personal level account of the visual animal represents
a conceptual leap forward in bridging the gap between visual 
science and perceptual processes. In the context of analytical 
isomorphism, Dennett’s (1992) conceptual objection to neural 
filling-in is well related: once information about the contents of
the blind spot has been gleaned from the surrounding visual field,
no re-presentation of the information is necessary. In the worst
case, such information would be kicked back out for inclusion in
the proximal stimulus. Far from disproof through just the ho-
muncular reductio ad absurdum argument, there is no apparent
practical utility derived for the system through such re-presenta-
tion. Indeed, the case against any such isomorphic “Cartesian the-
atre” (and for or against different neural bases of filling-in) is
strengthened by evolutionary considerations as well as neuro-
physiological and psychophysical data.
In an evolutionary framework, any neural representation iso-
morphic to either the proximal stimulus or perceptual content (be
it in the form of a “bridge locus” or not) is favored only insofar as
it facilitates the further processing of the represented elements.
One could further stipulate that the processing/resources re-
quired to create such a representation should not exceed its de-
rived utility. Consequently, an isomorphic representation would
be more likely to occur earlier in visual processing, as the proxi-
mal stimulus provides an obvious template from which a neural
representation could be passively “read off.” Once higher pro-
cessing delocalizes such information, putting the puzzle back to-
gether requires a significant expenditure, and therefore a com-
pelling incentive. Perception is not such an impetus.
The implication for neural filling-in is that if it is to contribute
to any type of isomorphic representation, the expenditure re-
quired to obtain the filled-in information must be outweighed by
the utility derived from its inclusion in the representation. Con-
sequently, although it is a difficult task to calculate the “derived
utility” side of the equation, we can still postulate that neural 
filling-in to complete an isomorphic representation (whether
topographical or otherwise) would be most likely to occur when
the complexity of the underlying processes is minimized. In terms
of the types of isomorphisms made clear by Gallistel (1990), the
isomorphism between the filled-in information and the initial
stimulus whether parts of the proximal stimulus or a neural inter-
mediate) would be considered functional but not computational,
as a matter of evolutionary tendency. Indeed, much of the target
article’s evidence shows that the basis of neural filling-in is passive,
frequently relying on propagation across the area of the visual cor-
tex corresponding to the blind spot that uses little more than the
identity operator. “Seeing” Marilyns in my blind spot requires a bit
more than this. (Such philosophical reverse-engineering may be
distasteful to some, but the practice is commonplace in Darwin-
ian thinking and evolutionary psychology, and all are haunted by
Popperian unfalsifiability.)
Part of the conceptual flaw inherent in analytical isomorphism
can also be traced to isomorphism alone in visual science. The tie
between a representational, subpersonal account of visual science
and isomorphism is strong. As the target article shows (sects. 2,
8.1), the utility of isomorphism can only proceed so far in the face
of the multiple realizability of perceptual states with respect to
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neural states; and an understanding of neural underpinnings that
is increasingly delocalized (both temporally and physically). How-
ever, the concept of homomorphism can do more conceptual work
as a substitute for isomorphism.
While isomorphism requires a one to one correspondence be-
tween two systems without the loss of information, homomor-
phism requires only that certain aspects of one system map onto
the other. Beyond the banal fact that there is information degra-
dation in a mapping between two nonabstract systems, homo-
morphisms can represent relations where the noncorresponding
elements of each system are themselves separate yet closely re-
lated functional aspects of their system. Within visual science this
allows for a more malleable description of proximal-stimulus/
neural and neural/perceptual relations. For example, homomor-
phism provides an alternative explanation for the seemingly neg-
ative result of Cumming and Friend (1980) referred to in the tar-
get article (sect. 7.1). While Pessoa et al. postulate that “the
mechanisms involved [in completion] may be at a ‘higher’ pro-
cessing level than the ones involved in the effect being probed (the
tilt aftereffect)” (sect. 7.1), the mechanisms may be at (an evolu-
tionarily preferable) “lower” level, while the content provided by
the mechanisms is homomorphic to the proximal stimulus (and
the tilt aftereffect is thus a nonrepresented aspect). Why does the
absence of a full isomorphism between neural filling-in and “the
real thing” cause Pessoa et al. to postulate a “higher level” of pro-
cessing to avoid a homomorphic account?
Finally, it is interesting to note that Pessoa et al. quote, and sub-
sequently disagree with, Todorovic´ (1987) as proposing that “con-
ceptually the idea of an isomorphism between certain aspects of
neural activity and certain aspects of percepts may be more ac-
ceptable [than a nonisomorphic mapping]” (sect. 8.1). A non-
isomorphic mapping is indeed not an appealing alternative in cog-
nitive neuroscientific explanations. If there are truly no relations
between the neural substrate and either perception or the proxi-
mal stimulus, then we are on the verge of invoking the “notorious
mind-body problem.” But I disagree with Todorovic´ ’s reduction
of what is easily conceived of as a homomorphic mapping to its iso-
morphic elements. Such a reduction, while perfectly feasible
within the subpersonal program, is reflective of the neglect of the
personal level to which Pessoa et al. refer.
Homomorphism at the level of visual perception and isomor-
phism at the level of neural relations/organization are different in
kind. Holding that they are not would be an instantiation of the
uniformity of content thesis.
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Visual perception and subjective visual
awareness
Antti Revonsuo
Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University 
of Turku, FIN-20014 Turku, Finland. antti.revonsuo@utu.fi
Abstract: Pessoa et al. fail to make a clear distinction between visual per-
ception and subjective visual awareness. Their most controversial claims,
however, concern subjective visual awareness rather than visual percep-
tion: visual awareness is externalized to the “personal level,” thus denying
the view that consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon somehow
constructed inside the brain.
In Pessoa et al.’s target article, the concepts of “vision,” “visual
space,” and “visual field” are used without explicitly clarifying
whether and in what sense these notions are supposed to refer to
subjective visual awareness. A theory of visual perception should
be very clear about the role it gives to subjective consciousness
(Smythies 1996). Visual awareness only refers to one specific phe-
nomenon in the perceptual chain; it should be confused neither
with the whole chain nor with other parts of it.
Visual awareness can be realized in the absence of perceptual
input or motor output. The visual appearance of dreams is for the
most part identical with perceptual experience of the waking
world (Rechtschaffen & Buchignani 1992). Certain neural mech-
anisms are necessary for creating visual awareness, others are not.
For example, (activation of) the retina and the visual pathway up
to the thalamus are neither sufficient nor necessary in producing
subjective visual awareness. Adventitiously blind people have vi-
sual awareness in their dreams even though their peripheral sen-
sory systems or pathways may have been destroyed decades ago
(Kerr 1993). Conversely, when we fall asleep, we become func-
tionally blind even when our eyes are opened: we cannot see
bright flashes (Dement 1976) or objects (Rechtschaffen &
Foulkes 1965) right before our widely open eyes, even though the
retina and the visual pathway at least up to the thalamus still func-
tion normally (Wu 1993). When visual awareness is created dur-
ing REM-sleep, bursts of ponto-geniculo-occipital waves bom-
bard the visual areas of the brain, using the same thalamocortical
pathway that perceptual input uses.
In the light of these empirical facts, it is difficult to deny that
subjective visual awareness somehow resides in the brain. Pessoa
et al. nevertheless seem to deny this. They say that perceptual 
content only exists at the personal level (the level of organism-
environment interaction). If this claim is supposed to be about the
phenomenal content of visual awareness, it is obviously wrong.
Phenomenal consciousness is brought about by (“subpersonal”)
causal processes entirely confined inside the brain, as the genera-
tion of visual dream phenomenology shows. The point is that while
the perceptual chain as a whole is not subpersonal, the brain pro-
cesses involved in the creation of subjective visual awareness cer-
tainly are.
Dennett (1991) insists that the contents of consciousness do not
exist in the brain at the subpersonal level (see Revonsuo 1994).
However, he is also notorious for denying the existence of subjec-
tive phenomenal experience altogether (e.g., Revonsuo 1993;
Searle 1997), so his views will not be of much help in clarifying the
role of subjective visual awareness in perception. When Dennett
talks about contents of consciousness, he means attributions of
content made from the outside, not subjective phenomenal expe-
rience. He denies that brain events could be classified into con-
scious and nonconscious, thus also rejecting the idea of a bridge
locus or stage: for Dennett, consciousness is not a real natural phe-
nomenon inside the brain, but an external attribution made on the
basis of objective patterns in organism–environment interaction.
The target article seems to reject, along with Dennett, any notion
of the borderline inside the brain between nonconscious brain
processes and subjective visual phenomenology. If Pessoa et al. re-
ally do accept Dennett’s view of consciousness, they should openly
say so, for then it is futile to expect their theory to acknowledge
subjective phenomenal experience at all. If they do not accept it,
they should explain how exactly they construe the place of sub-
jective visual awareness in perception, in dreams, and in relation
to the brain.
A cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, I propose, should
take seriously the following fundamental assumptions: subjective
phenomenal consciousness is a real natural phenomenon in the
brain. It is not a simple “bridge locus” or “stage,” but rather a level
of organization in a complex biological system. This phenomenal
level of organization is realized “off-line” when we dream, but be-
comes causally modulated by sensory input in waking perception
(Revonsuo 1995). It constitutes the brain’s phenomenal real-time
model of the world, which we in everyday thinking naively take as
the external world itself, as if physical reality were somehow “di-
rectly” perceived. Cognitive neuroscience should try to figure out
what the existence of such a phenomenal level of organization in
the brain means: At which level of neural organization could it be
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realized? Do we have appropriate methods to discover such a
level? What would even count as “measuring” or “imaging” it?
Pessoa et al. seem to be unable to make the fundamental dis-
tinction between the phenomenal model of the world, con-
structed by the brain, and the physical world itself. This distinc-
tion was described by Köhler as early as 1929 in a paper called “An
old pseudoproblem.” Pessoa et al. do refer to that paper, but they
nevertheless remain in the grips of that pseudoproblem. They re-
cite (sect. 9.2, para. 10-11) that the wallpaper Marilyns do not
seem to be present in one’s mind, but there on the wall; and that
it doesn’t seem as if one’s brain is doing anything when one per-
ceives. Now the brain’s model of the world is not supposed to seem
like a model or like anything the brain is doing. It is supposed to
seem like a world. That’s how the contents of consciousness are
experienced, even during dreaming.
Furthermore, voluntary interaction with the environment is
guided by the contents of visual awareness, not directly by the
stimulus fields or the external environment. Blindsight patients
have lost the ability to interact voluntarily with parts of the visual
world falling in their blind field; yet visual stimuli unable to mod-
ulate visual awareness still guide simple forms of nonconscious,
automatic action. In REM-sleep behavior disorder (RBD), the
mechanisms creating muscle atonia during REM sleep fail, and
the patient acts out his dreams (Schenk 1993). Such a patient at-
tempts to interact with the world currently in phenomenal aware-
ness. For example, a 73-year-old man with RBD, when dreaming,
attempted to catch a running man. His wife reported that he
jumped off the end of the bed and awoke on the floor, physically
injured (Dyken et al. 1995). If an epidemic of RBD were suddenly
to spread, all of us would behave in bizarre ways every night,
guided by the contents of our visual awareness.
The world the brain tries to interact with and adapt to through
voluntary behaviour is the world-model in phenomenal con-
sciousness, not the physical world somehow directly acting upon
us (Revonsuo 1997). Even a theory primarily interested in organ-
ism–environment interaction cannot neglect the critical role that
subjective awareness – the brain’s real-time model of the world –
has in mediating perception of, and interaction with, the physical
reality out there.
Filling-in while finding out: Guiding behavior
by representing information
William D. Ross
Lincoln Laboratory, MIT, Lexington, MA 02173-9108. bross@11.mit.edu
Abstract: Discriminating behavior depends on neural representations in
which the sensory activity patterns guiding different responses are decor-
related from one another. Visual information can often be parsimoniously
transformed into these behavioral bridge-locus representations within
neuro-computational visuo-spatial maps. Isomorphic inverse-optical
world representation is not the goal. Nevertheless, such useful transfor-
mations can involve neural filling-in. Such a subpersonal representation of
information is consistent with personal-level vision theory.
Pessoa et al. organize a thought-provoking review of many data
and perspectives on perceptual completion. They conclude that
the data support the possibility that neural filling-in serves as an
underlying mechanism of perceived filling-in in several visual
modalities. However, the authors join Dennett (1992) in caution-
ing against the fallacies of isomorphistic and representational ap-
proaches. Pessoa et al. find that Marr’s (1982) world-description
goal for vision “seems guilty of the fallacy of supposing that there
is a homunculus in the head whose job it is to view the incoming
information” (sect. 9.1, para. 4). Instead, they encourage the 
personal-level perspective that the goal of vision is the parsimo-
nious guidance of behavior. This commentary attempts to recon-
cile an apparent conflict between the authors’ empirical and the-
oretical conclusions by addressing how we can understand the em-
pirical evidence supporting neural filling-in, given that filled in
representations are not themselves the goal of visual processing.
Rebuilding a bridge-locus. Natural selection does not directly
favor world-representing subpersonal visual processing strategies.
Only an individual’s behavior, when sufficiently subtle to meet sur-
vival and reproductive needs successfully despite the challenges
and competition of a particular ecological niche, gives evolution-
ary advantage. Whether or not perceptual systems solve inverse-
optics problems could be irrelevant. Moreover, introspective evi-
dence for perceptual representations can only offer first-order
intuitions about mechanisms, not logical constraints on their form.
However, ruling out behaviorally useless representation on an
“internal screen” as a goal for vision does not remove the need for
those visual distinctions essential for adaptive behavior. The min-
imum requirement is that the visual system achieve neural repre-
sentations of incoming visual information in which the activity pat-
terns appropriate for driving different responses are themselves
distinguishably decorrelated from one another. Stated simply, dif-
ferent responses to different visual stimuli require discriminating
visual representations. To revise Teller and Pugh (1983), behav-
ioral bridge-loci must be reached.
The goal is not inverse-optical representations of the world but
useful re-presentation of incoming information. Since such rep-
resentations are, by definition, sufficient to guide behavioral de-
cisions, no homunculus need view them. They meet Barlow’s cri-
terion that “there is nothing else ‘looking at’ or controlling this
activity, which must therefore provide a basis for understanding
how the brain controls behaviour” (Barlow 1972, p. 380).
Filling in while finding out. The visual system does respond to
certain basic visual information in parallel across retinotopic
space. Behavioral motivation for this extravagance is not mysteri-
ous. Parallel evaluation of signals indicating potential prey, preda-
tor, or mate is simply faster than serial. A particular color of a ripe
fruit, or the tell-tale orientation of the continuous edge of a preda-
tor partially camouflaged in the brush offer urgent behavioral
cues.
Owing to the nature of optical projection, detecting such cues
is not directly possible by local retinal processing. Such events are
signaled by the integration of projected contextual information
measurable at neighboring or even disparate regions of the retinal
image. Pessoa et al. write: “the task of vision is not to produce rep-
resentations from images, but rather to discover through a per-
ceptual system what is present in the world and where” (sect. 9.1,
para. 4). Neural models which achieve their goal, but by “produc-
ing representations” of visual information from retinal images, are
described below. These models exhibit neural “filling-in” not as
their goal but as a consequence of integrative mechanisms of find-
ing out what is where.
Pessoa et al. argue (sect. 1, para. 5) that for brightness “there is
good evidence for neural filling-in that involves spatially propa-
gating activity.” Yet, in a theoretical discussion, they quote Ratliff
and Sirovich: “It may well be that marked neural activity adjacent
to edges [rather than neural filling-in between edges] . . . is, at
some level of the visual system, that final stage” (1978, p. 847).
Visual information is carried by illumination intensities varying
over many orders of magnitude, demanding that the retina make
good use of its limited neural dynamic range through measuring
center/surround contrasts. These track the much more limited
range of local surface reflectance ratios. As a result, retinal re-
sponses only show “marked neural activity adjacent to” surface re-
flectance edges, but these local contrast measures are not “final-
stage” correlates of local surface reflectance cues. Instead, they
signal local relations which vary greatly with context.
Discovering information about scenic surface reflectances de-
mands additional processing to integrate the relations coded by
purely local contrast measures. Horn’s (1974) integration model
was perhaps the first neurally plausible model to achieve this goal.
Integration works through the propagation of signals communi-
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cating visuospatial contrast information, not the gratuitous filling
in of already known lightnesses. Nevertheless, integration models,
including a recent neural model of structure-sensitive selective
contrast integration, can account for filling-in effects as well as
other lightness data (Ross & Pessoa 1997).
Detecting the likelihood of oriented scenic structural groupings
demands the statistical integration of colinear or curvilinear local
image boundary evidence. A cortical interpretation and develop-
ment of the boundary contour system (BCS) model (Grossberg &
Mingolla 1985) shows that such computations of a boundary’s co-
herent energy rather than its local energy achieve the goal of de-
tecting scenic structural groupings embedded in incoherent noise
(Grossberg et al. 1997). Such integrative structure detection can
result in the completion of boundaries (i.e., illusory contours) that
are statistically likely even where local boundary energy is com-
pletely absent.
This commentary suggests how an ecological perspective on
representation offers promise in reconciling the personal/subper-
sonal inconsistencies in vision science uncovered by the target 
article.
Filled-in sensations: The primordial 
species of imagery?
Kevin Sauvé
Department of Physiology and Neuroscience, Center for Neuromagnetism,
New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY 10016.
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Abstract: Filled-in sensations exhibit a distinctive mélange of causal fea-
tures, resembling perceptual sensations in some respects and imagery in
others. This commentary identifies several of these shared causal features
and advances the hypothesis that filled-in sensations may constitute the
primordial species of imagery, the evolutionary neurofunctional precursor
of paradigmatic forms of imagery.
The distinction between perceptions and imagery is fundamental
to any taxonomy of sensations. What causal differences distinguish
perceptions from imagery? The following criterion is initially plau-
sible and, I think, widely accepted: Sensory systems begin to gen-
erate imagery when they generate sensations that are not directly
causally dependent upon sensory receptor activity in the corre-
sponding part of the sensory field.
The visual sensations you experience while opening your eyes
and foveating on an object are almost always caused by a direct
spatiotemporally contiguous causal path from your retina to visual
thalamus and cortex. Perceptions can be plausibly construed as re-
quiring just such a direct causal connection to peripheral sensory
receptors. In contrast, imagery, is characterized as sensations aris-
ing largely independently of any direct, immediate causal con-
nection with external stimuli – as during paradigmatic imagery
states such as wakeful imaginative reveries and sleep dreams.
Thus, an important distinction between perception and imagery
can be drawn by considering only the causal history of the sensa-
tions in question (independently of any qualitative or functional
differences between perceptual and imagistic sensations).
Filled-in sensations create trouble for this apparently clear dis-
tinction. For, as Pessoa et al. note, many filling-in processes are
dynamically inaccurate, as when brightness extends across an ex-
panse of one’s visual field (Paradiso & Nakayama 1991) or when
static fills-over a visual stimulus (Ramachandran & Gregory 1991).
Dynamically inaccurate filling-in provokes us conceptually be-
cause the filled-in sensations are no longer directly caused by ex-
ternal stimuli at the corresponding part of one’s retina. In this re-
spect, such filled-in sensations are imagistic.
Despite these similarities, however, filled-in sensations are
quite distinct from paradigmatic forms of wakeful imagery and
more similar to perceptions in at least three respects:
(1) Filled-in sensations are generally not noticed as filled-in;
they are typically used as accurate representations of the world
(unless the subject has antecedent doubts about the accuracy of
these sensations).
(2) Filling-in processes are largely automatic and not under the
control we exhibit in voluntary wakeful imagery. This automaticity
is indicated by several lines of evidence: (a) filling-in can occur
with great rapidity (Paradiso & Nakayama 1991); (b) filling-in typ-
ically occurs without individuals trying to fill-in, even when com-
plex filled-in sensations require several seconds to be generated
(Ramachandran & Gregory 1991); and (c) early visual processing
activity, in V1 and V2, has been associated with several filled-in
phenomena (Fiorani et al. 1992; Pettet & Gilbert 1992). The tar-
get article cites no evidence to suggest that subjects can directly
control visual filling-in processes. In being largely beyond a per-
son’s control, filled-in sensations are dissimilar from most wakeful
imaginative episodes, and are more similar to most perceptions,
hallucinations, and dreams.
(3) The qualitative features of filled-in sensations are evidently
related intimately to ongoing perceptual sensory activity in im-
mediately surrounding areas of one’s visual field (Watanabe & Ca-
vanagh 1991; De Weerd et al. 1995). Thus the qualitative features
of filled-in sensations are closely but indirectly dependent causally
upon ongoing stimuli – a significant difference from paradigmatic
forms of imagery.
Thus, filled-in sensations share at least three important features
with perceptions: immediate behavioral use, automaticity, and
close indirect causal dependence on stimuli. We also noted, how-
ever, that the dynamic inaccuracies and relative causal indepen-
dence of filled-in sensations are features shared more by imagery
than perception. Thus, filled-in sensations are evidently an in-
triguing mélange of perception and imagery.
This mélange of causal features is entirely reasonable. The
major task of sensations is not to represent how the environment
was when our peripheral sensory receptors were stimulated but
to predict how our environment will be when we move – be-
cause behavior designed for our near future will be more suc-
cessful than behavior designed for our recent past. In addition,
systematic neural time constraints demand internal prediction:
transduction and transmission times mean that sensory inputs
will be 15 –100 msec old when first arriving in the thalamocor-
tical system. And, on the output side, motor signals travel for
50 –100 msec before activating the appropriate muscles. Inter-
vening between input and output, our brains need time – often
300 – 500 msec – to generate motor responses appropriate to
sensory inputs. Thus, our sensorimotor system must predict how
the world will be in 400 msec, and not merely how it was 15 –100
msec ago.
In general, predictive problems are made tractable by adopt-
ing a small set of generally applicable simplifying assumptions.
Filling-in processes simplify our sensory representations by in-
creasing the continuity of objects and features over space (e.g., by
conjoining lines across one’s blind spot or spreading brightness
across expanses) and time. During eye-blinks and saccades, for ex-
ample, visual sensations continue independently of stimuli for pe-
riods of over 300 msec. When our sensory systems simplify and
predict by filling-in over space and time, we should expect that
such sensations will be only indirectly causally dependent on cur-
rent inputs from peripheral sensory receptors in the relevant por-
tion of one’s sensory field.
Our sensory systems are basically predictive systems, and sim-
plification is fundamental to prediction. So there is reason to sus-
pect that simplifying, predictive filling-in processes may have
evolved quite early in the history of conscious sensory processes.
Moreover, paradigmatic forms of imagery (imaginings and
dreams) may have arisen as our filling-in capabilities extended
ever further in time, ever more independently of external stimuli.
Perhaps some filling-in processes constitute the primordial
species of imagery, the neural processes from which wakeful imag-
ination and sleep dreams were spawned.
Commentary/Pessoa et al.: Perceptual completion
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:6 771
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am grateful to C. B. Martin and Rodolfo Llinás for helpful discussions on
perception and imagery, and to the McDonnell-Pew Program in Cognitive
Neuroscience and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada for generous support.
Spatiotemporal unit formation
Thomas F. Shipley
Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122.
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Abstract: Findings in dynamic unit formation suggest that completion
processes reflect the optics of our world. Dynamic unit formation may de-
pend on patterns of motion signals that are consistent with the causes of
optical changes. In addition, dynamic completion conforms to a local cur-
vature minimization constraint. Such relational aspects of vision are im-
portant to consider in linking perceptual experience and neural activity.
Much of the discussion of filling in has focused on static displays.
Perceptual unit formation is also evident in moving displays, and
research on surface, boundary, and path completion of moving ob-
jects highlights the importance of ecological considerations in un-
derstanding the link between neural activity and perceptual expe-
rience. At the personal level both modal and amodal completion
of objects is observed. A substantial portion of Michotte’s original
discussion of amodal perception included dynamic displays (Mi-
chotte et al. 1964). For example, in “tunneling,” an object will be
seen as moving along a continuous path behind an occluder when
the visible parts of the moving object’s path align spatially and tem-
porally. Apparent motion, where an object appears to move back
and forth between two locations, is an example of modal comple-
tion across time.
It might be tempting to hypothesize that neurons that respond
to a moving point (and apparent motion) are the locus for the
neural completion of an object’s changing location; however, a
consideration of the optics of our world suggests that the link be-
tween neural and personal is not so simple. Sequential luminance
changes on the retina may arise from two different environmen-
tal events, the motion of an object or the sequential occlusion of
multiple objects or textural elements. In the first case, the local
motion signals are related directly to the motion in the world; the
motion signals that occur as things appear and disappear, however,
are not. Hence the latter motion signals should not serve as rep-
resentations of object locations in the world. These signals are not
random; their spatiotemporal pattern is lawfully related to an as-
pect of the occluding object – the orientation of the occluding
edge (Shipley & Kellman 1994; 1997). Each pair of appearances
or disappearances produces a motion signal whose direction and
magnitude is a function of the orientation of the occluding edge
and the relative position of the changing elements. As a conse-
quence, any pair of motion signals could be used to recover the
orientation of the occluding edge. Specifically, if two motion sig-
nals, represented by vectors, are positioned so that they have a
common origin, the tips of the vectors define the local orientation
of the occluding edge. Discriminating between the patterns of
motion signals that accompany motion and dynamic occlusion al-
lows the visual system to use the motion signals to identify bound-
aries of surfaces that are not specified by luminance, texture, or
other static differences. Such boundary formation processes could
aid in the identification of objects seen while moving through a
cluttered world.
The distinction between local element motion and occlusion
has been reported by a number of researchers who have found
that one of two percepts may be experienced in displays where el-
ements appear and disappear. Depending on stimulus conditions,
such as the temporal interval between changes, observers may re-
port either (1) an edge hiding and revealing elements or (2) mo-
tion of individual elements (Shipley & Kellman 1994; Sigman &
Rock 1974; Wallach 1935/1996). A parallel dichotomy is observed
in static displays where a tangent discontinuity is perceived as ei-
ther a corner in the world or a consequence of partial occlusion.
There are a number of other parallels between static illusory
contours and spatiotemporally defined edges. In both cases the
bounded region appears to have a surface quality that differs from
the surround (Cicerone et al. 1995; Cunningham et al. 1998), but
a surface quality difference is not necessary to see a bounding
edge (Kellman & Loukides 1987; Shipley & Kellman 1994). In ad-
dition, the filled in edge is almost always seen as smooth. Corners
in illusory contours are rarely reported and when shown a spa-
tiotemporally defined hexagon subjects frequently mistake it for a
circle (Shipley & Kellman 1994). Minimization of change, both
across surfaces and along edges, would appear to be a general
property of filling in.
The observation of covariation in perceptual aspects of an
event, as well as constraints on how filling in occurs, are relevant
to issues of representations in vision. Conceiving of perceptual
representations as encoding all aspects of a scene is indeed prob-
lematic. A more limited meaning of representation may be ap-
propriate, and may help focus on the importance of relationships.
Gallistel (1990) offers a definition of neural representations as
events or states of the nervous system that are isomorphic to
events or states of the world. This definition does not require all
aspects of the world be encoded, only the ones that are critical for
action. Unlike many uses of the term representation, this is purely
mathematical, so it focuses on what relationships (or functions)
present in the represented system are preserved in the represent-
ing system (e.g., when numbers are used to represent quantities
of objects, some relations such as addition and division are pre-
served, whereas others, such as whether the objects are soft or
hard, are not).
In building a bridge between the personal and neural, it may be
useful to try to understand which mathematical relationships ap-
ply in the representing system. Considering both how the nervous
system may instantiate computations (Gallistel [1990] reviews a
number of cases where the nervous system appears to use vector
representations and vector addition occurs as a consequence of
the spatial structure of the nervous system) and the ecological re-
lationships, which suggest that certain perceptual experiences will
be coupled (Epstein [1982] provides a review of cases where two
perceptual experiences are clearly linked) should be helpful.
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Active vision and the basketball problem
Manish Singh and Donald D. Hoffman
Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-
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Abstract: It is fruitful to think of the representational and the organism-
centered approaches as complementary levels of analysis, rather than mu-
tually exclusive alternatives. Claims to the contrary by proponents of the
organism-centered approach face what we call the “basketball problem.”
The target article of Pessoa et al. nicely summarizes a long list of
perceptual-completion phenomena. To this list we can add a rel-
atively new phenomenon called “dynamic color spreading” (DCS;
Cicerone & Hoffman 1991; Cicerone et al. 1995) in which appar-
ent motion triggers human vision to construct illusory surfaces and
contours. Figure 1a shows one frame from a DCS movie, consist-
ing of a square containing randomly placed dots. Most dots are
red, but a few (which fall within a virtual disk) are green. Figure
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1b and 1c show two more frames from the same movie. From
frame to frame no dots move – but different dots are colored
green. Setting these frames in motion triggers the modal percep-
tion of a circular and transparent green filter gliding over the red
dots. It can also trigger the amodal perception of an opaque green
disk gliding behind the red dots. DCS is unique in that the com-
pletion of the surface and bounding contour is triggered by ap-
parent motion.
The target article properly warns readers of the dangers of an-
alytic isomorphism and Cartesian materialism, and argues that
neural filling in need not imply either. However, its positive con-
tribution to methodology in visual science is less clear. The authors
contrast the representational approach to vision with an animal-
based or activity-based approach – one in which the focus of study
is not internal processing, but the whole animal interacting with
its environment – and they suggest that visual science should re-
ject the representational approach in favor of the animal-based ap-
proach.
It is not clear why these two approaches must oppose each
other. No one denies the importance of understanding vision and
cognition within the larger context of an organism interacting with
its environment. Indeed, representational questions are often mo-
tivated by observations at the organism/personal level: given that
an organism can do such and such, what computations and repre-
sentations might subserve this ability? For example, at the organ-
ism level, there is indeed a “perception-action system that enables
the animal to visually guide its activity and thereby visually explore
its environment.” But one needs to ask: What mechanisms make
such a perception-action system possible? This is the kind of ques-
tion that the representational approach addresses. Without an-
swers to such questions, our understanding is bound to remain in-
complete. Thus the representational and the organism-centered
approaches are more fruitfully thought of as complementary lev-
els of analysis, rather than mutually exclusive alternatives.
Pessoa et al. worry that current visual research focuses on rep-
resentations and ignores issues at the level of the organism. But
this research simply reflects the normal modus operandi of sci-
ence: It is easier to study small pieces of the puzzle first, and com-
plex interactions later. In this regard, it is surprising that the tar-
get article offers no systematic plan for research at the organism
level. In what ways would such research differ from current psy-
chophysics? What experiments would we run? What insights
might we expect? And how would these insights obviate the need
for representational accounts? If the authors wish to advocate an
alternative approach for vision research, the burden is on them to
detail a concrete plan of research, and show why it might be su-
perior.
This deficit is all the more acute because Pessoa et al. do not
make clear whether, by perception at the level of the organism,
they mean (a) perception from a third-person perspective in
which we as scientists look at the behavior of an organism and de-
cide that it perceives something, or (b) perception from a first-
person “phenomenological” perspective. For example, do they be-
lieve that the same methodology would apply in both cases?
Pessoa et al. also claim that the subpersonal account of vision
creates conceptual confusions regarding what vision is, and that it
is guilty of the homunculus fallacy. Again, no confusion results if
one keeps clearly in mind that one is dealing with two different lev-
els of analysis. One may talk either of an organism perceiving and
acting in an environment in appropriate ways, or of internal pro-
cessing that allows for such behavior. With this distinction in mind,
it involves no confusion to say that the construction of certain rep-
resentations is a necessary condition for the organism to see (Hoff-
man 1998; Singh & Hoffman 1997). Take away those representa-
tions and the organism no longer sees. Nor is a homunculus fallacy
involved: the representations that are constructed need not be
passed on to other “higher centers” for further interpretation –
some representations are by themselves sufficient to trigger ap-
propriate responses by the organism. Hence the representational
approach to vision in itself entails neither Cartesian materialism,
nor analytic isomorphism, nor the homunculus fallacy.
Even if we agree, for the sake of argument, that the need for
representations is minimized through reliance on perceptually
guided tasks of the animal as a whole, it is nevertheless true that
the animal engages in many such tasks, and that it must therefore
use many representations. We do not agree, however, that this
need is minimized through reliance on perceptually guided tasks.
Consider the perceptually guided task of playing professional bas-
ketball. One must keep track of one’s four teammates, the five op-
ponents, two baskets, the ball, the coach, and a stand full of noisy
fans. The burden is on advocates of the activity-based approach to
show how this task can be accomplished with minimal represen-
tations.
How do we see what is not there?1
Lothar Spillmanna and John S. Wernerb
aInstitute of Biophysics and Radiation Biology, University of Freiburg, 
D-79104 Freiburg, Germany; bDepartment of Psychology, University of
Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0345. spillmann@uni-freiberg.de
jwerner@clipr.colorado.edu
psych-www.colorado.edu/faculty/werner.html
Abstract: Pessoa et al. provide a valuable taxonomy of perceptual com-
pletion phenomena, but it is not yet clear whether these phenomena are
mediated by one kind of neural mechanism or more. We suggest three pos-
sible neural mechanisms of long-range interaction to stimulate further
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Figure 1 (Singh & Hoffman). Three frames from a dynamic color-spreading movie.
perceptual and neurophysiological investigation of perceptual completion
and filling-in.
Why do we perceive extended surfaces, including a uniform visual
field, and not just skeletons, as might be expected from our con-
cepts of the classical receptive field? Ganzfeld studies and studies
with stabilized images show that we do not maintain brightness
and color perception for long. A few minutes after being exposed
to a uniform sphere, observers report that a bright field becomes
gray and ultimately dark, approaching the Eigengrau (Knau &
Spillmann 1997). Similarly, with careful fixation, brightness, color,
movement, flicker, and even a gray square on a dynamic noise
background will become degraded and disappear from view. This
fading reflects the fact that the neuronal response dies down
quickly when a stimulus remains constant in space and time. With
eye movements, spatio-temporal modulation normally occurs at
the edge of the stimulus, thereby ensuring sustained and undi-
minished vision, even of an afterimage. The question is: How is
the enclosed area filled-in?
Pessoa et al.’s target article focuses on large scale filling-in of
uniform areas and discusses them within the framework of stim-
uli that cannot be seen (as in the blind spot) and of percepts for
which there is no appropriate stimulus (amodal completion).
What we see cannot be wrong, even if it is illusory (Metzger 1953).
Illusions are undeniable, persist despite superior knowledge, are
present in animals, and can even be shown to correlate with re-
sponses at the single-cell level. This assumption has been a cor-
nerstone for research on color perception but has never had a
comparable impact on the study of form perception. For those of
us who have loved visual illusions all along, it is gratifying to note
that ultimately these phenomena are considered more than just
oddities and that they are increasingly used as noninvasive tools to
better understand the workings of the human visual system.
The discussion of linking propositions, bridge loci, neural iso-
morphism, and so on should not distract from the fact that one can
be oblivious to such intricacies and yet strike empirical gold. In
the early fifties, when single-cell recording in the visual cortex 
of the cat began, Richard Jung, Günter Baumgartner, Otto
Creutzfeldt, and Otto-Joachim Grüsser in the Freiburg laborato-
ries made a concerted effort to find neuronal “correlates” of per-
ceptual phenomena. Grüsser (1956) defended this approach by
pointing out that one need not demonstrate a causal connection
between a cell’s behavior and the perceptual event; what matters
is the spatio-temporal correlation. A large body of publications
from that time (mostly in German) strongly suggests that there are
many parallels between the firing rate of individual neurons and
specific percepts, pointing towards the combined discharge of a
larger population of such cells as the putative mechanism. Naively
or not, firing patterns were understood as mediating the percept
of the stimulus, even if perceiving was actually misperceiving (as
in the case of the Hermann grid illusion). Where consciousness
arises was not asked.
To give but one example: Baumgartner’s finding (1961) that in
the cat, on- and off-units produce a spatial response distribution
that reflects border contrast, makes it highly plausible that the
percepts for “brighter” on the high-luminance edge and “darker”
on the low-luminance edge are somehow connected to (and pre-
sumably brought about by) different neural activities. Following
the early proposals of Mach and Hering in the last century and the
epistemological parallelism of the philosopher Nicolai Hartmann,
Jung (1973) listed a large variety of neurophysiological-perceptual
correlations in his seminal chapter in the Handbook of Sensory
Physiology. Even the staunchest opponent of neuro-reductionism
might find it difficult to attribute these correlations to mere coin-
cidence. The similarities in size between receptive fields of single
neurons in monkeys and perceptive fields (as their psychophysical
analogs) in human vision imply that many neurons essentially be-
have like a single one by interacting synergistically to produce a
given percept (Spillmann et al. 1987).
The long-range spreading in the perceptual phenomena con-
sidered by Pessoa et al. may be analogous to the perception of
color on a white field surrounded by a chromatic field, Goethe’s
colored shadows. Long-range interactions must be assumed to
propagate the information from the boundary to the “silent” por-
tions of the stimulus. Considering that the main topic of this 
target article is filling-in to explain illusory contours (boundary
completion) and area enhancement (featural completion), the
question might also be asked why under certain conditions a gen-
uine hole, such as the gap in a Landolt C, is not filled-in as it would
be if the gap were imaged on a scotoma.
Pessoa et al. remind us that the filling-in of subjective contours
may be something different from the filling-in of the physiologi-
cal blind spot. However, they present no compelling evidence that
these diverse phenomena require different neurophysiological
mechanisms for their explanation. A central question is whether
generalized neural circuits or specialized solutions are needed for
the brain to “make something out of nothing.” We (Spillmann &
Werner 1996) have suggested three candidate mechanisms of
long-range neural interaction to account for such diverse phe-
nomena as illusory contours, filling-in of brightness and color in
area contrast, and filling-in of the blind spot and scotomata, among
others.
One promising candidate to explain filling-in is provided by a
feedforward circuit in which the signals from spatially separated
receptive fields converge at higher levels. An example is the pro-
posal by Peterhans and von der Heydt (see Baumgartner 1990)
that subjective contours result from the convergence of neuronal
responses to real contours (e.g., offset grating lines) and a second
path that integrates these responses in a direction orthogonal to
the stimulus pattern. Signals from the two paths are combined so
that the output is indistinguishable from the response to a real
line.
A second mechanism for filling-in may be associated with the
“gating” of long-range horizontal connections between hyper-
columns that are separated by inactive cortical regions. In the ab-
sence of primary input (due to retinal lesions and, presumably,
uniform retinal stimulation), these horizontal connections may
provide links (Wertheimer’s “Querfunktionen” 1912) that bridge
the gaps between stimulated areas. In this way, the cortical repre-
sentation of unstimulated regions of visual space can be “assigned”
a neuronal state corresponding to the neural activity at the edges.
Finally, global interactions between widely separated areas in
the brain may be mediated by the synchronized discharge of
neural activity rather than through dedicated circuits. Such bind-
ing by re-entrant signals from higher areas may explain some of
the Gestalt factors (e.g., common fate) in which stimulus elements
spaced across numerous hypercolumns are nevertheless per-
ceived as a whole, by virtue of grouping.
Pessoa et al. have made a convincing case that active neural
mechanisms are responsible for a variety of filling-in phenomena.
We now look forward to further perceptual, psychophysical, com-
putational, and neurophysiological research to determine where
and how the brain accomplishes these tasks.
NOTE
1. Please direct future correspondence to Lothar Spillmann at: Ar-
beitsgruppe Hirnforschung, Institut für Biophysik, Hansastrasse 9, D-
79104 Freiburg, Germany.
In defense of neuro-perceptual isomorphism
Dejan Todorovic´
Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia,
Yugoslavia. dtodorov@dekart.f.bg.ac.yu
Abstract: It is argued that the notion of bridge locus is compatible with
distributed representation and brain interconnectivity. Isomorphism is not
a dogmatic condition on explanatory adequacy but a refutable hypothesis,
superior to Dennett’s proposed alternatives. The assumption of type-type
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neuro-perceptual correspondences is more parsimonious than multiple
realizability.
The bridge locus is a hypothesized set of neurons underlying con-
scious experience. One reason given for its dismissal in the target
article is that neural correlates of percepts may be distributed over
many brain areas. However, the notion of bridge locus does not
preclude this possibility. The existence of topographically orga-
nized reciprocal interconnections between visual areas can 
impose a functional unity upon subsets of neurons belonging to
different areas. Two interconnected neurons located in topo-
graphically corresponding positions in two anatomically distant
cortical areas may be functionally closer than two anatomically
nearer neurons in the same area. The aspects of neural activity rel-
evant for percepts may not be based on the “external” geometry
of anatomical locations but on the “internal” geometry of func-
tional interconnections. Thus, the interconnectivity of cortical re-
gions, which Pessoa et al. see as another problem for the notion of
bridge locus, can in fact be incorporated into it. Nevertheless,
some aspects of percepts may be determined predominantly by
neurons in a single area.
If bridge locus neurons provide the substrate for an ongoing
percept, then the structure of their activity should relate in some
way to the structure of the percept. Note that the abstract concept
of structure can be applied both to percepts and neural activa-
tions, thus helping to bridge the mind-brain gap; this is a key idea
of isomorphism. For example, in the Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet
effect, the perceptual structure to be accounted for is the per-
ceived lightness step: the two rectangles are perceived to have dif-
ferent homogeneous lightness levels. However, available physio-
logical evidence suggests that the spatial activity profile of retinal
neurons would be roughly in accord with the cusp-shaped lumi-
nance profile; furthermore, a very similar retinal profile is likely to
be induced by step-shaped luminance profiles (see Todoro-
vic´ 1987). The problem raised by this neuro-perceptual structural
mismatch is best seen by noting that retinal activations of equal
strength, corresponding to the interiors of the two rectangles, are
associated with different levels of perceived lightness. One way to
account for step-shaped percepts induced by luminance cusps and
steps is to hypothesize that in both cases the activity profile of the
relevant bridge locus neurons is isomorphic with the percept, that
is, step-shaped. A proposal of how both luminance cusps and steps
are first transformed into retinal cusps and subsequently into cor-
tical steps, corresponding to perceived lightness steps, is pre-
sented in a model by Grossberg and Todorovic´ (1988), which ac-
counts for a number of lightness perception phenomena. Rossi et
al.’s (1996) neurophysiological data on lightness contrast, de-
scribed in the target article, corroborate the isomorphicist pre-
diction that perceived lightness levels correlate with cortical ac-
tivity levels.
As against isomorphically guided theorizing, Pessoa et al. claim
that Dennett (1992) has uncovered the main conceptual error of
this notion: isomorphism, they say, maintains that neural corre-
lates must be isomorphic to corresponding percepts, whereas
Dennett shows that they needn’t be by pointing out alternative ac-
counts. This criticism is easily defused by substituting “must be”
with “are,” thus transforming isomorphism from a purported
dogma into an ordinary hypothesis. The proposal that neural cor-
relates are isomorphic with percepts, like any other scientific hy-
pothesis, is not endangered simply by indicating that alternative
accounts are conceivable, but by demonstrating that they are
preferable.
Are they? One of Dennett’s alternatives is that the brain ig-
nores the absence of a representation. However, the target arti-
cle describes several examples which strongly suggest the pres-
ence of neural representations in filling-in phenomena, and
none that suggest its absence. The other proposed alternative is
that the brain “jumps to a conclusion” that a region is colored, or
that it “attaches a color label all at once.” However, before such
proposals are considered as serious candidates for neural corre-
lates of percepts, they must be reformulated in neural terms,
preferably based on current knowledge of the structure of the vi-
sual system and color physiology. For example, what happens to
neurons in the portions of visual cortical areas activated by the
two rectangles when the brain “arrives at the judgement” that
constitutes our seeing of particular lightness levels in the Craik-
O’Brien-Cornsweet display? A neuro-perceptual theory requires
a neuro-perceptual vocabulary. Isomorphism may be a simplis-
tic, “pictorial,” or just a plain wrong answer, but at least it is an
answer to the problem of the relation of neural and perceptual
states, as it involves refutable hypotheses about neural activity.
In contrast, talk of judgments, conclusions, labeling, and the like,
without explaining how such processes are neurally imple-
mented, does not constitute an acceptably formulated answer,
neither does any account that side-steps these issues, such as
Pessoa et al.’s task-level approach. Furthermore, their “funda-
mental conceptual point,” which disallows inferences from per-
ceptual content to neural medium, appears to rule out, purely on
“logical, conceptual or methodological grounds” such brilliant
speculations as the Young-Helmholtz inference from color-mix-
ing data to cone spectral sensitivities, or Mach’s inference from
the appearance of his bands to the existence of retinal lateral
cross-connections.
Pessoa et al. note that the isomorphicist approach, as outlined
by Todorovic´ (1987), would be plausible only in the case of type-
type neuro-perceptual identities, but not if the same type of per-
cept could be identical to different types of neural states. Let me
first discuss the issues not in terms of mind-brain identity but of
correspondence. Type-type neuro-perceptual correspondences
may indeed not be required logically. But consider, again, the per-
cept of a lightness step. I would expect that whenever such per-
cepts occur, regardless of location, orientation, size, and so on,
they are always accompanied by corresponding step-shaped
neural distributions at the bridge locus. This is clearly a more 
parsimonious proposal than the idea that lightness steps might
correspond to neural distributions of several different shapes: a
multiple-realizability theory would have to explain how different
neural distributions come to correspond to the same percept, I am
not aware of any convincing examples of neural multiple-realiz-
ability of perceptual features such as lightness, color, texture, mo-
tion, and so on. Quite the contrary; researchers tend, quite natu-
rally, by default, to look for equal neural bases of equal types of
percepts.
Finally, concerning the relation of isomorphism and mind-brain
identity, the import of the statement of mine that Pessoa et al. ob-
jected to was not that isomorphism implies identity, but that iden-
tity would explain isomorphism. Suppose, for a moment, that
type-type correspondences and isomorphism get wide-spread em-
pirical support. The obvious next question would concern why
such a close neuro-perceptual correspondence should hold. The
lure of identity theory is that it would transform this mystery into
a triviality: if two entities turn out to be identical, there is no won-
der that they should be isomorphic!
The Cartesian Broadway
Christopher W. Tyler
Smith-Kettlewell Eye Research Institute, San Francisco, CA 94115.
cwt@skivs.ski.org www.ski.org/cwt.html
Abstract: Although Pessoa, Teller & Noë make excellent points concern-
ing the need for a mechanism of filling-in, they throw out the baby of
neural specificity with the bathwater of isomorphism and the homuncular
observer. The core act of perception is sensory processing by a stationary
observer and does not require overt behavioral interaction with the en-
vironment. The complexity of intracortical interconnectivity does not 
preclude local specificity in the representation of higher-order stimulus
properties.
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Sparse sampling obviates the need for filling-in. Dennett
(1992) is right, of course. There is no need for filling-in of stimu-
lus regions where no seeing occurs. The classic example is in cases
of sparse sampling of the image, not even mentioned in the target
article. The sky looks a uniform blue, even though the “blue” pho-
toreceptors are spaced far enough apart so that the gaps could eas-
ily be seen by the intervening bipolar cells fed by the “red” and
“green” photoreceptors. But logically, we do not need to fill in the
gaps if we do not survey the gaps with an “attentional” probe.
Where Dennett seems wrong, and Pessoa et al. miss the point,
is in most of the cases known as “filling-in,” because there does
seem to be perceptual and attentional sampling within the filled-
in field between the contours that generate it. The data convinc-
ingly support the existence of some kind of perceptual represen-
tation in these regions, but Pessoa et al. reject this implication as
a naive isomorphism, implying that it needs a Cartesian ho-
munculus to view the filled-in representation.
The poverty of linking propositions. Pessoa et al.’s account of
the Teller & Pugh (1983) paper implies that psychophysiological
parallelism is a sufficient condition for probable identity. Just be-
cause a physiological response decays at the same rate as a per-
cept, one would not rush to assume that one explains the other. A
contemporary example is provided by functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) of the brain, which records properties of
blood flow. The parallelism between fMRI response and percep-
tual properties may be extensive, but no one believes that the per-
cept is carried by the blood. It seems that a larger set of linking
propositions is required; for example, one must have a system ca-
pable of information transfer and storage before it is plausible that
it could support conscious percepts.
Thus, it is easy to agree with Pessoa et al. that psychophysio-
logical parallelism is not sufficient as a linking proposition. A ma-
jor goal of their analysis is to evaluate the notion of a “bridge lo-
cus,” which is essentially the “stage” in the conception of the
“Cartesian theater” in which percepts are brought to conscious-
ness. Pessoa et al. focus on the rich feedback interconnectivity
throughout the cortex as a reason to doubt the existence of such a
locus. As the role of such feedback may well be limited to gain con-
trol (or “auto-ranging”) functions, however, it may not interfere
with an essentially feedforward notion of the information pro-
cessing.
What is more damning, it seems to me, is the stunning multi-
plicity of such representations (over 30 visual representation areas
alone). The problem of identifying the homunculus in the audi-
ence of the Cartesian theater is that there are so many candidates.
In one sense, each visual representation area is the audience for
the Cartesian theater of the previous one. The brain is a veritable
Broadway of competing shows, with each audience performing on
the stage of the next theater! Is there a final arbiter or a heterar-
chy of interacting critics? Pessoa et al. are not explicit, proposing
an explanation at the “personal” level of interaction with the envi-
ronment, which makes the question of locus meaningless.
Local specificity of neural representation. To propose, how-
ever, that this level of complexity precludes any local specificity of
perceptual processing, seems premature. Critics of fMRI studies
often cite the complexity of the neural processing as an a priori
reason that fMRI data will not reveal anything useful about brain
processing. The data often appear to support such criticism, since
they are typically obtained from observers performing some dis-
crimination task on complex stimuli, for which a substantial num-
ber of discrete brain areas are shown to be activated.
But suppose you ask observers simply to look at well-defined
stimuli and maintain a stable perceptual state? FMRI studies of
responses to such stimuli, when compared with those for control
stimuli differing on only one attribute such as coherent versus in-
coherent motion, often show activation of only a single cortical
representation area. Where did the whole brain interaction and
multiple representation areas go in such cases? Critics argue that
they are still present, but too weak to be seen at the available 
signal-to-noise ratio. In the limit it is impossible to refute such an
interpretation, but to a first approximation (say, at a 10:1 signal-to-
noise ratio), such whole brain interactions are insignificant in re-
lation to the primary signal.
What does it mean for the Cartesian theater that a controlled
stimulus difference may activate just one local brain area; a dif-
ferent one for each stimulus property? It suggests that the infor-
mation for that stimulus property is stored locally, clearly elimi-
nating the notion of a distributed representation. The mapping
studies of large numbers of retinotopic visual maps already put a
profound crimp in the distributed representation. Maps are them-
selves an explicit isomorphism. Although several of the authors
cited by Pessoa et al. agree with Dennett that isomorphism is not
a necessary property of perceptual encoding, both they and Pes-
soa et al. need to deal with the fact that isomorphism is a physio-
logical reality at many levels of analysis: anatomical, neurophysio-
logical, neuropathological, and the neuroimaging level.
Isomorphism may not be necessary, but it seems to be useful.
The brain has evolved to have multiple isomorphisms in many sen-
sory and motor systems. Its main utility is probably in minimizing
the length of wiring while maximizing connectivity. Just as it is usu-
ally much easier to show someone how to construct a bookcase
than to explain verbally, the intermediate step of an isomorphic
mapping may provide a basis for manipulations of hypothetical
cases that are not readily accessible to a symbolic representation.
The utility of such mapping seems to have escaped critics of the
Shepardian concept of mental rotation (Shepard 1981). This sug-
gests the need for a new logical category: not necessary but effi-
cient!
The fallacy of the personal. Briefly, Pessoa et al. do not articu-
late the process of perception as “personal”; they essentially assert
that perception is the organism interacting with the environment.
This viewpoint does not encompass the perception that dominates
my awareness in everyday life, since it invokes a purely behavioral
definition. Moreover, it would have to imply that perception is at-
tributable to the behavior of simple organisms such as amoebae
(or even automatic pool cleaners), since these show complex in-
teractions with the environment that are superficially indistin-
guishable from those of humans. So the simple attribution of per-
ception to personal behavior is insufficient to define its properties
in a meaningful way.
Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn Monroe
Robert Van Gulick
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Syracuse University,
Syracuse, NY 13244-1170. rnvangul@mailbox.syr.edu
Abstract: Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in sup-
port of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed
those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism
and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory
importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
Pessoa et al. define the doctrine of “analytical isomorphism” as
holding that “cognitive neuroscientific explanation requires the
postulation of a “final stage” in the brain – a bridge locus – in
which there is an isomorphism between neural activity and how
things seem to the subject” (sect. 8.1, para. 2). They take issue
both with the postulation of a bridge locus and the requirement of
isomorphism, but their reasons for rejecting the doctrine may de-
pend on reading it in an unnecessarily strong way. Based on Teller
and Pugh (1983), they interpret the bridge locus not only as the
immediate neural substrate of perception, but as a “particular set
of neurons having a particular pattern of activity that is necessary
and sufficient for a particular perceptual state” (sect. 8.1, para. 5).
Read in this way, it does seem hard to justify the a priori require-
ment of a bridge locus. Why must the neural substrate reside lo-
cally in a particular set of neurons? As Pessoa et al. note, more
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global patterns of activity and temporally coded assemblies pro-
vide empirically plausible alternatives. Moreover, given neural
plasticity and the empirical possibility – if not likelihood – of mul-
tiple realizability, it seems unlikely that any given neural pattern is
necessary in the sense of being the only possible neural substrate
for a given percept.
Nonetheless, it seems that one could reinterpret the bridge lo-
cus in a way that avoids both of these problems while still provid-
ing a notion adequate for the formulation of analytical isomor-
phism. Assuming the truth of materialism, which Pessoa et al. do
not seem to doubt, every token percept must have a neural sub-
strate – whether local or global – that is sufficient to produce or
constitute it. Given multiple realizability, the nature of that sub-
strate may vary from one token to another, but on each occasion
that the percept is achieved, there must be some neural substrate
or other that is nomically sufficient for the percept. Call that state
in each case the bridge locus.
Analytical isomorphism then becomes the demand that on each
occasion there must be an isomorphism between percept and its
bridge locus, that is, between the features of each token percept
and its specific neural substrate. The issue thus shifts to the ques-
tion of what counts as an isomorphism in this context. If there is
to be an explanatory link between percept and substrate, there
must be some way – at least in principle – to map the features of
the percept onto underlying features sufficient to produce or con-
stitute them. The absence of such a mapping would leave the link
brute and inexplicable if not downright magical. To count as an
isomorphism the features mapped from percept to substrate need
not be the same; spatial relations in the percept need not be
mapped onto spatial features in the substrate. As Pessoa et al.
note, the isomorphism may be functional rather then topographic
(sect. 8.1). Given this broad and more abstract notion of isomor-
phism, how could there fail to be an adequate mapping? The au-
thors might reply that to avoid triviality the doctrine must place
some constraints on what counts as an isomorphism. Even ab-
stractly interpreted, the notion of isomorphism implies a relational
sameness of structure. Thus, at the least, it must be possible to de-
compose both the precept and its substrate into elements
(whether global or local) and then to establish some sort of corre-
spondence between the relations among those elements in the two
domains. Were the authors to deny that there is any meaningful
decomposition of the substrate into parts or elements – no matter
how broadly construed – they might argue in turn that the notion
of isomorphism cannot be meaningfully applied. But I am reluc-
tant to attribute any such view to them since they do not suggest
it nor can I say it is plausible. Thus the issue remains confused. It
is hard to say whether analytical isomorphism should be rejected
without knowing more about what counts as an isomorphic map-
ping from percept to substrate. I hope the authors will clarify the
matter in their reply.
Pessoa et al. draw attention to the distinction between percep-
tual content at the personal and the subpersonal level, a distinc-
tion which they claim is regularly ignored both by those who in-
voke filling in and by those who criticize it. The alleged common
error is to suppose that perceiving a continuous fully detailed
world involves being aware of a continuous fully detailed repre-
sentation. The authors claim that, on the contrary, personal-level
perceptual content is a matter of what the person (or whole or-
ganism) can accomplish in relation to the environment. “At the
personal level, there are no pictures, images, or other representa-
tions in visual perception; there is simply experience of the world”
(sect. 9.2). Thus, they conclude that the absence of a continuous
detailed subpersonal representation is no obstacle to perceiving
such a world at the personal level. Nor should the fact that our ex-
perience seems detailed and continuous in such a case imply that
there is anything illusory about how things seem.
Thus, in the case of the Marilyn Monroe imaged wallpaper, Pes-
soa et al. attribute to Dennett (1992) the view that “the person’s
experience of the Marilyns is mistaken or illusory” because it
seems fully detailed despite the absence of a underlying fully de-
tailed representation of the wall. They accuse Dennett of relying
on the uniformity assumption, according to which “there is no dif-
ference in kind between perceptual content at the personal level
and neural content at the subpersonal level.” It is difficult to be-
lieve that Dennett, who has had so much to say about the per-
sonal/subpersonal distinction, makes such an assumption. There
are obviously important differences between content at different
levels. Nor need one suppose otherwise to support Dennett’s rea-
soning about the Marilyns example. What is required is not an
equation of personal and subpersonal content, but merely an ap-
peal to a plausible principle of dependence that the authors them-
selves endorse when they write, “we accept the general thesis that
facts about brain-level content determine what the person sees or
experiences.” They rightly deny that dependence entails unifor-
mity, but that leaves unspecified the sort of subpersonal repre-
sentations needed to support a given form of experience.
Pessoa et al. are right that our ordinary experience is not an ex-
perience of representations, images or pictures, but rather of the
world. But it does not follow that our experience of the world does
not involve image-like representations, image-like or otherwise.
One can plausibly suppose that our personal level experience of
the world depends upon or is even constituted by the activation of
such representations, without falling into the error of supposing
that they themselves are the objects of our experience.
If so, we can reasonably ask, “what sort of subpersonal repre-
sentations are needed to produce a personal-level experience of a
fully detailed wall of Marilyns?” To answer the question, we need
to distinguish a further third level, namely, the phenomenal level.
Dennett’s concern is phenomenal or conscious experience, and al-
though all such states may be personal or whole organism per-
ceptual states, the converse is not true. A person or organism can
be perceptually informed about its environment, in the active
sense preferred by Pessoa et al. without having any corresponding
phenomenal or conscious experience. Thus the question to ask in
Dennett’s example is, “What subpersonal representations are
needed to support an experiential awareness of a fully detailed
wall of Marilyns?” The phenomenal realists Dennett is criticizing
claim that phenomenal mental states use a distinctive medium of
representation, one that is often thought of as a plenum, a deter-
minately differentiated continuous manifold. The intent of the
Marilyns case is to call that view into question; there can be no
such phenomenal representation because there is no underlying
subpersonal representation with the details to support it. Dennett
does not mean to deny that the person has a personal level per-
ceptual state whose content is that the wall is fully Marilyn cov-
ered. In that respect he seems much more in agreement with Pes-
soa et al. than the latter suppose. Moreover, what he regards as
mistaken or illusory is not our experience of the wall, but the naive
beliefs that we may form about the nature of our experience; it is
these beliefs that he regards as the source of mistaken phenome-
nal realism.
The challenge to the philosophical realists – of whom I am one
– is to find a way to formulate their view that can accommodate
the incompleteness and gappiness of experience while still pre-
serving the view that phenomenal states involve a distinctive mode
of presentation.
Fully embodying the personal level
Francisco J. Varelaa and Pierre Vermerschb
aLENA CNRS UPR 640, Hopital de la Salpetrière, 75013 Paris, France;
bLPC-CNRS, Ecole Normale Superieure, 92120 Monterouge, France.
fv@ccr.jussieu.fr www.ccr.jussieu.fr/varela/welcome.html
pvermers@es-conseil.fr www.es-conseil.fr/GREX/
Abstract: The target article concludes that it is essential to introduce the
personal level in cognitive science. We propose to take this conclusion one
step further. The personal level should consist of first-person accounts of
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specific, contextualized experiences, not abstract or imagined cases. Ex-
ploring first-person accounts at their own level of detail calls for the re-
finements of method that can link up with neural accounts.
Pessoa et al. have built a convincing case for introducing the per-
sonal level into visual science, well beyond the neural basis of 
filling-in (sect. 9.2). The importance of the personal level in the
target article is one of its most innovative aspects. But how exactly
is visual experience at the personal level to be studied? We would
like to take their argument one step further by underscoring here
the need for a methodologically disciplined approach to first-
person descriptions (Varela & Shear 1999). Only then can the per-
sonal level in visual science and cognitive science have its full 
impact.
Let us begin with the distinction between personal and sub-
personal. This is surely a useful one, but as stated in the target ar-
ticle, it does not make it fully clear that the personal is situated in
a contextual activity manifested primarily at the level of the sub-
ject’s practical life. Consider the metaphor of the knife and its han-
dle. The knife’s blade is akin to the subpersonal level; it constitutes
most of its surface and is where the actual cutting takes place. But
the handle is what the user has access to, albeit with no direct con-
sequences in the world. But try and use a knife without a handle.
This has an important consequence: The proper level of the per-
sonal is where the subject (the cognitive user) is accustomed to
handling the world in a prereflexive way, in what can be called the
“natural” attitude. The consequence is that to move forward in re-
search it is necessary to turn the subject’s attention to its own us-
age, and thus to introduce a level of examination that is proper for
a first-person phenomenological description.
By phenomenology we mean here a methodical quest to exam-
ine not the final result (has the cut been performed?), not merely
the intentional content of mental state (what is being cut? the
noema in technical terms), but the mental act itself (how do you
cut when you do the cutting, or noesis, Varela 1996). Such an
analysis will bring to the fore a number of implicit phenomenal
data that remained in the periphery of attention, in the sphere of
the prereflexive (Vermersch 1998). A good example is the recent
study of insight in professional settings, showing how the prere-
flexive made explicit is the key to exploring this practical human
activity (Peugeot 1999).
The significant difference between a general level of the per-
sonal/subpersonal distinction and the specificity of first-person
accounts can be clearly illustrated in Pessoa et al.’s critical discus-
sion of Dennett’s Marilyn wallpaper example, which he intends as
a case of active perception in which someone walks into a room
and notices the Marilyns. Dennett’s is a perfect example of arm-
chair psychology: an imaginary situation that has the appearance
of being concrete and specific, but in fact it isn’t. Thus the proper
phenomenal content gets to play no role. This criticism is actually
implicit in Pessoa et al.’s claim that the task of vision has to be un-
derstood at the personal level; instead Dennett’s analysis is moti-
vated by considerations from the subpersonal level. Dennett
means his example to be a case of active perception in which
someone walks into a room and notices the Marilyns, without be-
ing concerned with a detailed scrutiny of them.
But here is where the abstractness of the exercise begins to
make a difference. How is the observer instructed? What is his
motivation? And what is the precise task to be accomplished? Say-
ing: “Enter the room and tell me what you see,” is not the same as
saying “Go in and verify that all the designs on the wallpaper are
identical under examination.” Being in a dentist’s waiting room
and looking at the wallpaper because there is nothing else to do is
still an entirely different context. Surely a request for a detailed
comparison will lead to results quite different from those of pas-
sive contemplation with wandering thoughts. These, in turn, mean
that all these details, the very core of Pessoa et al.’s own demand
for embodiment, are not circumstantial, but essential for visual
science. Thus, although we concur with the authors’ critical as-
sessment of Dennett’s thought-experiment, our main complaint is
that the specific phenomenal disembodiment is not brought forth
sufficiently.
We have to avoid quickly slipping into a Dennett-style hetero-
phenomenology, as if the nonhuman/human difference did not ex-
ist. This can only be done by introducing not only the “personal as
a general” condition, but also the importance of systematic first-
person descriptions that act in mutual constraint with third-
person descriptions (Petitot et al. 1999; Varela 1996). Pessoa et al.
refer to an article (Thompson et al. 1999) in which they draw from
the tradition of phenomenological psychology deriving from
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but this connection is not made ex-
plicit in the target article. Although we can understand that they
cannot grapple with everything in a single article, we do wish to
underscore in this discussion the potential danger of assuming that
the personal does not entail a radical change in what method-
ological requirements are needed to make it come alive.
To conclude: The personal level, if it is to be an active engage-
ment in the world, needs to be explored with research strategies
in which: (1) The purposes and tasks must correspond to actual
experiences (not armchair case studies) so that the subject’s con-
text is fully taken into account and documented (the place and at-
titude, the materials used, the injunction proposed, etc.); (2) The
description of the lived experience does not boil down to a mere
final discrimination (which would be mere phenomenalism, not
phenomenology), the totality of its texture (for example, the vari-
ous stages of development in time) must be taken into account,
which typically requires an explicit methodological refinement. (3)
The phenomenal content of such first-person descriptions must
be open to validation in mutual circulation with third-person stud-
ies, beyond analytic isomorphism.
Pathological completion: The blind leading
the mind?
Robin Walkera and Jason B. Mattingleyb
aDepartment of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham,
Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom; bDepartment of Psychology, Monash
University, Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia. robin.walker@rhbnc.ac.uk
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Abstract: The taxonomy proposed by Pessoa et al. should be extended to
include “pathological” completion phenomena in patients with unilateral
brain damage. Patients with visual field defects (hemianopias) may “com-
plete” whole figures, while patients with parietal lobe damage may “com-
plete” partial figures. We argue that the former may be consistent with the
brain “filling-in” information, and the latter may be consistent with the
brain ignoring the absence of information.
Pessoa et al. have provided an informative and timely review of vi-
sual completion. Missing from their suggested taxonomy, how-
ever, are the phenomena of “pathological” completion in patients
with brain damage. Pathological completion was first described by
Poppelreuter (1917/1990) in his pioneering studies of brain dam-
aged patients with visual field defects. In his original study, he pre-
sented a simple shape (such as a circle) tachistoscopically so that,
with central fixation, a portion of it fell into patients’ impaired vi-
sual field. Under these conditions some patients paradoxically re-
ported having “seen” a whole shape. Since these early observa-
tions, several other workers have reported similar results in
patients with unilateral occipital and parietal lesions (e.g., Tor-
jussen 1978; Warrington 1962). Although pathological comple-
tion has been considered by some to be an example of the brain
“filling-in” missing information, there are a number of alternative
interpretations which mirror those applied to normal completion
phenomena. We have argued that there may actually be separate
forms of pathological completion (Walker & Mattingley 1997;
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Walker & Young 1996). One is consistent with the brain “filling-
in” information, via mechanisms that are as yet poorly understood;
the other appears consistent with the brain ignoring the absence
of information from within a hemianopic field. Thus pathological
completion encompasses both aspects of the debate surrounding
normal visual completion.
Recently, we reviewed all of the studies of pathological visual
completion and found that many reports of visual “filling-in” in pa-
tients with visual field defects (hemianopias) could be attributed to
residual vision in the impaired hemifield, compensatory eye move-
ments, or undetected sparing of visual function within the macular
region (Walker & Mattingley 1997). When these issues are taken
into account there are surprisingly few convincing demonstrations
of pathological completion in patients with visual field defects. One
notable exception is a study by Torjussen (1978) who tested three
hemianopic individuals using flash-induced afterimages to stabilise
the image on the retina (see also Weiskrantz 1990). Under these
conditions, all three hemianopic patients reported seeing whole fig-
ures as complete, even though part of the stimulus fell within their
objectively blind field. Moreover, half figures presented entirely
within the field defect were never reported, thus reducing the like-
lihood that residual vision was the explanation of this form of com-
pletion. None of the patients reported seeing half-figures as com-
plete when these were presented entirely in their intact visual field,
suggesting that patients’ veridical perception of whole shapes de-
pended on part of the stimulus falling across both the sighted and
“blind” visual fields. Furthermore, stimuli in the blind field were
reported only when a mirror-symmetric location was stimulated in
the sighted hemifield. Torjussen discounted “imaginative filling-in”
(or confabulation) as an explanation for his findings. Instead, he at-
tributed the effect to interhemispheric interactions whereby the
presence of a stimulus in the sighted hemifield can facilitate func-
tioning in the hemianopic field (cf. Pöppel & Richards 1974).
In contrast to Torjussen’s findings, there are numerous de-
scriptions of patients who report “seeing” a complete figure when
an incomplete one is presented in their intact visual field. Al-
though this seems to be an example of the brain filling-in the in-
complete portion of the figure, the nature of the patient’s brain
damage adds a further confounding factor. We have argued that
previous observations of completion of partial figures may be at-
tributed to “unilateral neglect,” a disorder in which affected indi-
viduals are unaware of visual stimuli falling toward the side of
space opposite their damaged (typically right) hemisphere. In sup-
port of this suggestion, we (Walker & Young 1996) presented ev-
idence from a nonhemianopic patient who had damage to the
right parietal lobe and showed neglect for the left sides of indi-
vidual objects, regardless of where they were located in the visual
field. Our patient often reported seeing whole shapes when fig-
ures were presented with missing left sides, even when these were
presented entirely within his ipsilesional visual field. In this in-
stance apparent completion may be a further consequence of uni-
lateral neglect whereby the brain ignores the absence of the miss-
ing left side. Furthermore, our review of the literature revealed
that the overwhelming majority of cases where pathological com-
pletion of partial figures has been reported can be related to the
presence of parietal neglect (Walker & Mattingley 1997).
We propose that the veridical perception of whole figures, which
has been observed in a few hemianopic individuals (without ne-
glect), and pathological completion of partial figures in patients
with unilateral neglect, reflect different underlying mechanisms.
Veridical perception of whole figures in hemianopic patients may
be an example of the brain filling-in missing information and is
open to a number of different interpretations as described by Pes-
soa et al. for completion in normal subjects. It may be related to
completion at the blind spot, which has been attributed by some
to a form of amodal completion in which the blindspot is treated
as an occluder (Durgin et al. 1995). It may also reflect “top-down”
activation of stored object representations, which reduce thresh-
olds for detecting a stimulus falling in the blind field. Alternatively,
it may involve interhemispheric interactions that modulate visual
sensitivity within the blind field. Pathological completion in pa-
tients with parietal neglect, however, may simply reflect their lack
of awareness for the contralesional side of visual stimuli. In these
cases, pathological completion may be regarded as a consequence
of neglect, rather than a reflection of some form of active filling-
in. Thus, consistent with Dennett’s view on how the brain treats
the blindspot, we suggest that parietal neglect patients may fail to
become aware of missing contralesional information, leading to
apparent completion.
Filling-in does require a mechanism, 
and some persistent doubts
Paul Whittle
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge CB2 3EB, England. pw109@cam.ac.uk
Abstract: (1) In the everyday situation of seeing a uniform patch on a var-
iegated background, filling-in does seem to require a mechanism. (2) Our
attempts to make matches to such a patch make us appreciate anew the
elusiveness of the phenomenon.
The target article is a useful and worthy successor to Walls’s (1954)
review. Filling-in is not a minor phenomenon. It is of the essence
of vision. Vision is the only sense that presents the world to us with
no gaps. I strongly agree with Pessoa et al.’s thesis that a notion
like “active vision” is required to avoid a Cartesian impasse, but I
restrict myself here to more empirical matters.
I want to discuss one basic kind of filling-in, for two reasons.
First, this kind is so common, and so inescapably requires some
sort of computation, that it seems to me to render academic the
question of whether filling-in requires neural machinery. Second,
we have been studying it, and close attention to the phenomenon
is instructive.
The situation I have in mind is seeing a patch of uniform colour
against a variegated background, so that the contrast varies around
the edge of the patch. We usually see such a patch as uniform. But
since there is good evidence from psychophysics and physiology
that the colour of a uniform region depends on the contrast at its
edge, in this case the various edge contrasts must be combined to
yield the single colour we see. We cannot conceive how this could
be done without some kind of machinery. It may be more like a
balance than a computer, but machinery there must be. Even
though Sherrington, as recently as 1906, found the idea of psychic
combination without physiological mediation intelligible in the
case of binocular fusion, this would seem a bizarre idea, to put it
mildly, in the present case. (Though might it not be good for us to
stretch our imaginations in a Sherringtonian direction?)
Note that there is no assumption of a “Cartesian theatre” here.
The argument is that we see one colour as a result of many inputs
– the various edge contrasts – so the inputs must be combined in
some way. It is like the question of how a unitary colour is derived
from several cone or opponent channels. My point is simply that
filling-in requires a mechanism no less and no more than that
does. The postulation of such a mechanism is not otiose; there is
something for it to do. This does not touch the question of whether
it is like painting in or finding out.
I said that we usually see such a patch as uniform. However, this
uniformity can break down, and in some cases it is not achieved at
all. Both are instructive, but I discuss only the first here. Thomas
Hayward and I made a computer graphic of a 108 circle divided into
four quadrants: white, light grey, dark grey, and black. We super-
imposed a 28 mid-grey “centre disk” on the centre where the quad-
rants met. Anyone coming into the room saw it as a uniform mid-
grey disk, with no problem. We wanted to manipulate the four edge
contrasts to find out what combination rule determined the exact
grey. First, we tried to set up a comparison disk in a uniform sur-
round, which subjects could adjust to match the centre disk.
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The striking result was that although we tried many ways of pre-
senting the comparison disk, we could find none that gave satis-
factory matches. If it was to one side, then matches were based on
the contrasts of the centre disk with the quadrants between it and
the comparison disk, and were very different depending on which
quadrants those were, despite the fact that the matches were all
made to the same grey. If it was in the same position, but alter-
nating slowly in time, with a blank interval between displays, then
we could never make the two disks look remotely the same, even
though one was mid-grey and the other could be set anywhere be-
tween black and white. It was a chalk and cheese difference, not
just a zone of uncertainty.
One subject’s response was that he needed another dimension:
the black-white continuum was not enough. He could not abstract
lightness from other characteristics of the centre disk.
My experience was that when the comparison disk was, for ex-
ample, set brighter than its surround, my attention was drawn to
those parts of the centre disk that were darker than their adjacent
background quadrants, and they looked markedly darker than the
comparison. The uniform filling-in did not survive close scrutiny.
We have found the same in other quite different experiments in
this lab, with patches on nonuniform backgrounds. The uniformity
is a real phenomenon, but requires a global rather than an analytic
perceptual attitude. “Finding-out” – attentive looking – destroys
the effect! This perhaps complements demonstrations by Davis
(1996) and others that filling-in of various types occurs in pre-
attentive vision.
These observations suggest to us that the phenomenology of
filling-in is more subtle than is often assumed. We see something
striking, describe it in readily available object terms, and these are
then fixed too firmly by the social process of generating a field of
work, whereas we should remain open all the time to the ambigu-
ity and elusiveness of the original phenomenon.
A task-oriented taxonomy 
of visual completion
Carol Yin
Computation and Neural Systems, Division of Biology, MC 139-74, California
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Abstract: Differences and similarities between modal and amodal com-
pletions can only be understood by considering the goals of visual com-
pletion: unity, shape, and perceptual quality. Pessoa et al. cannot reject
representational accounts of vision because of flaws with isomorphic rep-
resentations of perceptual quality: representations and processes for per-
ceptual quality (modal completion) and most likely dissociable from those
for unity and shape (nonmodal completions).
Pessoa, Thompson & Noë have made a much needed contribu-
tion to research on visual completion with their preliminary tax-
onomy of completion phenomena; I wholeheartedly agree with
their call for a more task-oriented approach to vision. They have
made a convincing case that there is no need to fill in an isomor-
phic representation to see an image. However, they then extend
the flaws of isomorphic representations to all visual representa-
tions in general, and incorrectly conclude that a representational
account of vision serves little purpose.
Pessoa et al.’s chain of reasoning rests implicitly on the idea that
the purpose of visual completion is to provide the perceptual qual-
ity of a visible surface (i.e., brightness, color, etc.), hence the dis-
cussion about Cartesian materialism. However, visual completion
has other purposes as well: determining unity and shape. These
other purposes are achieved without regard to perceptual quality
and do not require completion of a pictorial representation. Un-
derstanding them, however, does require a higher-order repre-
sentational account of vision.
The phenomenal difference between modal and amodal com-
pletions has misled some researchers to posit completely different
processes for each. Pessoa et al. have weighted this difference too
lightly, and assumed that their conclusions for modal completions
apply to amodal completions. The confusion can be cleared up
with a better understanding of the goals of visual completion.
Some goals may require different mechanisms for modal and
amodal completion, but most do not. In the spirit of Pessoa et al.’s
call for a more task-oriented approach to vision, I would like to
propose that the taxonomy of visual completion be revised and ex-
panded to better reflect the different goals of visual completion.
Pessoa et al.’s preliminary taxonomy assumes that there are only
two tasks for visual completion: recovering shape and producing
perceptual quality. The issue of figural unity has been neglected.
The optical information that projects to the retinas is frequently
fragmented or incomplete because objects may partly occlude one
another. The goal of unification is to determine which fragments
belong together. Rensink and Enns (1998) have shown that partly
occluded fragments can be “linked” or unified preattentively, in-
dicating the importance of unity for later visual processing.
Whereas the early Gestalt psychologists were interested in figural
unity (Koffka 1935), it has received only scattered attention in re-
cent studies of adult perception (cf. Boselie & Wouterlood 1992;
Gillam & McGrath 1979; Kellman & Shipley 1991; Palmer & Rock
1994; Peterson 1994; Trick & Enns 1997; Williams & Hanson
1996; Yin et al. 1997). Note that in many shape completion stud-
ies, the unity of the occluded figure is a given (Gerbino & Salmaso
1987; Sekuler & Palmer 1992; Takeichi et al. 1995).
Edge and surface-feature processes are intrinsically comple-
mentary to each other, although they may not be strictly serial.
Grossberg and Mingolla (1985) first made the distinction between
edge and surface-feature processes, but this distinction relegated
surface features to providing only the perceptual quality of com-
pleted surface regions: Boundary processes provided shape and
unity, then the filling-in of features from those boundaries pro-
vided the perceptual quality of the visible surfaces.
The revised taxonomy should reflect the contributions of 
surface-feature and edge processes to each of the three comple-
tion goals of unity, shape, and perceptual quality. However, the
contributions of surface features to unity and shape have in the
past been neglected. As Figure 1 illustrates, edge processes can
provide both shape and unity, but surface features can only pro-
vide unity information and thus have an indirect role in shape. Yin
et al. (1997) found evidence that surface completion processes can
amodally unify image fragments that arise from partial-occlusion,
based on the similarity of surface color and texture. Furthermore,
these surface completion processes may interact with edge pro-
cesses in determining shape.
The processes that are concerned with amodal versus modal
perceptual quality need to be dissociated from processes that re-
cover shape and unity. Shape processes are neither modal nor
amodal1 (Grossberg 1994; Kellman & Shipley 1991; Kellman et al.
1998; Ringach & Shapley 1996). Unity processes are also likely to
be insensitive to modality for several reasons, including parsimony
and the likelihood that unity is processed prior to (or at least in
parallel with) shape. Perceptual quality processes, however, must
be modal by definition. These processes probably stabilize only af-
ter unity and shape have been determined, since perceptual qual-
ities such as brightness can be influenced by higher-order factors
such as grouping, depth, and three-dimensional structure (Adel-
son 1993; Gilchrist 1977; Kanizsa 1979; Knill & Kersten 1991;
Nakayama et al. 1990).
The controversy about filling in isomorphic representations is
moot for the goals of unity and shape, because they can both be
accomplished nonmodally, without creating or recreating a visible
pictorial representation. Pessoa et al.’s arguments are valid only for
the task of determining perceptual quality, and their conclusions
cannot be extended to other tasks. It would be better to avoid the
terms “modal” and “amodal” altogether in future discussions of vi-
sual completion and instead refer specifically to the goal of recov-
ering shape, unity, or perceptual quality.
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We need to have internal representations that differ from what is
immediately available in the optical input because we must con-
stantly act upon things that we cannot see directly: objects may be
partly occluded or may move beyond our field of view. We may not
necessarily store every visual representation we derive, but stor-
age is a separate issue. There is abundant psychophysical as well
as neuropsychological evidence (see Farah 1990) that derived vi-
sual representations do underlie our behavior, even though those
representations are not necessarily available to phenomenal expe-
rience. We can heed Pessoa et al.’s call to avoid positing final stages
of processing by reconceptualizing visual representations as being
temporally dynamic or even multiplexed. However, the future of
visual completion research lies not in abandoning representational
accounts of vision but in understanding how representations re-
flect different states of processing for different visual tasks.
NOTE
1. Anderson and Julesz (1995) point out that the horizontal arms of the
cross (see Fig. 10 of the target article) may appear as bent flaps hinged to
the vertical bar. This happens more frequently when the horizontal bars
have near disparity. This does not entail that there are two kinds of bound-
ary interpolation as they suggest. Rather, it shows that the L-junctions at
the intersection of the cross have a bistable interpretation: a planar hori-
zontal bar is seen when L-junctions are interpreted as T-junctions signal-
ing occlusion, thus initiating edge interpolation (see Kellman & Shipley
1991). Bent flaps are seen when L-junctions are interpreted as L-junctions
signalling corners in the boundaries of two objects that abut the vertical
bar.
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Abstract: The following points are discussed in response to the
commentaries: (1) A taxonomy of perceptual completion phe-
nomena should rely on both phenomenological and mechanistic
criteria. (2) Certain forms of perceptual completion are caused by
topographically organized neural processes – neural filling-in. (3)
The bridge locus, understood as the final site of perceptual expe-
rience in the brain, should be replaced by the principle that each
token percept has a neural substrate that is nomically sufficient for
it, all else being equal. (4) Analytic isomorphism – the view that
there must be a pictorial or spatial neural-perceptual isomorphism
at the bridge locus – should be rejected. Although more abstract
kinds of isomorphism are central to the neural-perceptual map-
ping, the perceptual cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of
the neural, and therefore the explanation of perception cannot be
reduced to uncovering neural-perceptual isomorphisms. (5) The
task of vision is to guide action in the world, not to construct a de-
tailed world-model in the head. (6) Neural filling-in facilitates the
integration of information and thereby helps the animal find out
about its environment. (7) Perceptual content needs to be under-
stood at the level of the person or animal interacting in the world.
The main aim of our target article was to examine issues sur-
rounding the topic of visual filling-in, and to provoke dis-
cussion from visual scientists and philosophers. Our discus-
sion focused on the conceptual and methodological issues
of neural-perceptual isomorphism, the bridge locus, repre-
sentation and action, and the personal/subpersonal distinc-
tion. These issues, though theoretical, influence everyday
empirical research. For example, Walker & Mattingley’s
studies of pathological completion (which, unfortunately,
we did not know about when we wrote our article) have at
their core one of the main issues we discuss: Is perceptual
completion “ignoring an absence” (as seems to be the case
for neglect patients) or “representing a presence” (as seems
to be the case for some hemianopic patients)? Moreover,
the issues are not confined to visual science, but pertain to
all sensory modalities, as Appelbaum clearly demonstrates
in her discussion of analytic isomorphism in speech per-
ception. We are pleased that a majority of the commenta-
tors address these issues, and we wish to thank them for
their mainly constructive contributions.
As we stated in the target article, the term “filling-in” is
used in so many different ways that confusion can easily
arise unless researchers are careful about what they mean.
Some of the commentaries perpetuate such confusion.
Kranda states that we favor “the traditional notion of fill-
ing-in,” despite our clear distinction between perceptual
completion and neural filling-in, our rejection of the tradi-
tional isomorphic framework, and our review of the cases
in which there is evidence for neural filling-in and the cases
in which there is none. At the other extreme, Tyler inter-
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Figure 1 (Yin). Different contributions of edge and surface-
feature processes to shape and unity: (a) Surface feature and
boundary information both contribute to shape and unity; (b)
Boundary information is sufficient to overcome differences in sur-
face features, and provide shape and unity; (c) In the absence of
boundary completion, some impression of unity may be provided
by surface feature similarity; (d) When boundaries do not com-
plete and surface features are dissimilar, the figure appears to be
three disconnected surface fragments. Adapted from Yin et al.
(1997).
prets us as rejecting neural filling-in, although we took two
sections (6 and 7) to discuss the evidence for it. Kranda and
Tyler should read O’Regan’s commentary, for he recog-
nizes that although we think there is evidence for neural fill-
ing-in – evidence with which he takes issue (see sect. 2) –
we also think that neural filling-in needs to be severed from
the traditional notion of the filling-in of an inner pictorial
representation that is isomorphic to our perceptual experi-
ence at the bridge locus.
Our response falls into six sections (see Table R1). Sec-
tion R1 is devoted to taxonomic issues. Section R2 restates
the case for neural filling-in. Section R3 discusses the
bridge locus and neural-perceptual isomorphism. Section
R4 clarifies our criticism of the “representationist” concep-
tion of vision. Section R5 shows how to reconcile what some
commentators (Durgin, Kaufman, O’Regan) perceived
to be two incompatible aspects of our position – our argu-
ment for neural filling-in, and our argument that vision is
an active process whose goal is not representation (in the
sense of constructing a world-model in the head). Finally,
Section R6 discusses perceptual content and the per-
sonal/subpersonal distinction.
R1. Taxonomic issues
R1.1. Phenomenological and mechanistic criteria. Per-
ceptual completion phenomena are diverse and encompass
different visual modalities. We argued in the target article
that both phenomenological and mechanistic considera-
tions should guide the elaboration of a taxonomy, and we
proposed that the modal/amodal and boundary/feature
axes be used to classify completion phenomena.
Consider the modal/amodal distinction, which Dresp
and Yin argue is not useful, because it is phenomenological
rather than psychophysical (Dresp) or goal-oriented (Yin).
Modal completion produces visible attributes, such as color
and brightness, whereas amodal completion does not. Yin
writes that the phenomenological differences between
modal and amodal completion have misled researchers into
supposing different mechanisms for each; she argues that
we have underestimated these differences and assume that
“[our] conclusions for modal completions apply to amodal
completions.” Her interpretation of our position is mis-
taken, however, for we clearly state in the target article that
further experimental research is needed to determine the
similarities and differences between these two types of
completion. As an example, consider the work of Davis &
Driver, which supports our view of the perceptual impor-
tance of the modal/amodal distinction. As they discuss,
small, local stimulus manipulations, such as a change in dis-
parity sign, can change completion from amodal to modal
(see their Fig. 1, and Nakayama & Shimojo 1990a). In the
case of amodal completion, visual attributes at occluded
(and completed) regions do not reflect properties of the oc-
cluded object, but of the occluder. In modal completion,
the occluding (and completed) region inherits attributes
from adjacent areas. Why should this be the case? Davis &
Driver suggest that visual attributes help the visual system
draw attention to modally completed regions. Hence they
propose a difference in the functional effects of the two
types of completion that may be associated with the visual
system’s attending to potentially relevant information in
one case and ignoring irrelevant information in the other.
Contrary to Dresp’s claim that our taxonomy is purely
phenomenological, we invoked the modal/amodal distinc-
tion not primarily because of the perceptual differences be-
tween these two forms of completion, but because we
wished to pose precisely the question of whether the two
forms of completion engage similar mechanisms. The issue
is not whether a purely mechanistic taxonomy is superior to
a phenomenological one (as she suggests), or vice-versa, for
both kinds are needed for a comprehensive understanding
of visual perception in general and perceptual completion
in particular. The issue is rather how the types of taxonomy
are related to each other. For example, do modal and
amodal completion share boundary interpolation mecha-
nisms? Some evidence favors a common source (Kellman
& Shipley 1991), whereas other studies indicate separate
processes (Anderson 1995). Even if the two kinds of com-
pletion do engage similar mechanisms, the distinction be-
tween them at the perceptual level would not be invali-
dated, for as we argued in the target article, to eliminate the
phenomenological dimension (as Dresp advocates) is to
lose sight of vision as, in the first instance, a personal-level
phenomenon (see sect. 6).
R1.2. Area, surface, and contour completion versus
boundary/featural completion. A new taxonomy that in-
cludes area, surface, and contour completion is proposed by
Dresp. How do these types of completion relate to our
boundary/feature axis? Contour completion is equivalent to
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Table R1. Outline of Response
Section R1. Taxonomic issues Davis & Driver, Dresp, Walker & Mattingley, Yin
Section R2. The case for neural filling-in Arrington, Bachmann, Barlow, Dennett, Dresp, De Weerd,
Durgin, Gregory, Komatsu, Kranda, Murakami, Neumann, 
O’Regan, Pishva, Sauvé, Spillmann & Werner
Section R3. The bridge locus and Appelbaum, Arrington, Barlow, Hahn, Lehar, Myin, Pishva, 
neural-perceptual isomorphism Ross, Todorovic´, Tyler, Van Gulick, Byrne, Davis & Driver, 
Section R4. Representation and Earle, Lomas, Myin, Singh & Hoffman, Van Gulick, 
the task of vision Yin
Section R5. Filling-in is for finding out Bachman, Durgin, Grossberg, Kaufman, O’Regan, Ross, Sauvé, 
Shipley, Tyler, Whittle, Yin
Section R6. Perceptual content and Revonsuo, Singh & Hoffman, Tyler, Van Gulick,
the personal subpersonal distinction Varela & Vermersch
boundary completion. We view surface completion as the
complex interplay between boundary and featural comple-
tion processes; in other words, surfaces emerge as basic
units of visual perception as the result of the interactions
between these two complementary completion systems
(Grossberg & Mingolla 1985). This view is based on exper-
imental studies that indicate the existence of two separate
completion systems (see sect. 3.3.3, and De Weerd et al.
1998). We thus agree with Yin that both boundary and fea-
tural processes contribute to surface determination (shape
and unity).
What about area completion? Given that Dresp advo-
cates a purely mechanistic taxonomy (in which there are
only as many forms of completion as there are distinct com-
pletion mechanisms in the brain), should she distinguish
between area and surface completion? The finding that “ar-
eas” show decreasing detection thresholds from the border
(Dresp & Bonnett 1993), whereas “surfaces” do not (Dresp
1992), suggests that the associated experiments are tapping
into distinct levels of the visual system. It does not suggest
distinct mechanisms, however. We submit that Dresp’s area
completion and surface completion rely on common neural
mechanisms, namely, the spreading of contrast signals that
occur at luminance borders and are regulated by contour
signals. For example, one of us has described a brightness
model that can account for both what Dresp calls area com-
pletion (such as Mach bands) and the quality (or feature)
part of surface completion (Pessoa 1996a; 1996b; Pessoa et
al. 1995). Thus Dresp herself seems to rely on a distinction
between phenomenological and mechanistic criteria of
classification.
R1.3. Unification: Is it grouping or completion? As advo-
cates of a task-oriented approach to vision, we welcome
Yin’s suggestion that the taxonomy be expanded to reflect
the different goals of perceptual completion. She proposes
three main goals of perceptual completion: the determina-
tion of unity, shape, and perceptual quality. Shape determi-
nation is closely related to boundary completion, whereas
perceptual quality determination is closely related to fea-
tural completion. Unification – the determination of which
scenic fragments belong together – was largely ignored in
the target article.
When considering unification, it is crucial to assess the
differences between grouping and completion. Grouping
is a central process of early vision; it “places a non-visual
link between those fragments thought to belong to the
same object in the world” (Rensink & Enns 1998). For ex-
ample, in a field of randomly moving dots, a group of dots
sharing the same motion may be experienced as unified.
The key here is that although the dots compose a percep-
tual unit, no new visual elements are posited. The question
that arises, then, is whether unification processes are just
grouping processes, or whether some kind of completion
is involved.
Rensink and Enns’s recent study sheds light on this ques-
tion. They used a visual search task where target and 
distractors included, for example, long and short bar seg-
ments, together with cube-like objects, in different geo-
metric arrangements (suggesting, for example, occlusion of
the cube by bar segments). They showed that rapid com-
pletion is highly sensitive to the existence of gaps, with link-
ing occurring only across a completely occluded space.
Such sensitivity is not characteristic of rapid grouping in
which gaps may be ignored. They find that “occlusion edges
are removed and that occluders are needed to trigger 
linking, suggest[ing] that rapid completion may involve 
occlusion-specific mechanisms not found in any general
grouping process.”
In conclusion, we embrace Yin’s proposal to include
unity as one of the goals of completion, and we agree that
the taxonomy “should reflect the contributions of surface-
feature and edge processes to each of the three completion
goals of unity, shape, and perceptual quality.” Care must be
taken, however, to distinguish between unification pro-
cesses that engage general grouping mechanisms and those
that engage true mechanisms of completion.
R1.4. Pathological completion. One omission from our tax-
onomy is pathological completion as discussed by Walker &
Mattingley. Such phenomena occur in patients with uni-
lateral brain damage who report seeing whole shapes even
though large portions of the stimulus fall in the impaired vi-
sual field. In their recent comprehensive review, Walker &
Mattingley (1997) describe patients with visual field defects
(hemianopias) that complete whole figures (with portions in
the impaired field), and patients with parietal lobe damage
that complete partial figures (in the intact visual field). Their
analysis shows that whereas the former case is consistent
with the brain filling-in, the latter is consistent with the brain
ignoring the absence of information. In fact, the latter case
may be attributed to unilateral neglect, a syndrome in which
individuals are unaware of visual stimuli that fall within the
space opposite their damaged hemisphere. Walker and Mat-
tingley suggest that the apparent completion in neglect pa-
tients may have to do with their failing to become aware of
the missing information. In this case, subjects would be ig-
noring the absence of information.
R2. The case for neural filling-in
R2.1. What do we mean by “neural filling-in”? In our tar-
get article (sects. 5.1, 6, and 7) we distinguished between
two senses of “neural filling-in.” The first is the weak notion
of the brain’s merely providing a signal (representing a pres-
ence as opposed to ignoring an absence), whereas the sec-
ond is the strong notion of the brain’s providing a signal that
is spatially or topographically organized. The right conclu-
sion to draw from our review of the empirical literature is
that there is evidence for the weak kind of neural filling-in
in some cases (e.g., Murakami’s [1995] motion aftereffect
investigation), and for the strong kind of neural filling-in in
other cases (e.g., illusory contours in the studies by von der
Heydt and colleagues, and brightness perception in the
studies by Paradiso and colleagues discussed in the target
article). Hence we disagree with O’Regan when he con-
cludes that there is no evidence (at all!) for the strong kind
of neural filling-in. Although there is no proof, the evidence
is strong. On the face of it, the evidence is not merely for
dynamic long-range interactions in the sense of interactions
involving nonclassical receptive fields (see Spillmann &
Werner, and Spillmann & Werner 1996), but for dynamic
long-range interactions that involve the spreading of spa-
tially organized signals. It is always possible, of course, to
propose alternative interpretations of psychophysical re-
sults and cellular responses, but we think our interpretation
is faithful to the data we cite.
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On the other hand, we certainly share O’Regan’s con-
cern not to “prejudge the issue of an internal, pictorial rep-
resentation” (and to that extent we agree that the term
“neural filling-in” can be misleading and that a better term
might be sought). Indeed, one of the main tasks of our ar-
ticle was to criticize analytic isomorphism, which assumes
that there must be such an inner pictorial representation.
Whether there are such representations is a matter to be
decided empirically. We therefore disagree with Mu-
rakami that “there is no promising way to test whether
there is a pictorial neural representation of filling-in that is
directly or indirectly equated with our perception.” Al-
though we certainly do not think that any inner representa-
tion (pictorial or otherwise) is to be equated with our per-
ception (see sect. 6), whether there are (subpersonal)
pictorial neural representations causally responsible for
personal-level perceptual experience must be decided ex-
perimentally. (In the target article we mentioned a number
of promising recent experiments that bear on this issue,
such as De Weerd et al. [1995] on texture filling-in and
Rossi et al. [1996] on the cortical substrates of brightness
perception.)
R2.2. What neural mechanisms mediate perceptual com-
pletion? It is proposed by Spillmann & Werner that three
types of neural processes may be responsible for perceptual
completion phenomena: (1) converging feedforward pro-
jections (from lower to higher levels) leading to the gen-
eration of new receptive field properties at higher levels; 
(2) horizontal intrinsic connections allowing interactions
within a single visual area; and (3) feedback projections to
cells at lower levels that respond selectively to specific
properties of a stimulus (see also Spillmann & Werner
1996). Figure R1 shows these three types of mechanisms.
For example, responses to luminance borders may be prop-
agated to inner regions (that do not receive direct support)
by horizontal connections and thus form the neural sub-
strate for the Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet effect.
Although mechanisms of these three kinds may be able
to account for perceptual completion, at the present mo-
ment not a single completion phenomenon can be traced
directly to a particular type of neural mechanism. Consider
illusory contours. Although it is well established that the re-
sponses of certain cells in primate V2 correlate well with il-
lusory contour stimuli, how these cell properties come
about is unknown. Indeed, computational models belong-
ing to each of the three classes above can be found in the
literature, such as the feedforward model of Peterhans et
al. (1986), the horizontal-connections-based model of Neu-
mann et al. (1997), and the feedback model of Grossberg &
Mingolla (1985).
Bachmann adds a fourth kind of possible completion
mechanism – the intriguing notion that modulatory inputs
from nonspecific arousal systems, such as nonspecific thal-
amic nuclei, could play a role in neural filling-in. These nu-
clei would provide slower, spatially spreading modulation
that would allow for completion. This suggestion is moti-
vated by Bachmann’s “requirement of maximum veridical-
ity.” Nevertheless, neural filling-in that is mediated by
(among other things) lateral connections (which Bachmann
rejects) may play a crucial role in removing ambiguity from
local stimuli and hence in sustaining “adequate and consis-
tent responding to the full concreteness of the environ-
mental stimuli.”
In sum, our current knowledge of the neural substrates
of perceptual completion is sketchy at best. A concerted ef-
fort to integrate physiological recordings, psychophysical
experiments, and computational modeling is needed to mit-
igate our ignorance. In this connection, the recent interest
shown by physiologists in filling-in is encouraging (see De
Weerd, Komatsu, and Murakami).
R2.3. Cortical neurons and surface perception. It is well
known that uniform areas typically do not elicit vigorous re-
sponses from cortical neurons; spatiotemporal contrast is
needed. Hence one of the great puzzles of cortical physiol-
ogy is how neural responses encode extended surfaces. One
possibility, which is suggested by the spreading type of
neural filling-in, is a topographic encoding based on the ac-
tivation of neurons in early cortical areas, but this type of
substrate has proven elusive (Komatsu, personal communi-
cation; von der Heydt et al. 1996). For this reason, Komatsu
proposes that surfaces are encoded by a population of size-
sensitive cells across several cortical areas, with the larger re-
ceptive fields of higher areas helping to encode larger sur-
faces. (It is worth noting that in this scheme the percept is
correlated with activity that is distributed across several vi-
sual areas, not with a single one as the traditional notion of
the bridge locus would imply. We take up the bridge locus
issues in sect. R3.1) Arrington extends this notion and pro-
poses that “edge junctions” in general provide local surface
constraints that are bound together and provide the sub-
strate for surface encoding. These proposals notwithstand-
ing, the question of how the visual system encodes surfaces
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Figure R1. Potential neural substrates of filling-in. (A) feedforward convergence. (B) horizontal connections. (C) feedback connec-
tions.
is far from settled. In fact, there is evidence that, in some
cases, cells in the topographically organized striate cortex do
respond when the entire receptive field is uniformly stimu-
lated (Komatsu et al. 1996; Rossi et al. 1996).
R2.4. The blind spot. At the present time, the question of
how the brain treats the receptorless region of the retina –
whether it ignores it or actively completes it – cannot be an-
swered. Contrary to Kranda, however, the issue is not a
pseudo-problem and must be settled experimentally. Fur-
thermore, in-principle arguments about the apparent lack
of utility of neural completion (Pishva) miss the point that
the underlying circuit is there for other important reasons
(see below). As Gregory aptly remarks, once a complicated
completion machine is invented, why not use it?
Most studies in primates have shown that the represen-
tation of the blind spot in V1 is monocular and driven by the
ipsilateral eye – that is, by the eye whose stimulation is not
at the optic disc (Horton 1984; Le Vay et al. 1985). To a first
approximation, then, the associated singularity in cortical
representation would provide an automatic mechanism for
completion – the blind spot is simply sewn up, as it were. A
bar across the blind spot would have a continuous cortical
representation (although shortened in length relative to
other cortical regions of comparable eccentricity), as would
texture and color. Such an idea is favored by many re-
searchers, including Kranda and Neumann, but the situ-
ation is not likely to be so simple, for the study by Fiorani
et al. (1992) shows that cells can be driven binocularly at
the cortical region corresponding to the blind spot. Does
this result tell us that the brain does in fact actively fill in
the blind spot? Such a conclusion would be premature for
the reasons discussed in section 4.5 of the target article: The
monkeys were anesthetized (see also sect. R2.6 below) and
only bar stimuli were used; furthermore, the neural re-
sponses need to be compared more directly to psychophys-
ical performance on an appropriate task.
These points show that Durgin is mistaken when he im-
plies that we interpret the Fiorani et al. (1992) study as
showing that “completion neurons” are “painting lines into
conscious experience.” Once again, the neurons reported
by Fiorani et al. are important insofar as previous studies
mapping the cortical representation of the blind spot re-
ported it as being purely monocular (e.g., Horton 1984). Al-
though the Fiorani et al. study does not allow us to conclude
that a neural substrate for blind spot completion has been
identified, it does raise the possibility that the neural sub-
strate involves more than ignoring an absence or “implicit
filling-in” as proposed by Neumann (abstract).
The same possibility is raised by Murakami and his
study of the motion aftereffect after adaptation to filled-in
motion at the blind spot (Murakami 1995), which we dis-
cussed in section 7.1 of the target article. Durgin charges
that our argument based on this study – an argument that
Murakami himself gives in his commentary – is “mislead-
ing,” and suggests that his recent studies of texture afteref-
fects (Durgin & Cole 1997) show that we need to be more
careful in the interpretation of completion data. We are
aware of the dangers of inflated explanations based on par-
ticular studies. Nevertheless – and this was our main point
in the target article – Murakami’s study shows that real mo-
tion and filled-in motion share a common early pathway,
and it provides a measurable effect of one kind of percep-
tual filling-in of the blind spot; therefore, his study force-
fully challenges the “neglect” or “ignoring an absence” hy-
pothesis about blind spot completion.
To date the most telling findings about the cortical rep-
resentation of the blind spot come from psychophysical in-
vestigations. One important study by Tripathy et al. (1995)
also shows why Kranda’s putative “paradox” about filling-
in mechanisms does not withstand scrutiny. They asked
subjects to compare the lengths of test bars presented at the
blind spot to the lengths of reference bars presented at the
corresponding location in the other eye. They found either
small distortions or no distortions at all in perceived length
at the blind spot. More importantly, performance at the
blind spot was comparable to that in normal periphery at a
comparable retinal location (eccentricity). How do these
results help us understand the cortical representation of the
blind spot? If opposite sides of the blind spot are contigu-
ously represented in the cortex, then size distortions should
occur in the task, because in this case the effective length
of the bar is its total physical length minus the diameter of
the blind spot in question (the part that is not physically
stimulated). What occurred, however, were only very minor
size distortions, which suggests that the blind spot is com-
pleted with the background (by whatever mechanism),
rather than being sewn up. Recent psychophysical results
such as these (see also Tripathy & Levi 1994) suggest that
blind spot completion is not a simple matter of a singular-
ity in cortical representation, though they do not specify
how completion is accomplished.
R2.5. Perceptual completion without cortical reorganiza-
tion. In section 4.3 of the target article, we discussed stud-
ies of cortical reorganization after retinal lesion and the idea
that the associated receptive field expansion may help ex-
plain the perceptual filling-in of color and texture, as well
as the appearance of illusory contours (see Gilbert 1992).
Murakami mentions a recent study of his that questions
this idea (Murakami et al. 1997). He and his colleagues
showed (1) that there is behavioral evidence for perceptual
filling-in at a scotoma produced by a monocular retinal le-
sion; and (2) that no cortical reorganization occurs in mon-
key area V1. Instead, the normal visual system seems to be
able to produce perceptual filling-in when some part of the
retina is lesioned. (Of course, there remains the possibility
of perceptual filling-in resulting from cortical reorganiza-
tion in the case of binocular lesions as suggested by Gilbert
[1992]).
R2.6. Awareness and cortical cell responses. In section
4.5 of the target article, we urged caution when one com-
pares perceptual results with the results of single-cell
recordings in anesthetized animals. De Weerd provides
additional material relevant to this point. He describes 
unpublished experiments with Ricardo Gattass on texture
filling-in with anesthetized Cebus monkeys in which they
did not find “climbing activity” in V2 and V3 under condi-
tions that caused both perceptual filling-in in human ob-
servers and climbing activity in neurons of awake Rhesus
monkeys. Although this finding might be specific to Cebus
monkeys, it is more likely that the state of the animal was
the determining factor in obtaining a negative result. As De
Weerd aptly states: “The absence of climbing activity dur-
ing unconsciousness enhances its possible role as a neural
substrate for perceptual filling-in.” Should these results
withstand careful scrutiny, they reinforce our point in the
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target article about how to interpret results in anesthetized
animals. In this context it should be noted that the results
of Fiorani et al. (1992) in anesthetized Cebus monkeys (dis-
cussed in sect. 4.2 of the target article) have recently been
replicated in anesthetized skunks (Leticia & Volchan, un-
published observations), a species with a simpler brain than
that of primates.
R2.7. The time-course of filling-in and normal surface
perception. One key task in linking the perceptual and
neural domains is to relate the time-course of perceptual
completion to that of underlying neural mechanisms, a mat-
ter we discussed in section 4.5 of the target article. Den-
nett notes that effects that take longer than around 200
msecs of fixation to develop, such as the texture filling-in 
effects studied by Ramachandran and colleagues (Ra-
machandran & Gregory 1991; Ramachandran et al. 1993),
cannot themselves be part of normal vision. They can tell us
about normal vision, however, as De Weerd helpfully elab-
orates in his commentary by addressing the issue of why dif-
ferent types of featural completion (e.g., texture and bright-
ness) follow different time courses. He and his colleagues
have shown in an impressive recent study (De Weerd et al.
1998) that the slow time scale of texture filling-in (several
seconds) does not reflect a slow filling-in process, but rather
the long time it takes for figure-ground segregation to fail,
after which a fast completion process ensues. In other
words, after the contours between the textured and untex-
tured regions adapt (see Fig. 13 of the target article), they
can no longer contain the fast spreading process that re-
sults. In everyday perception contours antagonize the per-
ceptual completion of texture information, but weak
boundaries can be overcome and produce fast percep-
tual completion. As De Weerd et al. (1998) state: “[t]he 
seconds-long delay before perceptual filling-in illustrates
the close intertwining of segregation and neural filling-in
processes, which is at the basis of normal surface percep-
tion.” Finally, these results further corroborate the di-
chotomy between boundary and feature systems advanced
by Grossberg and Mingolla (1985), and hence provide ad-
ditional support to the boundary/feature axis in our per-
ceptual completion taxonomy.
R2.8. The level of filling-in. Although the exact mecha-
nisms of neural filling-in are unknown, what we do know
suggests that they occur early in the process of vision. For
example, the perceptual completion of boundaries in illu-
sory contours occurs as early as V2 (see sect. 4.1 and 6.1 of
the target article). In fact, all the effects suggestive of neural
filling-in that we reviewed are indicative of mechanisms in
V1, V2, and V3.
Gregory asks whether “illusory surfaces” (as perceived
in a Kanizsa figure) also occur early. He observes that “com-
pletion seems to depend on general rules rather than on
specific object knowledge” and suggests that such rules can
be considered to be cognitive (see also O’Regan). We
think, however, that the kind of rules exhibited in surface
completion are probably not readily susceptible to the sub-
ject’s beliefs and desires, and so are probably not cognitive
in this sense. One of the hallmarks of cognition is its flexi-
bility. Yet the stereotyped character of completion – for ex-
ample, its dependence on the length, number, and contrast
of inducers (see Lesher 1995) – marks it as typical of “early
vision.”
What do psychophysical results reveal about this issue?
Dresp suggests that the processes that determine illusory
surface brightness occur at higher levels in the visual sys-
tem than the ones responsible for “local” brightness effects,
such as seen in Mach bands (see also Dresp 1992). This sug-
gestion implies that they occur at least beyond the striate
cortex (see Pessoa 1996a), which does not rule out that
much. Davis and Driver (1994) showed that detection of
Kanizsa figures in a visual search paradigm is parallel.
Hence, the perception of illusory figures does not require
focal attention, and occurs at early stages of the visual sys-
tem. Unfortunately, Davis and Driver’s results are not con-
clusive with regard to surface completion, for they are con-
sistent with the filling-in of boundaries between the
inducers (as we discuss in the target article, boundary and
surface completion may involve different processes). Their
results show that boundary completion is preattentive, but
not that surface completion is preattentive. What needs to
be devised, therefore, are direct tests for preattentive sur-
face completion. One would need stimuli that produce il-
lusory surfaces but no contours. Although one would have
to be careful about controls, one could use stimuli such as
those in Figure 8A of the target article. Such experiments
would enable us to answer more directly Gregory’s ques-
tion about the level of illusory surfaces.
A recent study by Mattingley et al. (1997) also lends sup-
port to the idea that early factors are involved in surface
completion. They showed that parietal extinction arises
only after the formation of visual surfaces, such as Kanisza
figures (see especially their Experiment 4). Although we
cannot review their study in detail here, their results pro-
vide neurophysiological evidence that surface filling-in oc-
curs early.
R2.9. Neural filling-in, prediction, and statistical infer-
ence. It is suggested by Barlow that prediction should be
seen as pattern completion in the temporal domain, as fill-
ing-in in time (see also Sauvé). Both spatial filling-in (as
discussed in the target article) and temporal filling-in 
(as discussed by Barlow) can be seen as types of statistical
inference. Viewing perceptual completion as statistical in-
ference and prediction could be of help to task-level de-
scriptions of vision. Barlow goes on to state, however, that
“statistical inference, jumping to a conclusion, subjective
filling-in, and spatially propagating neural activity are
surely different levels of description of the same process in
the brain and there need be no incompatibility between
them.” Were we wrong, then, in our criticism of Dennett
(sects. 6 and 7 of the target article), when we assumed that
spatially propagating activity is more than “jumping to a
conclusion”? We do not think so. In some cases the pro-
cesses might be one and the same, though described at dif-
ferent levels, but in other cases they could indeed be dif-
ferent. For example, in texture completion as studied by
Watanabe and Cavanagh (1991; 1993), our guess is that the
visual is just “jumping to a conclusion” in Dennett’s sense,
that is, simply signaling that “more of the same” is present.
No topographic representation or neural spreading
through lateral interactions (or interactions of some other
form) would be involved in this case, whereas they do seem
to be involved in illusory contours and brightness percep-
tion. Precisely because there are so many different levels
of description for completion phenomena, it is easy to slide
unwittingly from one to the other. Our view is that careful
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experimental work should determine our descriptions of
the phenomena.
R3. The bridge locus and neural-perceptual
isomorphism
In the target article (sect. 8.1) we criticized the doctrine of
analytic isomorphism, according to which there must be a
final stage in the brain – a bridge locus – where an isomor-
phism obtains between neural activity and the subject’s per-
ceptual experience. We took issue with both the postulation
of a bridge locus and the a priori preference for isomor-
phism in the neural-perceptual mapping. Although we fo-
cused on vision, we meant our points to apply to the study
of perception in general. We therefore wish to thank Ap-
pelbaum, who shows how analytic isomorphism comes
close to being a dogma in the study of speech perception,
one which, she argues, “will have to be rejected before
progress in explaining speech perception will be made.”
Todorovic´ and Van Gulick, on the other hand, think
that our reasons for rejecting analytic isomorphism depend,
as Van Gulick puts it, “upon reading it in an unnecessarily
strong way.” They defend a more refined, nonlocalization-
ist conception of the bridge locus – as does Hahn – and
then suggest that isomorphism is the most plausible way to
understand the neural-perceptual mapping. In this section
we will consider their arguments and the related points
made by Barlow, Lehar, Myin, Pishva, Ross, and Tyler.
R3.1. The bridge locus. We endorse Barlow’s claim that it
is useful for neuroscientists to seek “the location in a neural
system where one can most readily show that particular
neural states provide enough information to account for
particular psychological performance.” Let us call such
neural states the informational substrate of the perfor-
mance or percept. Several commentators – Barlow, Hahn,
Todorovic´, and Van Gulick – seem to think that we were
attacking this conception of the informational substrate,
but that was not our intention at all. This conception is not
what Teller and Pugh (1983) meant by the term “bridge lo-
cus,” contrary to Barlow’s claim, nor is it what we criticized
in the target article. As we read Teller and Pugh, the bridge
locus is the set of neurons whose activation is necessary and
sufficient for a percept.2 Barlow’s informational substrate is
not sufficient to produce a percept, although it is necessary
(all other things being equal) for the production of a per-
cept. Indeed, as Teller has advised us (personal communi-
cation), Barlow’s informational substrate is what she and
Pugh called the “critical locus”:
Most visual scientists also would accept [in addition to the
bridge locus as the immediate substrate of perceptual experi-
ence] the notion that in a particular experiment the flow of in-
formation (e.g., about the spectral content of a stimulus)
through the visual system can be importantly blocked, limited
or otherwise reorganized at a particular stage. . . If one stage
imposes such a critical transformation, this stage will be called
the critical locus. . . for that experiment (Teller & Pugh 1983,
p. 581).
Far from wishing to challenge the idea of the critical lo-
cus, we feel that it is a useful one for visual science. We
agree with Barlow who writes: “States of activity in under-
lying neural representations must provide sufficient infor-
mation for the perceptual discriminations that are based on
them.” He continues by noting that the discovery of such
neural representations “enables one to find out when brain
events can and when they cannot explain perceptual phe-
nomena.”
We doubt, however, that the stronger conception of the
bridge locus is useful for shaping research in visual science.
This was the central claim made in our discussion of the
concept in the target article. We reject the notion of the
bridge locus for the following reasons. First, there is no 
logical requirement that we postulate it. Second, the em-
pirical evidence to date does not lend strong support for 
the view that there must be a final neural stage in process-
ing: (1) Brain regions are not independent stages or mod-
ules; they interact reciprocally because of dense forward
and backward projections, as well as reciprocal cross-
connections. (2) A central idea in recent neuroscience is
that brain activity is highly distributed (spatially and tem-
porally). (3) Neural plasticity in recovery from lesions sug-
gests that the connection between a specific psychological
performance and a particular locus is variable and context-
dependent. In general, therefore, we think that there is lit-
tle empirical support for the idea that vision is a process
whereby retinal information streams to a final place “where
consciousness happens.”
In the target article, we assumed that the requirement of
spatial and temporal locality was built into the bridge locus
concept, and we therefore argued that the concept should
be abandoned. Hahn, Todorovic´, and Van Gulick com-
ment that the concept can be revised so that it no longer in-
corporates this assumption. (Davida Teller – one of the
original formulators of the concept – also recently made
this point [Teller 1998].) Van Gulick’s formulation is the
clearest and most precise:
Assuming the truth of materialism . . . every token percept
must have a neural substrate – whether local or global – that is
sufficient to produce or constitute it. Given multiple realizabil-
ity, the nature of that substrate may vary from one token to an-
other, but on each occasion that the percept is achieved, there
must be some neural substrate or other that is nomically suf-
ficient for the percept. Call that state in each case the bridge
locus.
The basic idea, then, is that the core of the bridge locus con-
cept is not the localizationist assumption, but rather the as-
sumption that each percept has a neural substrate that is
nomically sufficient for it.
Subject to two essential qualifications, we are prepared
to accept this proposal. First, the neural substrate is suffi-
cient to produce the percept, but not to constitute it. Per-
ception is an adaptive, cognitive capacity of the animal or
person, and therefore it is constituted not by the neural sub-
strate per se, but by the interactions of the nervous system,
the body, and the environment (see Chiel & Beer 1997).
Second, the neural substrate is sufficient to produce the
percept only given the assumption that all other things are
equal. The “all other things being equal” clause is crucial,
for the neural substrate is nomically sufficient for the per-
cept only if the following three conditions exist: (1) the
neural substrate is properly embedded in the nervous sys-
tem; (2) the nervous system is properly embodied in the an-
imal or person; and (3) the animal or person is properly sit-
uated in the environment. The absence of any of these
three conditions would provide a reason for holding that the
percept would not be present, even if its typical neural sub-
strate were. Our commitment to (3) in particular puts us –
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to use current philosophical jargon – in the “externalist”
camp: Perceptual content is inherently world-involving,
and therefore cannot be reductively identified with neural
states inside the individual.
Ross, on the other hand, suggests that instead of think-
ing of a perceptual bridge locus, we should instead consider
“behavioral bridge loci.” These are neural activity patterns
that must be reached to produce motor actions. The main
issue is how the visual system updates its activity in the face
of current stimuli so as to enable visually guided behavior.
This idea is certainly congenial to our enactive, task-level
approach to vision. In the case of perceptual completion,
the issue would be how the topographically organized
neural processes found in some cases help to support and
enable behavior. We take up this topic in section R5.
In sum, if we use the term “bridge locus” to mean the
neural substrate that is nomically sufficient, all other things
being equal, to produce a given token percept, then we
have no objection to the concept. Its status, however, strikes
us as similar to that of the filling-in concept: When properly
clarified and revised it seems a shadow of its former self. 
Indeed, just as one might argue that the very term “neural
filling-in” can be misleading (see our earlier response to
O’Regan in sect. R2.1), so one might argue that the very
term “bridge locus” can be misleading, because it does not
make explicit the above qualifications (besides having the
lingering localizationist and Cartesian materialist connota-
tion of a final stage in the brain).3
R3.2. Neural-perceptual isomorphism. In the target arti-
cle, we criticized what we call “analytic isomorphism,”
which is the idea that there must be a neural-perceptual iso-
morphism at the bridge locus. Van Gulick suggests that
our rejection of this doctrine depends on taking the re-
quirement of isomorphism in an unnecessarily strong way.
He argues that “[i]f there is to be an explanatory link be-
tween percept and substrate, there must be some way – at
least in principle – to map the features of the percept onto
underlying features sufficient to produce . . . them.” all that
is needed for isomorphism, he suggests, is that such a map-
ping exist (see also Arrington). He points out that “[t]o
count as an isomorphism the features mapped from percept
to substrate need not be the same; spatial relations in the
percept need not be mapped onto spatial features in the
substrate.” Thus his idea seems to be that it is sufficient for
neural-perceptual isomorphism that we can in fact explain
elements or facts at the level of the percept in terms of cor-
responding processes or patterns of activation at the neural
level. The absence of this kind of “broad and more abstract”
isomorphism, he argues, would leave the neural-perceptual
link “brute and inexplicable if not downright magical.”
In the target article, it was not our intention to attack this
highly abstract and fairly weak notion of isomorphism. Our
aim, rather, was to criticize the doctrine that there must be
a pictorial (spatial) isomorphism at the bridge locus. The
idea is that the neural substrate will be isomorphic to the
corresponding percept in the sense that the spatially orga-
nized properties of the percept will correspond to the spa-
tially organized properties of the neural substrate. Such an
equality of spatial structure would provide a kind of “trans-
parent relation” between the neural and the perceptual do-
mains, to use Myin’s term. It was this notion of pictorial 
isomorphism that we criticized in our discussion of Todor-
ovic´’s treatment of the Craik-O’Brien-Cornsweet effect.
We are willing to endorse Van Gulick’s “broad and more
abstract” neural-perceptual isomorphism, but only subject
to an important qualification. As stated above (sect. R3.1),
and in the target article (sect. 9), we think that there are
likely to be significant limitations on the extent to which the
perceptual can be explained solely in terms of the neural. A
central point of our target article was to call into question
the view that explanations of the perceptual can be given
entirely in neural terms without including references to the
environment in which the animal or person is embedded,
as well as nonneural facts about the animal’s body (see also
sects. R4 and R6 below). To employ a different philosoph-
ical jargon, we believe that perceptual states do not super-
vene on neural states, but on neural and environmental
states, and it is therefore not possible to explain every fea-
ture of perception in neural terms. For example, it is an
open empirical question to what extent the categorical
structure of human color perception can be explained in
neural terms without including linguistic and cultural fac-
tors (see Hardin & Maffi 1997 and Saunders & van Brakel
1997 for discussion of this issue).
Because, in general, it is not possible to give an exhaus-
tive explanation of the perceptual in terms of the neural, the
explanation of perception cannot be reduced to uncovering
neural-perceptual isomorphisms. Thus we think that the
doctrine of analytic isomorphism, even as modified by Van
Gulick, is a misleading way of thinking about the relation
between the personal and subpersonal bases of perception.
Nevertheless, we think Van Gulick is right that, to the ex-
tent that it is possible to explain the perceptual in terms of
the neural, such explanation will proceed by establishing a
mapping between the perceptual and neural domains, and
this mapping will typically be highly abstract and functional,
rather than pictorial or topographic.
Myin helpfully draws attention to an important feature
of our position, which is that we reject only the necessity of
neural-perceptual pictorial isomorphism, not its possibility.
Whether there are such neural-perceptual isomorphisms in
any given case strikes us as an empirical matter for cogni-
tive neuroscience to decide (see sect. 8.1 of the target arti-
cle). Thus there is nothing about our position that requires
us to oppose Tyler’s correct observation that the visual sys-
tem does in fact make use of retinotopic maps. Todorovic´
states that he is happy to transform the idea of a (topo-
graphic) neural-perceptual isomorphism (in the case of
brightness perception) from an a priori assumption into an
ordinary hypothesis. Contrary to Tyler’s reading of our po-
sition, this transformation is exactly the move we recom-
mend for visual science. Furthermore, we agree with
Todorovic´ that there is nothing objectionable in the work-
ing hypothesis that there are pictorial isomorphisms at the
bridge locus (when the bridge locus concept is watered
down in the way we just outlined in sect. R3.1).
As we discussed in the target article, Köhler (1947) ar-
gued that neural-perceptual isomorphisms hold between
the dynamic-topological relations in each domain, not the
topographic or geometric ones. The problems with his
field-theory view of brain activity notwithstanding, we be-
lieve that such a dynamical system approach to isomor-
phism can provide a more promising avenue for research in
cognitive neuroscience than searching for spatial isomor-
phisms. Indeed, this emphasis on the dynamic-topological
features of the neural and perceptual domains has been re-
vitalized by the so-called dynamical approach to cognition,
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which also incorporates elements from the Gibsonian eco-
logical perspective (see Kelso 1995; Port & Van Gelder
1995).
Pishva offers another proposal. He suggests that we
abandon the a priori demand for an isomorphism (of any
kind) between the neural and the perceptual domains, and
instead take the neural-perceptual mapping to be homo-
morphic, that is, some of the structural properties of the
perceptual domain could map onto structural properties of
the neural domain, without there being a one-to-one cor-
respondence between the relations among the elements in
the two domains. This is an interesting suggestion, but
Pishva provides no clear example of what such a mapping
would look like in visual science, and so his proposal is dif-
ficult to evaluate.4
In attacking the analytical requirement of pictorial iso-
morphism are we attacking a paper tiger? We think not. For
example, Lehar explicitly endorses it: “[I]somorphism sug-
gests that the required algorithm [for space perception] in-
volves the construction of a fully spatial three-dimensional
internal model of that external world as observed subjec-
tively.” One could not ask for a better example of a priori
computational theorizing, which in this particular case hap-
pens to fly in the face of what we know about the neural sub-
strates of space perception: Space does not seem to be rep-
resented in a uniform three dimensional map separate from
the processes involved in motor actions and selective at-
tention, but rather in a multiplicity of highly specialized vi-
suomotor maps (see Milner & Goodale 1995; Rizzolatti et
al. 1994).
Although this kind of neural-perceptual isomorphism
may be an easy target, even theorists who take pictorial iso-
morphism to be just a working hypothesis are sometimes so
wedded to the idea that it becomes a dogma. In such cases,
the quest for pictorial isomorphism can hamper research by
preventing other possibilities from being explored. The his-
tory of Mach band investigation provides a case in point.
Mach’s brilliant insight allowed him to propose that some
form of lateral-inhibition circuit mediated the effect that
now carries his name. Lateral inhibition per se, however,
cannot explain Mach bands, insofar as they are not elicited
at sharp luminance transitions (or edges), but occur only
when there are gradual luminance transitions, such as in lu-
minance ramps (Pessoa 1996a). The lateral-inhibition ac-
count predicts that Mach bands should be stronger at
edges. So why was such a glaring discrepancy not noticed
for more than a hundred years? We think that the strikingly
close spatial resemblance between the percept and the reti-
nal cell responses obtained by Hartline and colleagues
(Hartline 1940; 1949) led researchers simply to ignore this
key fact. The spatial isomorphism account of Mach bands
seemed so natural that the absence of such bands at edges
was dismissed as less relevant. It was only when the retina
became less favored as the crucial site of the effect and
more sophisticated accounts of visual function emerged
(e.g., the postulation of “bar” and “edge” detectors), that ac-
counts less centered on the “spatial resemblance” principle
appeared (see Pessoa 1996a). Once that occurred, explain-
ing why ramps produce Mach bands and why edges do not
became central to understanding the underlying circuitry.
One final point. The main empirical moral of our target
article in the case of perceptual completion is that there is
no a priori or empirical reason to insist on only one kind of
isomorphic or nonisomorphic neural-perceptual mapping.
Thus we think that in the case of texture completion the ev-
idence does not favor pictorial isomorphism (or strong
neural filling-in), whereas in the case of brightness percep-
tion it does. Nevertheless, given the misleading connota-
tions of the pictorial isomorphism concept (the tendency to
take it in the analytic or Cartesian materialist way), we think
it would be much more informative and precise to talk
about topographically organized neural substrates, and to
discuss the properties of such computational maps for per-
ception and action (e.g., Knudsen et al. 1987; Schwartz
1980).
R4. Representation and the task of vision
In section 9.1 of the target article, we argued in favor of a
task-based conception of vision at the level of the animal or
person interacting with the world, and contrasted this “en-
active” conception with the “representational conception of
vision.” Even though a large part of our article was devoted
to considerations about the content of various subpersonal
neural processes, our critical points about a certain kind of
representational model of vision led a number of the com-
mentators – Byrne, Davis & Driver, Earle, Lomas,
Myin, Singh & Hoffman, Van Gulick, and Yin – to in-
terpret us as rejecting the very idea of subpersonal repre-
sentation in vision. This was not our intention. What we
meant to criticize, rather, was the idea that perception is
representational in the sense of requiring a world-model in
the head. To avoid further misunderstanding, we would like
to clarify our position here.
First, to understand how vision works one must under-
stand what vision is, namely, a cognitive capacity of the an-
imal, the function of which is to give the animal access to
the environment and to guide action, not to produce a uni-
fied internal representation of the outside world from the
retinal image. Therefore, it is a (conceptual) mistake to an-
swer the question “what is vision?” by saying that vision is
the recovery of the outside world in a model inside the head
after the fashion of inverse optics, though such an assertion
is of course perfectly legitimate as a hypothesis about how
vision works subpersonally. We are well aware that Marr’s
(1982) “work was characterized by careful analyses of the
tasks to be solved by particular visual processes” (Davis &
Driver; see also Earle). The point of our critical remark
about Marr in the target article (sect. 9.1) was that he and
his followers (e.g., Poggio et al. 1985) often treat the sub-
personal task of the visual system (which they define as the
ill-posed inverse optics problem of deriving object-cen-
tered representations of the world from viewer-centered
two-dimensional retinal images) as if it were the cognitive
function of vision at the level of the animal or person. It is
this tendency that can unwittingly lead to the fallacious
form of homuncularism, or to the mistaken idea that the
distinction between the animal or person and its subper-
sonal states does not matter in cognitive science (e.g.,
Fodor 1975, p. 52). In contrast, Gibson’s (1979) attention to
the animal as the proper subject of perception enables us
to avoid these problems by providing a proper description
of what vision has to accomplish at the level of the animal
(Nakayama 1994; Noë 1995, Ch. 4; Thompson 1995, pp.
232–35).
Second, the issue is not merely one of how to understand
the concept of vision, for the proper characterization of the
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task of vision at the level of the animal can lead to better sci-
entific accounts of how vision works subpersonally. For ex-
ample, if one starts from the abstraction of the stationary
retinal image and asks how the visual system manages to de-
rive a model of the objective world, one will decompose the
visual system into modules that are passive in the sense of
not being interconnected to motor processes. On the other
hand, if one starts from the sensorimotor cycle of saccadic
eye movement and asks how the animal is able to fixate
points in the environment, one will decompose the visual
system into visuomotor modules that guide action. As it
turns out, such an animal-centered, action-based decom-
position reduces the need for certain kinds of representa-
tions in vision, in particular for an on-line, moment-to-mo-
ment, detailed world-model (see Ballard 1991; 1996), a
result that happens to cohere with psychological experi-
ments on scene recognition (see Intraub 1997; Simons &
Levin 1997) and neuropsychology (Milner & Goodale
1995).
We trust these remarks demonstrate that we do not think
there is any “opposition” (Singh & Hoffman) or “incon-
sistency” (Earle) between the personal-level and the sub-
personal-level in accounts of vision, and that we do not “cre-
ate a gulf between neural and personal accounts of
perception that belies the role that neural accounts play in
explanations of visual experience on the personal level”
(Lomas). (This latter accusation ignores sects. 4, 6, and 7
of the target article, which are devoted to the role that
neural accounts play in explanations of perceptual comple-
tion.) What we object to is the neglect of the personal level
and the way it motivates the faulty subpersonal theory of vi-
sion as the passive reconstruction of the world in a model
inside the head. The reason this theory is defective is that
it focuses on the kind of representation that is not useful or
even necessary for the animal. For example, constructing a
detailed representation in world-centered coordinates is
unnecessary and hence a poor strategy if actions can rely on
representations in a more convenient gaze-direction coor-
dinate system (Ballard 1991; 1996).
The connection between this point and the topic of per-
ceptual completion is that if one thinks that vision does re-
quire a detailed world-model, then one will take neural fill-
ing-in to be obligatory for vision (see Lehar). On the other
hand, to reject the representation-as-world-model concep-
tion forces us to reconsider the role played by neural filling-
in. Although there is evidence for topographically orga-
nized processes of neural completion, there is no reason to
think the function of these processes is to fill-in the detail
of a single, unified representation or world-model in the
head. What, then, is the function of these processes? A full
answer to this question would take another article, but in
the next section we would like to sketch an answer based on
the idea that filling-in is for finding out, and that finding out
depends on the integration of local signals.
R5. Filling-in is for finding out
R5.1. When is filling-in needed? Active filling-in mecha-
nisms are postulated by Grossberg, first, to overcome the
inadequacies of the initial retinal coding of the image (e.g.,
occlusion by blood vessels), and second, for the reconstruc-
tion of surface features. Neural responses to uniform re-
gions are largely suppressed at the retinal level, and thus to
reconstruct visible surfaces one needs to rely on the neural
responses generated at object borders as contrast estimates
(see Neumann & Pessoa 1998a and Pessoa & Neumann
1998 for an explicit link between diffusive filling-in mecha-
nisms and reconstruction through regularization theory).
Yet Grossberg does not explain why such reconstruction is
needed, aside from saying that “without further processing,
visual representations would be colored outline cartoons”
(see sect. 9.1 of the target article for a critical discussion of
this idea). In fact, cell responses at borders carry enough in-
formation to determine appearance unambiguously in re-
gions where responses were originally suppressed. For ex-
ample, a brightness step can be signaled by, say, retinal
On-cell responses at the light side and Off-cell responses at
the dark side. Although the final filling-in computations in
models such as Grossberg and Todorovic´’s (1988) help de-
termine how well the model’s predictions match perception,
they do not add information to what was already present in
border-related responses (brightness is proportional to the
integral of On-responses minus Off-responses). The final
diffusive filling-in step could have been omitted.
Grossberg also states that without filling-in it is not pos-
sible to explain why regions with equivalent early neural sig-
nals (such as responses at the retina) have different bright-
nesses, or why regions with different neural signals have the
same brightness. Consider Figure R2. The one-dimen-
sional luminance and brightness profiles of a step stimulus
are sketched together with a schematic representation of
retinal responses (above baseline responses correspond to
On-cell responses, and below baseline responses to Off-cell 
responses). In Figure R2(A), two regions with identical
(zero) responses are associated with different brightnesses
(see circles), whereas in Figure R2(B), two regions with dif-
ferent neural signals have the same brightness (see circles).
Although neural filling-in is one mechanism to obtain the
correct response, a host of alternative accounts have been
proposed in the literature (see Pessoa 1996a). These ac-
counts typically include as their central element the detec-
tion of primitive “events,” such as lines and edges, and pos-
sibly some “symbolic” encoding. (The key feature of all
accounts is using contrast information at luminance transi-
tions to specify brightness levels.) What careful considera-
tion of Figure R2 reveals, therefore, is that the processes
that determine brightness perception must make use of
nonlocal information, because the cells that fire for such
stimuli are at or around the luminance discontinuities (at
the center).
R5.2. Using filling-in for finding out. How can the topo-
graphically organized processes suggested by some of the
filling-in data (e.g., brightness and illusory contours) facili-
tate the visual behavior of the animal in its environment?
We need to address this question because several com-
mentators (Bachmann, Durgin, Kaufman, O’Regan,
and Ross) see a missing link in our target article between
neural filling-in data and task-level considerations about vi-
sion. We believe that there are important task-level or be-
havioral reasons for neural filling-in, and that as a result, the
evidence we provide in support of neural filling-in is com-
patible with a task-based, personal-level approach to vision.
In a nutshell, neural filling-in helps the animal find out
about its environment.
To link neural filling-in to the situated visual behavior of
the animal in a satisfying way we would need, on the one
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hand, a more careful description of the processing tasks the
visual system faces, and on the other hand, a deeper un-
derstanding on a case-by-case basis of the ways in which
neural filling-in can meet those processing demands. In the
case of brightness perception, for example, what are the
reasons that the visual needs to go beyond the representa-
tion at retinal ganglion cell responses, or cortical simple and
complex cell responses (localized edge responses)? To an-
swer this question, we need to determine the usefulness of
the results of filling-in (or integration) computations.
To understand the function of neural filling-in, consider
that vision has evolved to guide action. For action, animals
need reliable information about their environment. The vi-
sual system in its earlier stages, however, acquires only re-
liable local estimates (as a result of the spatially confined
profiles of receptive fields in early vision). These estimates
are ambiguous with respect to the larger global context.
Therefore, to fulfill its action-guiding role the visual system
must integrate this available information. There are a num-
ber of different ways in which integration could be accom-
plished in principle. We believe that neural filling-in is one
way for the visual system to accomplish this task of inte-
grating early information (which must be useful for finding
out about the environment; see also Tyler). Although
neural filling-in is not necessary, it may be an efficient inte-
gration method.
Consider the particular case of lightness perception. At
the retinal level, cells encode stimulus contrast. Ratio sen-
sitivity enables the visual system to handle adequately,
within the limited firing range of visual neurons, the more
than five orders of magnitude over which the incoming il-
lumination varies. The dynamic range of such cells is thus
greatly expanded. Nevertheless, sensitivity to luminance ra-
tios is not enough to provide reliable estimates of surface
properties, such as lightness and color, because local esti-
mates can be completely ambiguous. For example, consider
a sequence of abutting patches of ascending luminance val-
ues (forming a luminance staircase), such that at every tran-
sition (or step) physical contrast is defined to be identical.
The early neural responses to a transition at, for example,
the beginning of the entire stimulus are identical to re-
sponses near the opposite extreme. At the beginning of the
staircase, a dark gray patch is seen, whereas at the end a
much lighter one is perceived. The only way that a reliable
estimate of surface appearance can be obtained is by com-
bining the information of all scenic contrast-responses of
interest.
Lightness perception, therefore, requires the integration
of information (see also Whittle).5 How might this be ac-
complished in the visual system? One way is simply to rely
on retinal contrast information and consider the entire ar-
ray of stimulation (i.e., neither fill-in nor integrate). Let us
refer to this operation as implicit integration. Now consider
the case where a simple creature uses lightness information
to guide its behavior – for example, to flee from “light-gray
objects.”6 In this case, the entire set of optic fibers would
somehow have to guide behavior. (Remember that local sig-
nals are ambiguous with respect to lightness values.) The al-
ternative would be to use the initial retinal firing pattern to
produce a more compact neural representation through in-
tegration of retinal contrast measures – which we could call
explicit integration. This transformation would provide
more direct accessibility to lightness signals and facilitate
perceptuo-motor communication (see Fig. R3). In the
process, something like a “lightness image” would be gen-
erated in the brain. There is nothing mysterious about such
an image; it is there simply to support effective visually
guided behavior. (We hope that these points, as well those
below, convince Yin that we do not view the purpose of
completion as providing visual surface perceptual quality.)
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Figure R2. Luminance to brightness mapping (one-dimensional cross sections). A luminance step or edge produces a cusp-shaped dis-
tribution of retinal activity. The final percept comprises uniform brightness levels arranged as a brightness step. Depending on the spa-
tial location, the same retinal responses may be associated with different brightness levels (A), or distinct retinal responses may be asso-
ciated with the same brightness level (B).
Although the above example suggests that integration is
needed, how such integration should be accomplished is 
an open question. For completeness, we considered the
possibility that some form of implicit integration occurs.
Such a hypothesis, that the entire array of contrast re-
sponses constitutes by itself the underlying lightness signal,
is superficially attractive, given that nothing extra needs to
be computed. The problem, however, is that such a pro-
posal could be iterated indefinitely without any criterion for
stopping (see Lehar). Thus it could be claimed that the pat-
tern of cone responses is sufficient to explain the percept,
which is clearly unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the ar-
gument applies the other way around, too. Some criterion
must be established to determine when the neural states
provide enough information (Barlow). In other words, how
much integration is enough? We submit that in many cases
this question cannot be answered from a purely perceptual
perspective; the behavioral side of the equation must also
be entered.
Similar types of argument for the need for integration ap-
ply to other forms of perceptual completion, such as bound-
ary completion in illusory contour perception. In general,
contours are not specified solely by luminance discontinu-
ities (or edges). Several other scenic attributes, such as tex-
ture, depth, and motion, contribute to the specification of
object contours. As in the case of lightness, local signals are
insufficient because they are highly ambiguous. For exam-
ple, in the case of an object contour occluded at several re-
gions by mud splashes, there is very little information about
the whole contour locally at the unoccluded parts (Gross-
berg et al. 1997); also see Shipley for a related example).
Nevertheless, in many such cases, the perception of a sin-
gle contour is effortless. As in the case of lightness, inte-
gration allows for stable perception, in this case of object
contours. Boundary-formation processes are important, as
Shipley observes, because occlusion is prevalent in the
world. Such processes, then, might aid in the identification
of objects seen moving through a cluttered world.
In sum, we submit that the integration of information is
needed for robust perception and action. Such integration
removes ambiguity and creates the basis of more robust, in-
variant representations. As Sauvé observes, it increases the
continuity of objects and features across space, improving
the accessibility of the relevant information. We believe
that integration is what is revealed by some filling-in ex-
periments: Filling-in is caught in the act of integrating. No-
tice that we say that integration is needed, not filling-in.
In light of the evidence for neural filling-in in topo-
graphically organized regions, we think it would be useful
for visual science to investigate further what advantages
such integration schemes have over other nonspatially or-
ganized methods. One reason might be related to the fact
that cortical topography minimizes the total volume of ax-
ons and dendrites (Cowey 1979; Mitchison 1995). Hence
the local computations supported by topographic maps
might favor the integration of information that preserves
spatial structure, and in this way effective use would be
made of the cortical circuitry. In such cases, filling-in would
be accompanied by what seem like spreading interactions
and spatially organized representations.
R6. Perceptual content and the personal/subpersonal
distinction. In section 9.2 of the target article, we argued
that the evaluation of perceptual content should not be dic-
tated by subpersonal considerations about internal pro-
cessing, but rather by considerations about the task of vi-
sion at the level of the person or animal interacting with the
world. We contrasted this view with the “uniformity of con-
tent thesis,” which maintains that perceptual content at the
personal level is just neural content at the subpersonal level.
Contrary to Hahn, our rejection of this thesis has nothing
to do with an “endorsement of dualism,” but rather with try-
ing to make sense of the different kinds of content found in
the natural world. We hold that perceptual content pertains
to the animal as an embodied agent interacting with the en-
vironment, requires for its description an animal-centered,
task-level account, and is constrained by norms of rational-
ity. Conversely, neural content pertains to the animal’s 
internal functional organization and requires for its de-
scription levels of explanation concerned with internal pro-
cessing. We are grateful to the commentators who ad-
dressed this topic, for their remarks enable us to clarify,
revise, and improve our position.
R6.1. The uniformity of content thesis: Dennett and vi-
sual science. Our interpretation of Dennett and our crit-
icism of the uniformity of content thesis are contested by
Byrne and Van Gulick. The interpretative questions about
Dennett are important to the extent that they touch on sub-
stantive issues about perception at the personal and sub-
personal levels. Rather than respond to them point by
point, however, we think it will be more fruitful to refor-
mulate our position in light of the commentaries by Byrne,
Dennett, and Van Gulick.
One of our targets in section 9.2 was a certain pattern of
reasoning that relies on the uniformity thesis. According to
this reasoning, for a person to have a perceptual experience
of environmental detail, the environmental detail must be
represented in his brain. Therefore, if one can show that the
detail is not represented in the person’s brain, it will follow
that the person does not really see all the detail. We drew
attention to this idea in the target article in connection with
Dennett’s “Marilyns” example. The reasoning in that con-
text goes like this: From the supposed fact that the brain
does not represent each of the Marilyns on the wall, it fol-
Response/Pessoa et al.: Perceptual completion
792 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:6
Figure R3. Sensory-motor mapping. (A) Early sensory re-
sponses to image contrast produce distributed spatial patterns of
activation at an intermediate processing stage. For robust deter-
mination of scenic attributes (such as contours, lightness, and
color) at a given location (black disk), all responses must be used
by motor processes (implicit integration). (B) Early sensory pro-
cessing responses are explicitly integrated and produce a localized
response for that spatial location.
lows that the person does not really see them all. This pat-
tern of reasoning clearly relies on the uniformity thesis.
We have argued that the central task of vision is not to
produce detailed internal representations, but to guide ac-
tion (see sect. R4 above and sect. 9.1 of the target article).
If one accepts this point, it then becomes an empirical ques-
tion whether the visual system must produce detailed in-
ternal representations to guide action. It is also an open em-
pirical question whether the person’s perceptual awareness
of the detailed wall of Marilyns requires that there be sub-
personal neural representations (pictorial or otherwise) of
all the detail. The line of reasoning that we criticize treats
the absence of a detailed world-model as a sufficient reason
for denying that the person sees the detail. To reason in this
way is to assume the uniformity of content thesis and the
associated representationist conception of vision.
This pattern of reasoning, far from being a “straw man”
(Hahn), is widespread in visual science, especially in the
current studies of scene perception and change blindness
(which we discussed in sect. 9.2; see also Intraub 1997; Noë
et al., forthcoming; Simons & Levin 1997). The moral of
these studies is generally taken to be not only that the visual
system lacks a precise representation of the visual world,
but also that because it lacks such a representation the vi-
sual world is an illusion (see Blackmore et al. 1995; Intraub
1997; O’Regan et al. 1996). Durgin relies on this reason-
ing in his commentary when he invokes the so-called
“Grand Illusion of perception – that the perceived world is
complete and fully detailed in all directions, despite the
unarguable evidence that the internal representation of the
world that we can study in visual cortex is nonuniformly
sampled (i.e., blurry and poorly localized in the periphery).”
We believe that visual perception probably does not in-
volve detailed pictorial or symbolic neural representations
of a scene (a world-model). We also think, however, that this
fact has no immediate bearing on the evaluation of the con-
tent of the person’s perceptual states. In particular, we do
not think it implies that our visual experience of the world
is an illusion (see Noë et al., forthcoming). The reason is
that we disagree with the uniformity of content thesis. In
our view, one cannot read perceptual content directly from
neural content, because perceptual content is constituted
by the coupled systems of animal and environment, not
neural states.
The assumption that perceptual content can be specified
solely by virtue of neural content leads to conceptual and
phenomenological distortions. Both kinds of distortion
seem to be at work in Dennett’s discussion of filling-in (de-
spite Van Gulick’s point that “[i]t is difficult to believe that
Dennett, who has had so much to say about the per-
sonal/subpersonal distinction, makes such an assump-
tion”).7 In the Marilyn wallpaper example, Dennett, after
asserting that the brain just “jumps to the conclusion that
the rest are Marilyns,” begins a new paragraph by saying:
“Of course it does not seem that way to you. It seems to you
as if you are actually seeing hundreds of identical Marilyns”
(1991, p. 355). Dennett does not deny that, in one sense,
the person does see the Marilyns on the wall, for he con-
tinues: “And in one sense you are: [T]here are, indeed, hun-
dreds of Marilyns out there on the wall, and you’re seeing
them.” Yet a natural reading of these three sentences sug-
gests that he thinks there is another sense in which the per-
son does not actually see the Marilyns. What would this
sense be? What Dennett goes on to say is this: “What is not
the case, however, is that there are hundreds of identical
Marilyns represented in your brain.” We agree with this
statement, taken as an empirical claim about the person’s
brain. Yet the remarks give the impression that there is a
sense of “seeing” or “having a visual perceptual experi-
ence,” such that the person does not in fact perceptually ex-
perience hundreds of identical Marilyns – even if it seems
to him that he does – because there is no detailed repre-
sentation of them – pictorial or otherwise – in his brain.
(Or, to put the point the other way round, if all the detail
were represented in his brain, then he would in fact have a
perceptual experience of the detail.) In other words, con-
trary to Byrne and Van Gulick, the person suffers from a
kind of perceptual illusion: It seems to him that he visually
experiences the Marilyns, but he does not, because the sub-
personal neural representation required for such an expe-
rience is not present. Although the passage does not logi-
cally entail this idea, its tone and rhetoric strongly suggest
it. (The same sort of idea is strongly implied by Dennett’s
remark, quoted in the target article, that the continuity of
consciousness at the personal level is actually an illusion,
because the underlying neural contents are discontinuous.
The idea goes beyond any straightforward empirical claim,
for it amounts to a view about the conditions of application
at the personal level for the concept of seeing or of having
a visual perceptual experience: What the person can be said
to experience perceptually is the content of what his brain
represents. This is a subpersonally motivated sense of see-
ing: It implies that, even if it seems to the person that he
sees the detail, and he correctly judges that the detail is
present there on the wall, he nonetheless does not in fact
perceptually experience the detail unless it is neurally rep-
resented (pictorially or otherwise). This line of reasoning is
unacceptable because we have reason to believe both that
the detail need not be neurally represented (there is no
need for such a world-model in the head) and that the per-
son sees the detail (he says he sees it and the judgment he
makes on the basis of his visual experience is correct). Be-
cause the uniformity of content thesis is responsible for this
faulty line of reasoning, we should reject the thesis.8
Van Gulick asks: “What sort of subpersonal representa-
tions are needed to produce a personal-level experience of
a fully detailed wall of Marilyns?” This is a legitimate ques-
tion. We believe that we do have such experiences and that
they do not require having neural representations of all the
detail (symbolic or pictorial world-models) in our heads.
Van Gulick observes that not all personal-level perceptual
states are conscious (though all conscious perceptual states
are personal-level phenomena). We accept this point, too.
When we suggest, however, that there is no sense in which
the person does not see the Marilyns simply by virtue of not
having a neural representation of all the detail, we do not
mean that the person perceives the wall unconsciously; we
mean his perceptual experience of the Marilyns on the wall
is a conscious one. Why do we believe that we can be con-
scious of the detail even though we do not represent all the
detail in a scene-model in our heads? The reason is that vi-
sion is not a “snapshot” phenomenon; vision is a temporally
extended process of looking constituted through eye-,
head-, and whole-body-movements. As O’Regan (1992, p.
484) puts it: “[S]eeing constitutes an active process of prob-
ing the external environment as though it were a continu-
ously available external memory.” In other words, we do not
need to represent the detail of the world in our heads be-
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cause we can visit it with our eyes (see also sect. R4.1
above). The person does not visually discriminate all the
Marilyns at once, but as an active moving perceiver he can
explore the scene. In that sense, the person does see the de-
tail (though this will depend on the circumstances and the
task at hand: see Varela & Vermersch). To appreciate
what is involved in consciously seeing the wall, we must re-
flect more carefully on the actual character of looking than
most philosophers and visual scientists have been inclined
to do (see Thompson et al. 1998). In other words, we need
a careful conceptual and phenomenological study of per-
ceptual experience at the personal level. (For our views on
what such a study does and does not involve see our re-
sponse to Varela & Vermersch below.)
In the target article, we took Dennett’s remarks to imply
that he believes that the person’s perceptual experience is
mistaken or illusory in the Marilyn case. Byrne counters
that the mistake “is not any kind of perceptual illusion,” but
rather an “intellectual error we make when reflecting on
our experience,” namely, the mistaken belief that because
we experience the wall as covered with detailed Marilyns,
the neural representation must contain detailed represen-
tations of Marilyns. Van Gulick, too, writes: “what [Den-
nett] regards as mistaken or illusory is not our experience
of the wall, but the naive beliefs that we may form about the
nature of our experience.” Byrne makes the same point
about its seeming to one that the Marilyns are present in
one’s experience or mind, not just on the wall: The error is
the intellectual one of invoking “something like sense data
as the evidence that must be presented to an ‘inner Witness’
in the brain.” Similarly, Van Gulick takes Dennett to be crit-
icizing the philosophical doctrine of “phenomenal realism,”
which holds that “phenomenal mental states use a distinc-
tive medium of representation, one that is often thought of
as a plenum, a determinately differentiated continuous
manifold.”
As we indicated two paragraphs earlier, however, Den-
nett does give the impression that there is a kind of per-
ceptual illusion involved in the Marilyn case. It is possible
that he would not endorse the line of reasoning that gives
rise to this idea. In any case, he certainly thinks that ordi-
nary, unreflective perceptual experience typically involves
a commitment to false beliefs about its own nature in rela-
tion to the brain. Thus he believes that in the Marilyn case
the person’s perceptual experience typically involves the
false belief that the mind or brain must contain a detailed
picture of the Marilyns. Van Gulick is therefore closer to
the truth than Byrne, because he recognizes that the mis-
take is supposed to be one of “naive belief,” rather than “in-
tellectual error.” The intellectual error is analytic isomor-
phism, which is the naive belief spelled out in the form of a
theory. In other words, for Dennett, the mistaken intellec-
tual doctrines of analytic isomorphism and Cartesian mate-
rialism have their origins in the naive and false beliefs of or-
dinary perceptual experience (rather than, as we believe, in
a particular sort of misguided representationalism in phi-
losophy of mind and cognitive science).
Dennett gives voice to this very idea in his commentary.
He writes: “What needs accounting for is not necessarily
that there is filling-in but that there seems to be filling-in –
subjects (naively) believe there is filling-in [parentheses in
original].” Then later, describing the Marilyn case he says:
“I say there is something illusory about the ordinary per-
ceptual experience, not because I endorse the isomorphism
principle, but because ordinary people do tacitly endorse it,
and it leads them to error. . . It is, if you like, a theorist’s il-
lusion, but it turns out that we are all theorists.” We took 
issue with exactly these points in the penultimate paragraph
of section 9.1 of the target article. We deny that subjects
naively believe there is neural filling-in, that is, we deny that
their ordinary perceptual experience (or even their per-
ceptual experience of illusory figures and their own blind
spot) typically involves beliefs in neural filling-in. Ordinary
perceptual experience typically involves beliefs about the
world, but not beliefs (whether naive or intellectual) about
what goes on in the brain when we perceive. Nor does tacit
endorsement of analytic isomorphism play a role in every-
day perceptual experience. To suppose that perceptual ex-
perience involves such beliefs is to falsely intellectualize
perception. Thus we think that Dennett gets wrong the
epistemic commitments implicit in ordinary perceptual ex-
perience. To get these commitments right requires a care-
ful conceptual and phenomenological account of percep-
tual experience at the personal level.9 Our contention is
that such an account would make no mention of beliefs
about neural filling-in, or of doctrines about the neural-
perceptual relation such as analytic isomorphism and Car-
tesian materialism; instead, it would describe how people
experience the world given their perceptual capacities and
conceptual resources.
Finally, we wish to address the relation of the uniformity
thesis to analytic isomorphism. Analytic isomorphism is not
entailed by the uniformity thesis. It is a much stronger ver-
sion of the requirement of uniformity of content. Byrne
points out that many of our arguments against Dennett are
arguments against the claim that to see the wall of Marilyns
there must be a picture-like, isomorphic representation in
the brain; and he argues that none of these arguments
against analytic isomorphism carries any weight against the
uniformity thesis. We regret the lack of clarity in our pre-
sentation that gave rise to this criticism. (Several referees
objected to an earlier version of sect. 9.2 because they
found it too “philosophical.” In our revisions we inadver-
tently sacrificed clarity for brevity.) What we hope now to
have made clear is that (1) we give good reasons to reject
the uniformity thesis; (2) we give good reasons to reject an-
alytic isomorphism; (3) we do not assume that arguments
against analytic isomorphism count against the uniformity
thesis; and (4) there is some evidence that Dennett relies
on the uniformity thesis. We do, however, concede to Den-
nett, and to Byrne, that Dennett does not rely on analytic
isomorphism.
R6.2. Consciousness and the personal level. A number of
comments are provided by Revonsuo about “subjective vi-
sual awareness,” of which only a few speak directly to points
we made in the target article. He believes that “visual
awareness only refers to one specific phenomenon,” and as-
serts that “it is difficult to deny” that this specific phenom-
enon “somehow resides in the brain.” He then falsely states
that we “seem to deny this.” We made no such denial. If by
the phrase “subjective visual awareness resides in the
brain,” Revonsuo means that neural activity is nomically
sufficient (all other things being equal) for visual experi-
ence, then we agree. What we did say was that the bearer
of perceptual states is not the brain or nervous system per
se, but rather the animal or person; and we argued that we
must be careful to avoid unwarranted a priori assumptions
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(e.g., about neural-perceptual isomorphism) when investi-
gating the neural perceptual relation. It is not clear whether
Revonsuo objects to these statements. He does say that if
we mean to claim that “the phenomenal content of visual
awareness” exists only at the personal level, then we are
“obviously wrong,” because it “is brought about by (‘sub-
personal’) causal processes entirely confined inside the
brain, as the generation of dream phenomenology shows.”
This argument is question-begging and misses the point. To
say that neural processes are causally responsible for con-
sciousness does not mean that consciousness should be con-
ceptualized as a subpersonal-level phenomenon, rather
than a personal-level one. The example of visual experience
in dreams is no counterexample, for although neural activ-
ity of a particular sort is causally responsible for dreaming,
it is the animal or person who dreams.
Revonsuo also says that we “seem to be unable to make
the fundamental distinction between the phenomenal
model of the world, constructed by the brain, and the phys-
ical world itself.” This comment shows that he has not
grasped the most basic points of our target article. We ar-
gued that one must clearly distinguish what is represented
from the medium or vehicle of representation. In other
words, one must not assume that the brain models the
world by constructing a neural model that has the same
properties as the world it models. We also argued that there
is no reason to assume that the brain constructs detailed
models of the world. Revonsuo does make this assumption:
The phenomenal consciousness of visual perception “con-
stitutes the brain’s real-time model of the world, which we
in everyday thinking naively take as the external world it-
self, as if physical reality were somehow ‘directly’ per-
ceived” (see also Lehar). It is difficult to know how to as-
sess such a vague, sweeping claim. We have already
discussed the reasons for doubting that the brain is in the
business of constructing detailed models of the world (sect.
R4), and what is wrong with the idea that ordinary percep-
tual experience is committed to naive beliefs about its own
nature in relation to the brain (sect. R6.1). In the target ar-
ticle we took no position on whether perception is “direct,”
but the issue is not nearly as obvious as Revonsuo seems to
think, for it turns on the precise senses given to the terms
“direct” and “indirect,” and on the precise specification of
the items that might or might not mediate perception.
Earle and Tyler raise questions about the relationship
between the perceptual experience of the person and the
ecological, task-based aspect of the personal level. Earle
says that from an ecological, task-based perspective “the
conscious experience of the perceptual world . . . can be re-
garded as epiphenomenal,” and therefore our approach
“reduces the importance of the phenomenological experi-
ence of vision.” He believes that “[t]he phenomenology of
vision may be important in its own right . . . but it has little
to do with current visual science.” Tyler’s assessment of our
task-based approach is similar – he says that we “essentially
assert that perception is the organism interacting with the
environment” – and objects because our “viewpoint does
not encompass the perception that dominates my aware-
ness in everyday life, since it invokes a purely behavioral de-
finition.” Our position, however, is that consciousness can-
not be conceptually severed from the embodied life of the
animal or person embedded in the world. Therefore, to
study the perceptually guided action of the animal is to
study the way in which it is aware of the world (including it-
self ), and hence its sentient or conscious life. This view
hardly treats consciousness as epiphenomenal. Nor does it
reduce seeing to behaving; it simply insists on not separat-
ing perceptual experience from embodied action. Such an
approach does not entail – as Tyler suggests – that “simple
organisms such as amoebae (or even automatic pool clean-
ers)” have perceptual experience, for such organisms or sys-
tems do not (pace Tyler) “show complex interactions that
are superficially indistinguishable from those of humans.”
They are easily distinguishable from those of humans.
Singh & Hoffman and Varela & Vermersch raise gen-
eral questions about methodology at the personal level.
Singh & Hoffman accuse us of not clearly distinguishing be-
tween perception as experienced from the first-person per-
spective and perception as studied from the third-person
perspective of the scientist, and they ask whether we think
the same methodology would apply in both cases. Varela &
Vermersch ask: “How exactly is visual experience at the per-
sonal level to be studied?” They also assert the importance
of disciplined “first-person phenomenological description.”
These important issues go beyond what we can discuss ex-
tensively here, but we do wish to make a few points.
First, we find the dichotomy between first-person and
third-person perspectives problematic. When one is asked
to reflect on and describe one’s visual perceptual experi-
ence, one is being asked, in the first instance, to describe
what one sees, that is, how the world looks, not a private in-
ner sensation or feeling. (One can proceed to describe the
perceptual act itself, but such description needs to proceed
on the basis of the prior account of what one sees.) Fur-
thermore, the descriptions one gives are produced in an in-
tersubjective, linguistic context.10 Therefore, we need to
move beyond first-person versus third-person formula-
tions. Second, we do not find Varela & Vermersch’s anal-
ogy between a knife and its handle useful for conceptualiz-
ing the relation between the subpersonal and personal
levels. Third, unlike Varela & Vermersch, we have no ob-
jection to abstract or imagined cases. As we see it, imagined
cases (both abstract and detailed) have a role to play in 
personal-level investigations. Indeed, a central method-
ological tool of Husserlian phenomenology (which Varela &
Vermersch invoke) is “imaginative variation”: Phenomenol-
ogy is the description not simply of actual experiences, but
of possible, that is, imagined, ones. (This is what makes phe-
nomenology a conceptual project, not simply a descriptive
one.) Dennett’s Marilyn example can be taken in precisely
this spirit; hence their criticism of it is unfair. The example
is designed to make a conceptual point, one that is unaf-
fected by the variations in the perceptual situation they de-
scribe. Finally, although we agree that phenomenological
accounts are needed to complement the natural scientific
study of perception, and that they cannot be reduced to
“heterophenomenology” (see Note 5), we see no reason to
believe that, in the context of visual science, they need to
include every affective detail about how the subject feels in
perceiving the world.
Lomas argues against our statement that visual percep-
tion at the personal level is constrained by norms of ratio-
nality. He cites the Müller-Lyer illusion, which he thinks is
a counterexample, because it persists despite the person’s
belief that it is an illusion. Our point, however, was not that
having a perceptual experience is equivalent to forming a
belief – the so-called belief-theory of perception (Arm-
strong 1968) – but rather that perceptual experience has a
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rational bearing on judgment. How things look to someone
is always relevant to how one ought to judge them as being;
and this remains true even in cases where an illusion per-
sists despite one’s knowledge that it is an illusion. One can-
not have the experience of the lines looking unequal with-
out at least recognizing that the experience raises the
question of whether the corresponding judgment – that the
lines are unequal – is true. To say that perceptual experi-
ence and judgment can diverge and even contradict one an-
other is to say that they can also be in accord, and that is
enough to show the two kinds of content are normatively
linked (see Noë 1995, where this view is first presented and
elaborated).
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NOTES
1. Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed.
2. We think this is the best interpretation of the passage from
Teller and Pugh (1983, p. 581), which we quote in the target arti-
cle. We would like to note, however, that in personal communica-
tion Teller has expressed doubts about this way of stating the
bridge locus concept.
3. Although “locus” can mean any figure made up wholly of
points that satisfy a given condition, rather than a place or local-
ity, we believe that most cognitive neuroscientists conceptualize
the bridge locus in the latter sense of a place or locality in the brain
that is the immediate substrate of perceptual experience. Con-
sider, for example, Crick and Koch’s (1995) well-known view that
the neural correlates of visual awareness have to be located some-
where in groups of cortical neurons that project directly to the
frontal cortex, but not in V1.
4. Pishva claims that the homomorphism concept provides an
alternative explanation for the Cumming & Friend (1980) study
of the blind spot we discussed in section 7.1. He attributes to us
the view that the mechanisms involved in blind spot completion
may be at a higher level than those involved in the tilt aftereffect
being probed. We did not endorse this view, however; we simply
said it was not ruled out by their study. We fail to see the light that
the homomorphism concept sheds on these experiments.
5. The requirement for the integration of contrast information
has been discussed since the classic work of Land and McCann
(1971) and Horn (1974). Recently, Ross and Pessoa (1997) have
argued that previous brightness filling-in models (e.g., Grossberg
& Todorovic´ 1988) need to be extended to handle integration fully.
6. We wish to thank William Ross for conversations that have
shaped the present discussion.
7. For Dennett, the person or animal would seem to be no
more than a logical construct of subpersonal brain states and pro-
cesses, just as the British Empire at the time of the War of 1812
was a logical construct of the King, the Members of Parliament,
various officials and subjects of the Crown, and so on:
Since You are nothing over and above the various subagencies and pro-
cesses in your nervous system that compose you, the following sort of
question is always a trap: “Exactly when did I (as opposed to various
parts of my brain) become informed (aware, conscious) of some event?”
Conscious experience, in our view, is a succession of states constituted
by various processes occurring in the brain and not something over and
above these processes that is caused by them (Dennett & Kinsbourne
1992, p. 236, emphasis in original).
Our view, however, is that the person or animal, although not
something over and above its embodied being in the world (like a
Cartesian Self), cannot be reduced to the various subagencies and
processes of its nervous system (see Chiel & Beer 1997). The per-
son or animal also has a different kind of intelligibility from its ner-
vous system (requires different principles and descriptive vocab-
ularies for its characterization), as Dennett (1987) himself has
discussed, but seems unwilling to acknowledge fully (see Sedivy
1995).
8. Van Gulick thinks the issue here is about the philosophical
doctrine of “phenomenal realism,” which holds that “phenomenal
mental states use a distinctive medium of representation, one that
is often thought of as a plenum, a determinately differentiated
continuous manifold.” As he sees it, “[t]he intent of the Marilyns
case is to call that view into question; there can be no such phe-
nomenal representation because there is no underlying subper-
sonal representation with the detail to support it.” Van Gulick is
certainly right that Dennett criticizes realism about phenomenal
consciousness. Our impression, however, is that Dennett rejects
this doctrine because he thinks there is something “fishy,” ill-
defined, or incoherent about the very concept of phenomenal con-
sciousness. If Van Gulick’s interpretation is right, then Dennett
would seem to be committed to the coherence of the notion of
phenomenal consciousness after all, otherwise there would be no
point to the argument that we lack the subpersonal resources
needed to support that kind of consciousness.
9. In our view, such an account would not be merely “het-
erophenomenological,” that is, it would not take as its data merely
“the manifolds of subjects’ [verbally or behaviorally expressed] be-
liefs about their conscious states” as interpreted from the per-
spective of the scientific observer; it would be phenomenological
in the sense of also including as its data features of the experiences
themselves (for further discussion see Pettitot et al. 1998 and
Thompson et al. 1998).
10. As Varela & Vermersch note, such intersubjective de-
scriptions are not available in the case of animal studies. This fact
points toward an important difference between the animal and
the person, a difference we have had to gloss over in our discus-
sion of the personal level.
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